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1INTRODUCTION
A unitary central government tends to provide uniform public services nationwide,
contrary to subnational governments who are believed to respond better to public preferences.
Therefore, a decentralized government is believed to be able to improve the efficiency of public
service delivery (Musgrave 1973, Oates 1972, 1993).
The ultimate goal of decentralization is efficiency in public service delivery (Oates 1972,
1993, Musgrave 1973), and the motive for most decentralization is public service improvement
(Ahmad et al 2005). For this reason, efforts to improve implementation of decentralization
should put strong emphasis on achieving better public service. The efforts can cover broad and
often interconnected areas, ranging from political, administrative, and fiscal aspect of
decentralization. This research in particular will investigate the area of fiscal decentralization,
especially the management of intergovernmental grants.
In most decentralized countries, the majority of subnational governments’ revenues come
from intergovernmental grants. Depending on issues to be addressed, the design of the grants
may vary, but the objectives are mostly to finance subnational spending and to implement
national priorities (Bergvall et al 2006), in order to achieve the goal for decentralization.
Decentralization in practice does not always deliver the results predicted by theories.
International experiences show that funding from central government to subnational
governments does not always result in improved public service delivery. Problems with
decentralization generally stem from, among others, lack of capacity at subnational
governments to exercise responsibility for public service delivery, misaligned responsibilities
due to incomplete process (possibly for political reason), and political capture within lower tiers
of governments (Ahmad et al 2005).
The challenges of decentralization are complex and intertwined. By itself, no single
solution can response best to the challenges. It is argued that holistic response by people at the
2local level is crucial to address this issue, and incentives are critical to gain positive response.
For this reason, innovative reforms with performance-based grants (PBG) system have been
applied to improve subnational governments’ capacity and performance. Introduced in mid
-nineties in developing and middle-income countries, there is considerable evidence that the
incentives provided through PBG have resulted in genuine improvement in subnational
governments’ performance, especially in core administrative and financial area (UNCDF 2010).
Performance-based incentive is recommended to induce desirable behavior from subnational
government (Lewis and Smoke 2008), to improve administrative performance and service
provision, e.g. through rewarding proper initiatives and penalizing inefficiency (Steffensen
2007), and to improve the quality and responsiveness of subnational government (World Bank
1995).
The idea of PBG is to incorporate incentives into intergovernmental grants by linking
funding with performance or output. This is the main point that differentiates PBG from the
traditional input-based grants. Advocates of PBG argued that this grants can improve the
accountability of grant recipients by tying funds transfer with standard attainment, thus
strengthening the link between input (funds) and performance (standard attainment). As a result,
PBG also promotes accountability by emphasizing result-based, bottom-up, and client driven
approach (Broadway and Shah 2009).
Indonesian governments started the adoption of PBG ideas in intergovernmental grants in
2010. Indonesian PBG became a new addition to input-based grants which had been
implemented since the beginning of decentralization 2001. Having been introduced as pilot
projects, the implementation of PBG to date appears to show promising results. Given the
relatively short period of PBG implementation to date, however, there is no conclusive research
that either support further expansion of PBG or oppose it.
This research tries to fill that void by evaluating the implementation of PBG as a
component of intergovernmental grants in Indonesia and how it affects the accountability in
3public service delivery in decentralization, especially in monopolistic public service which
provision mainly depend on local governments. The evaluation is undertaken to answer the
following questions: (1) Does PBG in Indonesia strengthen the accountability of local
governments in public service delivery? (2) If so, how?, and (3) Is PBG generally applicable to
local governments in Indonesia?
Between 2010 and 2012, Indonesian government has implemented 5 PBG projects, 2
have been completed and 3 are ongoing. This research will use one of the completed projects,
PBG for drinking water, as a case study to observe the impacts of PBG on local governments’
accountability in public services delivery. Drinking water is an example of monopolistic public
services, and the accountability of local governments to deliver this service is crucial for
citizens’ welfare.
The findings of this research are expected to contribute to better understanding of PBG
system in general, and to the effort of Indonesian government to enhance its intergovernmental
grants system to further the objective of its decentralization, especially regarding the
implementation of PBG.
Research keywords: performance-based grants, incentives, accountability, decentralization,
intergovernmental grants, developing countries, performance.
4CHAPTER I
RESEARCH BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES, AND ORGANIZATION
Indonesia used to be a centralized country. Since January 1, 2001, Indonesian central
government, triggered by monetary crises and political transition, officially implements
decentralization policy. The decentralization changes the roles of both central and subnational
government (i.e. provincial and local governments) in Indonesia. Not only that, decentralization
also brings significant difference in various areas, such as power sharing, functions sharing, and
resources allocation between central government and subnational governments, especially local
governments which under decentralization received the devolution of public service functions.
Because of the variations in geographical characteristics, natural resources, cultural
heritages, and other local potentials, local governments have different capacity to deliver public
services. To provide local governments with necessary resources to exercise the function,
central government provides funding in the form of intergovernmental grants to local
governments. The grants are the embodiment of intergovernmental financial relation between
central government and local governments in the implementation decentralization, where
subnational governments have the autonomy to manage their budget according to local
priorities.
More than a decade into the decentralization, Indonesia consistently uses the traditional
input-based approach to its intergovernmental grants. In 2010, in addition to the existing grants,
Indonesia begins to implement the performance-based grants (PBG). The adoption of PBG into
Indonesian intergovernmental grants raises an interest of whether this grant should be
implemented in greater scale in the future. The decision of this matter needs to take many
different aspects into consideration; however given only the short period that has been elapsed,
research on PBG implementation in Indonesia, both to support or to oppose the expansion of
PBG implementation, is relatively few.
5This research tries to evaluate the implementation of PBG as a part of intergovernmental
grants in Indonesia and how it affects the accountability in public service delivery in
decentralization, especially in monopolistic public service which provision mainly depend local
governments. In this chapter, the background of the research is discussed. The discussion
includes the situation that initiates the research, the significance and objectives of the research,
research questions, methodology, and chapter plan.
1.1. PBG: Introducing Incentives in Intergovernmental Grants
Since the beginning of the decentralization implementation, a considerable portion of
national budget has been dedicated to intergovernmental grants. According to Indonesian
decentralization laws (Law No. 32/2004 and No. 33/2004), at least 26% of net domestic revenue
established in national budget is to be allocated as intergovernmental grants.
There are several components in Indonesian intergovernmental grants; each has the
characteristics of either general/unconditional grants or specific/conditional grants. For most
subnational governments, intergovernmental grants are the main source of revenues in their
budgets. Based on the data of Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat
Statistik/BPS), from 2007 to 2010, the grants make up to more than 80% of local revenues. In
2010, adding to the existing intergovernmental transfers, Indonesian government started to
adopt the performance-based grants (PBG) system in its intergovernmental grants.
PBG was first implemented in 1997, with Uganda as a pilot project (Boschmann 2008). It
is a type of grants that provides incentives to its recipients by encouraging them to accomplish a
specific task by focusing on performance, and transfers the funds only if certain performance
standards are satisfied. With this feature, capacity and accountability are expected to improve,
along with public service quality (UNCDF 2010). As an intergovernmental grant, the design of
PBG differs across country (Bergvall et al 2006, Steffensen 2007), depending, among others,
culture, governments structures, and mandatory functions (Steffensen 2007). Despite the
6difference in the detailed arrangement, PBG essentially keeps its main principle of linking
incentives, performance, and funding.
Incorporating incentives for performance is the main and innovative feature that
differentiates PBG from the traditional input-based grants, which provide funding prior to the
implementation of a task. The feature is expected to encourage subnational governments to
support national priority programs and to promote accountability culture, especially in targeting
areas with greatest needs (Tremolet and Evans 2010).
The PBG in Indonesia is basically specific or conditional grants, which transfer can only
be made after certain standard is reached. The idea is consistent with the main idea of PBG in
general which, according to Steffensen and Larsen (2005), is to link incentives, performance,
and funding to motivate subnational governments to demonstrate desirable behavior, e.g.
improving specific public services, participating in a national priority program, reforming local
bureaucracy, and involving more public participation in policy making.
A case study in drinking water PBG in Indonesia will be used in this research. The results
of the evaluation are expected to contribute to the consideration of whether PBG has the
potential to be implemented in greater scale in the future, and which aspects of that calls central
government’s attention in order to improve PBG implementation, provided such system is to be
continued.
1.2. The Significance and Objectives of the Research
Aiming at the improvement of public service delivery, sectors targeted by PBG are also
targeted by other type of intergovernmental grants in Indonesia. To date, central government
keeps providing funds to subnational governments (especially local governments) in the form of
PBG and other grants as well. The drinking water sector, for example, receives
intergovernmental grants in the form of PBG and DAK, other type of conditional grants. Given
the similar targeted sectors, the implementation of PBG raised interests of the importance of
7implementing PBG, why it is necessary and what impacts it has on intergovernmental grants
management and finally on public service delivery.
Only a short period has elapsed since PBG was first implemented in 2010. There is gap in
the discussion of the implementation of PBG in Indonesian intergovernmental grants; most
available studies focus on either the existing intergovernmental grants or PBG, but not both.
This research tries to highlight how PBG is different from the existing intergovernmental grants
and what limitation is there in the existing grants that call for the needs and desirability of
introducing PBG system. The research argues that existing grants have limitation in addressing
public service and thus there’s a need for an innovative approach to improve the situation. This
is the first reason for conducting the research.
Second, in intergovernmental grants, there’s also an accountability issue to be concerned.
In decentralization, efficiency in public services is achieved assuming local governments have
better knowledge about local preferences (Musgrave 1973, Oates 1972, 1993).  Recent studies
argued that, in addition to that knowledge, local governments also need to be accountable to
citizens (Broadway and Shah 2007). Traditional input-based grants, however, have been argued
to have significant limitation that compromises accountability, such as controls on inputs and
process with little or no concern for results (Broadway and Shah 2009). Despite the said
limitation, until 2010 input-based grants are the only approach used by Indonesian government
in its intergovernmental grants. Literatures on PBG suggest that as intergovernmental grants,
PBG promotes accountability between citizens and government (Steffensen and Larsen 2005,
UNCDF 2010) and between levels of government in bottom-up and top-down approach
(Steffensen and Larsen 2005). In light of this, the research evaluates whether PBG
implementation in Indonesia in fact results in improved accountability.
The World Bank (2004) in its World Development Report 2004 argued that the
accountability relationships involve all actors in public services, which include citizens,
governments, and service providers. The report also suggests that in public services, where
8service providers are generally monopolistic, accountability is enforced through a long route:
citizens hold service providers accountable by holding the government accountable.
Monopolistic public services are different from public services in competitive markets, in which
short route of accountability applies, and citizens are unlikely to hold providers directly. Similar
finding is also reported by Meijer and Schillermans (2009), who found that citizens usually do
not hold the providers directly accountable for public services. In their findings, one of the
conclusions is that the accountability of providers is not the result of the citizens’ actually
holding them responsible, but the result of providers’ own anticipation of the potential of being
hold responsible by citizens.
Using drinking water service as a case study, this research in addition tries to confirm, by
analyzing how PBG for drinking water impacts accountability, whether the above arguments on
the long route of accountability have validity.
Third, PBG is relatively a new system in Indonesia, compared to other intergovernmental
grants, and however effective it is in light of accountability and performance, there is question
of whether and how it can be broadly expanded and smoothly accepted to different public
services of different subnational governments. One of the crucial questions here is how the
recipient local governments perceive PBG relative to other intergovernmental grants, but study
on the subject is rare. The research tries to shed light on the subject by investigating how the
local governments respond to the implementation of PBG, in comparison with other
intergovernmental grants, focusing on the factors that make PBG more or less attractive
compared to other conditional grants.
The research is conducted in the context of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia, within the
frameworks of intergovernmental grants, assuming current system, laws, and regulation on
fiscal decentralization are continued to put into practice. The objectives of the research are as
follows:
9a. Evaluating the implementation of existing Indonesian intergovernmental grants, identifying
the limitation, and evaluating the role of PBG in intergovernmental grants system.
b. Using drinking water service as a case study, evaluating how PBG impacts accountability of
local governments in public service.
c. Investigating the responses of local governments to the implementation of PBG.
1.3. Research Question
With the implementation of decentralization, indicators for government effectiveness and
democracy in Indonesia show promising results. According to the World Bank, Indonesian
governance indicators, including voice and accountability and government effectiveness, have
improved from 2000 to 2010.1 Improved democracy also has impact on local governments’
budget decision. Skoufias et al (2011) find that in Indonesian regions where direct elections are
imminent, local governments tend to have higher current expenditures on public works.
But are higher expenditures on public works equal improved public service delivery
performance? Experience has shown that there is no one-to-one link between increase in public
spending and improvement in public service delivery performance (Huther et al 1997). However,
this does not necessarily mean that increasing financial support for public service is useless.
Providing financial support for improving public service is crucial; in fact an important way to
communicate accountability is through the provision of financial resources, the so-called
financial accountability (Glynn 1993). In this regard, increasing financial support should not be
seen merely as increasing the amount of funds. A mechanism to ensure accountability in
utilizing the funds needs to be put in place, as well as incentives to encourage accountable
behavior of funds recipient.
This is a thought to consider in intergovernmental grants. Traditionally,
intergovernmental grants are input-based which provides little incentives for performance and
1 Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp
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accountability. Recently in Indonesia, effort to change this situation has been taken by
introducing PBG, in addition to the existing intergovernmental grants – all of them are
input-based. Previous research highlight the findings that the incentives feature in PBG has
positive impacts on encouraging desirable behavior, including accountability if this is the
desired condition to achieve.
This research aims to confirm whether the results of PBG implementation in Indonesia
are consistent with previous research. The research focuses on the incentives feature of PBG
and accountability, and posing these research questions:
(1) Does PBG in Indonesia strengthen the accountability of local governments in public service
delivery?
(2) If so, how does PBG strengthen the accountability?
(3) Is PBG generally applicable to local governments in Indonesia?
To answer the research questions, the research uses a conceptual framework developed
from the accountability relationships framework introduced by the World Bank (2004). The
framework explains the accountability relationships between three actors in in monopolistic
public services: citizens (as clients), governments (as policy makers), and service providers. to
evaluate the case study. A case study of PBG for drinking water in Indonesia is selected to
evaluate the impacts of PBG on accountability in public services delivery. The case is selected
because (1) drinking water is a monopolistic public service, which enables evaluation based on
theoretical framework, and (2) drinking water is essential since it is one of human basic needs,
but the drinking water service has decreasing performance. This raises interest of why this
condition exists despite the national policy that puts drinking water as a priority. The two
reasons above make drinking water sector an ideal case study, since the research can observe
how the incentives feature in PBG work and whether there’s a difference between the condition
before and after PBG implementation.
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1.4. Methodology
The research uses the following methodology:
a. Library research
Library research aims at collecting and summarizing academic reviews, theories, and
ideas on intergovernmental transfers in the context of decentralization, evaluating the
designs, implementation, and assessments of PBG by previous research. Library
research targets on collecting raw data for analysis.
b. Questionnaire
Questionnaire to local government officials aims at investigating the response of PBG
recipients. From the questionnaire, the research tries to observe whether PBG is
supported by local governments, and whether they can adapt well to the new system.
The questionnaire also tries to gather information about the advantages and
disadvantages of PBG implementation from grants recipients’ viewpoint.
c. Interviews
Interviews with Indonesian central government officials aim at collecting first-hand
information on how current systems are implemented and the expectations on
improvements. Interviews also seek information about the implementation of PBG,
expectations on PBG, and deficiencies to be addressed in the implementation of PBG
and other intergovernmental grants.
1.5. Data collection
The methods used to collect research data are as follows:
a. Library research
Data related to Indonesian government affairs are obtained from Indonesian Ministry of
Finance, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of National
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Development Planning, and Central Bureau of Statistics. Other data are obtained from
publication by Indonesian development partners. The findings of previous research in
relevant fields are obtained from academic journal, reference books, and publications by
international institutions and government agencies.
b. Questionnaire
Questionnaire is distributed to 35 local governments (cities and regencies) who received
drinking water PBG in 2010 and 2011. Of the 35 subnational governments, 17 responded.
The distribution on questionnaire is conducted from February to March 2012.
c. Interviews
Interviews were conducted in March 2012. Interviewees are officials from the Ministry of
Finance, the Ministry of Public Works, and AusAID as the donor who sponsored PBG for
drinking water.
1.6. Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of these following chapters:
a. Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter describes research background, research significance and objectives,
research questions, methodology, data collection, and organization of the thesis.
b. Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter reviews theoretical background and previous research in decentralization,
intergovernmental grants, incentives, accountability, and PBG. Several countries’
experiences with PBG implementation are also presented.
c. Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis
This chapter explains research conceptual frameworks, the basis for developing the
framework, and research hypothesis.
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d. Chapter 4: Decentralization in Indonesia
This chapter describes the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia, how the
functions are divided between central government and local governments, how the
resources are shared, and how intergovernmental grants operate in the decentralization
scheme.
e. Chapter 5: Evaluation of Indonesian Intergovernmental Grants
This chapter analyzes the implementation of intergovernmental grants in Indonesia,
focusing on balancing funds, the most significant component in intergovernmental
grants, and the newly-introduced PBG. The analysis aims at identifying the limitation
of intergovernmental grants, what areas that needs improvements, and how PBG can
contribute to improve the intergovernmental grants system.
f. Chapter 6: Case Study – PBG for Drinking Water
This chapter analyzes the case study to find the answer to the research questions
mentioned earlier in this chapter. The analysis focuses on the implementation of PBG
for drinking water in Indonesia, how it works, and whether it has impacts on local
governments’ accountability in drinking water service, and how it can has such impacts.
In this chapter, the result of the survey to investigate local governments’ responses on
PBG implementation is also presented.
g. Chapter 7: Conclusion
This chapter describes the answers to research questions, summarizes research findings,
and proposing recommendation on future PBG implementation.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEWS
This chapter reviews theories and previous researches in decentralization and
intergovernmental grants. The focuses of the discussion are (1) decentralization, (2)
intergovernmental grants to provide the funding of decentralization, and (3) performance –based
grants (PBG) as an option to incorporate incentives in intergovernmental grants and to improve
accountability relationship in public service delivery.
The purpose of the reviews is to clarify the concepts of decentralization and
intergovernmental grants according to theories and previous research, and to explain how the
concepts connect to PBG in particular. This chapter will also identify the areas which previous
research have not sufficiently covered, and describe in what way this research can contribute to
fill the gap.
2.1. The Meaning of Decentralization
There are several factors that trigger decentralization. A country can decentralize to
maintain the national unity in the presence of separatism risk, to accommodate the transition
from less democratic to more democratic government, and to respond to financial crisis
(Wallace and Bahl 2005). In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, it was part of the
political and economic transformation; in Latin America, it was to reinforce the transition to
democracy; in South Africa, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, it was a response to ethnic or regional
conflict; and in Chile, Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire, it was to improve the delivery of basic
services (Shah and Thompson 2004).
Despite the reasons, decentralization arguably contributes to the improvement of public
services performance, because it increases the efficiency, responsiveness, and accountability of
government. A unitary central government tends to provide uniform public services nationwide,
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contrary to subnational governments who are believed to respond better to public preferences
(Musgrave 1973, Oates 1972, 1993).
In a broad sense, decentralization can include government and non-government.
Rondinelli and Nellis (1986) defined decentralization as the transfer of responsibility for
planning, management, raising and allocation of resources from central government to (1) field
units of central government, (2) subordinate unit or lower level of governments, (3) semi
-autonomous public authorities or corporation, (4) area wide regional or functional authorities,
or (5) non-government private or voluntary organizations.
In a limited scope that only include government entities, decentralization can also be
broadly defined as the shifting of responsibilities between tiers of government by several fiscal,
political, and administrative instruments (Asfaw et al 2007); the restructuring or reorganization
of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at
the central, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity, thus increasing
the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance, while increasing the authority
and capacities of sub-national levels (UNDP 1997).
Decentralization has 3 dimensions: political, administrative, and fiscal dimension.
Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) argued that the processes of decentralization includes the
varying degrees of transfers of powers (political decentralization), the transfer of resources to
subnational tiers of government (fiscal decentralization), and the granting of autonomy to
subnational entities relative to central government (administrative decentralization). The
dimensions of decentralization– political, administrative, and fiscal –interact with each other.
An increase in a decentralization dimension can lead to an increase in other dimension.
Alternatively, the increase can lead to a decrease in other dimension. For example, fiscal
decentralization might generate greater administrative decentralization if local units used
increased resources to assert administrative autonomy from the center. On the other hand, fiscal
decentralization might lead to less administrative decentralization if central governments
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systematically counteracted the release of resources with an increase in bureaucratic or
regulatory controls (Schneider 2003).
Political decentralization refers to the degrees to which central government allow
subnational government entities to undertake the political functions of governance (Schneider
2003). Political decentralization can also refer to representative governments, and can support
democracy by increasing the influence of citizens or their representatives in the formulation and
implementation of policies. The World Bank argues that in political decentralization, citizens
or their elected representatives have more power in public decision making. The policy made
under this greater influence is assumed to be more relevant to the needs of local citizens,
compared to the decision made only by central authorities, because the selection of
representatives from local electoral jurisdictions allows citizens to know better their political
representatives and allows elected officials to know better the needs, desires, and interests of
their constituents.2
Rondinelli (1990) mentioned that administrative decentralization could be distinguished
by the degree of authority and power, or the scope of functions, which the government of a
sovereign state transfers to or shares with other organizations within its jurisdiction. Based on
this, he categorized administrative decentralization into 4 types: deconcentration, delegation,
devolution, and transfer to non-government organizations, each is briefly described as follows:
- Deconcentration is the transfer of power and functions to field agencies or local
administrative offices of central government.
- Delegation is the transfer of power and functions from central government to parastatal
offices (owned or controlled partly or wholly by the central government).
- Devolution is the transfer of power and functions from central government to subnational
governments.
2Source: The World Bank (http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/political.htm).
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- Transfer to non-government organizations (also commonly known as privatization) is the
transfer of power and functions to entities that are not part of government institutions.
Devolution is the type of decentralization that best captures the essence of function,
power, and resource sharing, because in devolution such transfers occur between two
government entities: central government and subnational governments, each with its
responsibilities (Rondinelli 1990). Similarly, Pollit (1998) argued that devolution is the
strongest form of decentralization, as each is a separate legal entity, and therefore the transfer is
usually difficult to reverse.
The devolution of public functions refers to the function sharing, the political and
administrative authority refers to the power sharing, and fiscal instruments refer to the resource
sharing (Pollitt et al 1998). The resource sharing involves the transfer of funds to finance the
implementation of devolved functions, commonly known as intergovernmental grants and
mostly discussed under fiscal decentralization.
2.2. Fiscal decentralization
Fiscal decentralization is another dimension of decentralization. Subnational governments,
regardless of the political or constitutional definition of the nations, are almost never
self-sufficient financially, because their ability to generate revenues falls short of their
expenditure responsibilities. This makes them depends on financial transfers from central
government (Broadway and Shah, 2007).
The definition of fiscal decentralization itself evolves as more researches are conducted
and new evidences emerge from its implementation. To this extent, fiscal decentralization has
been defined and redefined, reflecting the dynamic of researches in this area. Some definition of
fiscal decentralization are: the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from
the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent organizations or the private sector
(Litvack and Seddon 1999), the devolution of power and responsibilities of national (central),
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government towards sub-national (local) governments (Neyapti 2005), and the empowerment of
people by the (fiscal) empowerment of their local governments (Bahl 2005).
In the definitions above, there are some elements that present in fiscal decentralization:
the transfer of public services functions from the higher level to lower level of governments,
accompanied by authority and resources to exercise the functions. With regard to this, the
working definition of fiscal decentralization in this dissertation is “the devolution of public
functions from central government to subnational government with the administrative authority
and fiscal instruments to execute such functions” .
Steffenson (2010) mentioned that fiscal decentralization has 3 objectives:
- Improved efficiency: by strengthening the links between the mix of services with the citizens’
demand and needs, being closer and more responsive to the local preference (matching of
local preferences);
- Improved financial accountability by bringing the government and decisions closer to the
people in terms of options for voice, influence, information exchange, control and
monitoring etc., and
- Improved effectiveness: by improving the likelihood of strengthening of competition in
public services provision, mobilizing citizens’ contribution, innovation, etc.
Traditionally, there are four pillars in fiscal decentralization: the assignment of
expenditure responsibilities, the assignment of revenue and its local administration, the
subnational borrowing and debt, and the design and provision of intergovernmental grants. How
the pillars are managed highly depends on the choice a country makes regarding its
decentralization implementation, such as what functions to decentralize, how to decentralize and
to what extent.
Oates (1999) mentioned that the basic issue of the arrangement between levels of
government is aligning responsibilities and fiscal instruments at the proper government level.
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Thus, it is important to understand which functions and instruments are best centralized, and
which are best decentralized. Understanding this will help in exploring the roles of the different
levels of government and the ways in which they relate to one another. This is also the subject
matters of fiscal federalism.
2.3. Fiscal Federalism Theory
It should be noted that the use of the word ‘federalism’ in fiscal federalism is different
from its standard use in political context, in which federalism is associated with a political
concept in which a group of members are bound together by covenant with a governing
representative head. As a normative concept, federalism is the advocacy of a pragmatic
balancing of citizen preferences for (1) joint action for certain purposes, and (2)
self-government of the constituent units for other purposes (Ahmad 2010). In political context,
federalism is a system based upon democratic rules and institutions in which the power to
govern is shared between national and provincial/state governments, creating what is often
called a federation.
The word ‘federalism’ in fiscal federalism context does not refer to a specific form of
government, neither does it imply that a government should be federal to apply the principles it
offered. However, because of the difference in the political context, legislation, and fiscal
principles resulting from different forms of government (e.g. whether it is unitary or federal),
the application of fiscal federalism principles obviously provide different opportunities and
results.
Fiscal federalism is most often used in the earlier studies on the fiscal relation between
multi-tier governments, most notably in the works of Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972, 1993).
It is not to be confused with fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization is highly related to
fiscal federalism. Generally speaking, the concept introduced by fiscal federalism is put into
practice by fiscal decentralization. Sharma (2005) clarified that fiscal federalism constitutes a
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set of guiding principles, a guiding concept that helps in designing financial relations between
the national and subnational levels of the government. Fiscal decentralization, on the other hand,
is a process of applying the principles of fiscal federalism. Boschmann (2008) referred to fiscal
federalism as the structure of financial and broader relationships between central and
subordinate levels of government. The process of altering the structure of fiscal federalism by
devolving powers to lower levels of government is generally known as fiscal decentralization.
Essentially, fiscal federalism is a state of affairs, whereas fiscal decentralization is a specific
process meant to alter that state of affairs.
Over the years, major theories of fiscal federalism have shifted from an economic
efficiency-oriented focus to a broader focus involving social and political factors. The first
generation theory (FGT) is largely normative and focused on maximizing social welfare. The
second generation theory (SGT) is built on FGT, but assumes that political factors (e.g. the
motivation of voters and public officials) can come into conflict with social welfare
maximization.
2.3.1. First Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
The first generation theory of fiscal federalism (FGT) put more focus on the economic
efficiency of decentralization. For this reason, Musgrave (1973) pointed out that public services
should be provided and their costs shared in line with the preferences of the residents of the
relevant benefit region, and that particular services should be voted on and paid for by the
residents of this region. In other words, services with nationwide benefits (e.g. national defense)
should be provided by the central government, while those with local benefits (e.g. clean water)
should be provided by subnational governments.
Oates (1972) argued that given the required condition, it is always efficient for
subnational governments to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective
regions, compared to the central government. Physical proximity between subnational
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governments and local residents is the main argument that subnational governments are more
aware about the residents’ preferences and local conditions. The concept is summarized in his
classic Decentralization Theorem (Oates 1972:35):
“For a public good the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets of
the total population, and for which the costs of providing each level of output of the good in
each jurisdiction are the same for the central or the respective local government–it will always
be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local government to provide Pareto-efficient levels
of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any
specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions.”
In FGT, Musgrave and Oates based their assumption on efficiency grounds, assuming
public decision makers are benevolent and act solely on the consideration of maximizing social
welfare. To achieve this, government must perform the three functions of the public sector:
ensuring efficient use of resources, establishing equitable distribution of income, and
maintaining the economy at high levels of employment with reasonable price stability (Oates
1972, 1993)–the three functions are commonly summarized as allocation, distribution, and
stabilization.
In the implementation of decentralization, it is crucial that all jurisdictions can
exercise their fair share in maximizing social welfare. Taking this point and the public sector
functions into account, FGT puts emphasis on correcting the so-called horizontal and vertical
inequality. Attempts to correct this lead to the employment of intergovernmental grants, in
which higher levels of governments provide funds to lower levels of governments.
2.3.2. Second Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
The second generation theory of fiscal federalism (SGT), in addition to economic
perspectives, includes other factors such as social and political condition in understanding
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decentralization. It is based on first-generation fiscal federalism but assumes that public officials
have goals induced by political institutions that often systematically diverge from maximizing
the welfare of the residents. Oates (2005) summarized that the second generation of fiscal
federalism examines the workings of different political and fiscal institutions in a setting of
imperfect information and control, with a basic focus on the incentives that these institutions
embody and the resulting behavior they induce from utility-maximizing participants.
SGT departs from the assumptions that participants may have other objectives to
maximize, and this can influence the outcome of decentralization through political process. This
makes political process and decentralization inseparable. Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) argued
that, in addition to the efficiency reason (on which FGT is based), political participation is also
among the reasons to consider in the concept of fiscal federalism. For example, the ability of
governments to provide public service efficiently may depend crucially on how representatives
are selected in the national legislature. Locally chosen representatives may place parochial
interests above collective interests in efficient public services. Therefore, the implementation of
fiscal federalism necessarily carries with it a balancing of economic efficiency, political
participation, and protection of individual rights and liberties.
There is an important point that can be highlighted in the rising of SGT: the presence
of incentives can drive away participants involved from the ideal goal of welfare maximization.
For this reason, SGT puts emphasis on the importance of fiscal incentives in achieving welfare
maximization.
Based on the literature, public service delivery is upheld in FGT and SGT. SGT,
however, provides new insights into the principle of fiscal federalism introduced in FGT (Oates
2005). This is not to say that FGT is less important than SGT or vice versa, or that both
generations compete with each other. Weingast (2009) pointed out that FGT and SGT are
complementary. FGT studies the optimal design of fiscal institutions in the context of welfare
maximization without respect to incentives, while SGT extends FGT lessons to the context of
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incentives and self-interested political officials.
SGT inspires a new approach in designing decentralization and its instruments, given
the more realistic environment where political motives and incentives are inseparable from the
decision making process. This condition can also extend to the implementation of
intergovernmental grants.
2.4. Intergovernmental Grants
With decentralization, most public service functions are devolved to subnational
governments. This requires additional funding. While some subnational governments do not
encounter significant problems in generating the funds by themselves, some others may find it
impossible to do so. In fact, most subnational governments are almost never self-sufficient
financially, because their ability to generate revenues falls short of their expenditure
responsibilities. This makes them depend on financial transfers from the central government
(Broadway and Shah, 2007), commonly known as intergovernmental grants or
intergovernmental transfers.
Intergovernmental grants are one of fiscal decentralization’s pillars. The grants cover a
broad range of who gives and receives the grants and what to give as grants. Essentially,
intergovernmental grants can be given by central governments to subnational governments, by
subnational governments to the central government, and by one subnational government to
another subnational government. What to give as grants can also take various forms: cash,
goods (both perishable and non-perishable), capital (such as buildings and vehicles), and
services (such as training and technical assistance). Despite this broad range, intergovernmental
grants most commonly discussed in literature are cash grants from a higher level of government
(central government) to a lower level of government (subnational government). Since cash
grants are involved in the majority of discussions, some literature uses the terminology of
“intergovernmental grants” interchangeably with “intergovernmental transfers”.
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2.4.1. Definition of Intergovernmental Grants
Bahl and Wallace (2007) defined intergovernmental grants as “a grant of funds from
the government that raised the funds, to another level of government”. This definition
essentially has captured the substance of intergovernmental grants. It should be noted too,
however, that in line with the principles of “money follows functions” in fiscal decentralization,
the grants of funds should be administered in a way that foster the accountability of all levels of
governments involved.
In various forms and for various reasons, central government provides funds to
subnational government. But not all of these funds can be classified as intergovernmental grants.
Depending on who uses the funds and whose functions are funded, the grants of funds may, or
may not, be classified as intergovernmental grants. For the funds to be qualified as
intergovernmental grants, the funds recipient must have administrative authority over the
funded function.
This issue is especially relevant when we consider the level of decentralization
involved, as categorized by Rondinelli (1990). In deconcentration, the power and functions shift
within the central government administration (i.e. a line ministry and its branch offices).
Therefore, the funds involved only revolve within the central government budget as well. In this
case, there are no intergovernmental grants involved. The same case also applies to privatization,
in which the funds are transferred to non-governments.
The thin line of the relevance of intergovernmental transfers exists in delegation. In
delegation, transfers of power and functions occur to parastatal. Parastatal, according to Oxford
Dictionary of English, is “organization having some political authority and serving the state
indirectly”. In this context and from the viewpoint of the central government, parastatal may
take the form of a subnational government office (which has some political authority in its
jurisdiction) receiving assignment from the related line ministry, to execute the ministry’s
program on its behalf (thus serving the central government indirectly).
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Delegation occurs when, for example, the ministry of public works (central
government) assigns local public works department (subnational government) to do the
maintenance of interstate highway. Interstate highway is the responsibility of the central
government, however for efficiency reason the maintenance may be best delegated to
subnational government. In this case, the funds for maintenance are provided by the central
government to subnational governments. The funds, however, cannot be considered as funding
subnational governments’ functions. This is because the function funded belongs to the central
government; subnational government has no administrative authority for the function, it only
receives an assignment to execute the central government’s function on central government’s
behalf as an agent. As Bird (2000) clarified, this is a top-down approach, in which the focus of
evaluation is how well subnational governments serve the central government’s policy
objectives.
In a fiscal decentralization context, the grants of funds can only be considered as
intergovernmental grants in devolution setting. In devolution, the transfers of power and
functions from the central government to subnational governments, which are separate entities,
are followed by administrative authority. With this, there is a link between the funds and the
functions; an application of “money follows functions” principle. Most importantly, local
autonomy prevails in this case. It is a crucial point since it also clarifies that subnational
governments are to be accountable for the management of the funds, including planning the
utilization, implementing the plan, and reporting the implementation. Bird (2000) called this a
bottom-up approach, which focus is on improved governance and allocative efficiency.
The approach is most relevant to a country’s situation, which influences the design of
its intergovernmental grants. In this thesis, the approach considered most relevant to
intergovernmental grants is the bottom-up approach for 2 reasons: first, bottom-up approach
provides funding to execute subnational functions, and second, it preserves local autonomy.
Taking all these points into account, the working definition of intergovernmental grants in this
26
thesis is “grants of funds from central government to subnational governments managed in
fiscal decentralization scheme to implement the functions devolved under decentralization” .
2.4.2. Classification of Intergovernmental Grants
The classification of intergovernmental grants can be based on several viewpoints.
Tidemand et al. (2003) classified intergovernmental grants based on orientation
(development-oriented and non-development oriented), and durability (capital grants and
recurrent grants). Broadway and Shah (2009) suggest classifications that include matching
grants (require grant recipients to provide counterpart funds) and non-matching grants (no
counterpart funds required); closed-ended (grantor put a ceiling on the maximum amount of
grants) and open-ended (unrestricted amount).
Many literatures classify intergovernmental grants as conditional grants and
unconditional grants (Musgrave 1973, Oates 1972, 1993, Shah 2007, Broadway and Shah 2009,
Steffensen 2007). Unconditional grants are often referred to as general-purpose grants,
non-specific grants, block grants, or general grants; while conditional grants can also be referred
to as specific grants, earmarked grants, categorical grants, restrictive grants, or selective grants.
Musgrave (1973), Broadway and Shah (2009), and Steffensen (2010) argued that each type of
grant can respond best to a specific issue.
a. Unconditional grants.
Unconditional grants are provided as general budget support with no strings attached,
and are intended to preserve local autonomy and enhance inter-jurisdictional equity. These
grants are typically mandated by law, but occasionally they may be of an ad hoc or
discretionary nature. They simply augment the recipient’s resources (Broadway and Shah
2009).
Because of the inequality in fiscal capacity, it is impossible for all subnational
governments to provide comparable level of public services at comparable tax rates
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(Broadway 2007). In this case, unconditional grants can be an attempt to equalize the
potential of subnational governments to provide comparable level of public services at
comparable tax rates. Unconditional grants mainly focus on equalization, bridging
inequality, contributing to subnational funding (Steffensen 2010), and avoiding distortions
and efficiency costs which arise from tax structure differentials among subnational
governments (Musgrave 1973).
For equalization objectives, unconditional grants can reduce the gap between
subnational governments’ fiscal capacities, and as a consequence provide a stronger fiscal
base for subnational governments to provide public services of a certain standard. From a
theoretical point of view, this will enable citizens to have access to public services of the
same quality regardless of their domicile. Unconditional grants also arguably enhance the
welfare of local residents and preserve local autonomy (Broadway and Shah 2009),
because they simply augment the budget resources of the recipient without imposing any
conditions on how to spend them. Unconditional grants are considered most suitable when
local autonomy is the main concern.
b. Conditional grants
Conditional grants are intended to encourage subnational governments to undertake
specific programs or activities. These grants may be regular, mandatory, discretionary, or
ad hoc. Conditional grants typically specify the type of expenditures that can be financed
(input-based conditionality), but they can also require attainment of certain results of
service delivery (output-based conditionality). Conditional grants may or may not
incorporate matching provisions – known as conditional matching grants and conditional
non-matching grants (Broadway and Shah 2009).
Conditional grants work most effectively to subsidize, providing subnational
governments for spillover and externalities (Musgrave 1973, Steffensen 2010, Broadway
and Shah 2009). They also encourage subnational governments to undertake specific
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activities and to influence local priorities, especially in sectors considered as low priority
locally, but high priority nationally (Steffensen 2007). In addition, conditional grants are
useful to stimulate behavioral changes, to promote adoption to reform, to encourage
cooperation from subnational governments (Lewis and Smoke, 2008), to achieve national
minimum standard for public services, to harmonize central and local policies (Broadway
2007, Slack 2009), and to encourage additional resources allocation from subnational
governments in expectation that eventually it will replace the central government’s
allocation (Broadway and Hobson, 2003).
The grants are also useful to induce subnational governments to increase spending on
the assisted functions, particularly when a line ministry within the central government
wants to ensure that the recipient local governments spend the funds in the ministry’s area
of interest (e.g. health, education, sanitation, etc) without distorting local priorities among
alternative activities (Broadway and Shah 2009). The degree of the central government’s
influence can be further modified by matching or non-matching and/or closed-ended or
open-ended requirements, and by input or output/performance-based approach.
2.5. Accountability in Public Services Delivery
Accountability is a widely used term, but it is rather complex (Mulgan 2000) and not
always clear (Schedler 1999). General definitions of accountability include the obligation of
actors to provide information about, and/or justification for, their actions to other actors, along
with the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply and/or to engage in appropriate action
(Brinkerhoff 2004).  Cohen and Peterson (1997) described accountability as holding public
servants responsible for outcome, efficiency as positive relationship of resource outputs and
inputs, and effectiveness as a measure of the appropriateness of output. At a basic level of
analysis, many authors agree upon a minimal definition: accountability is an interactive
communication between accountor and accountee, in which the former’s behavior is evaluated
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and judged by the latter, in light of possible consequences (Schillemans 2008, Meijer and
Schillemans 2009).
Accountability implies that an agent explains and justifies his behavior towards a
significant other. Here the agent is an actor in the accountability process. Accountability as it is
understood here, refers to the processes by which actors provide reasons for their actions and the
mechanisms that are designed to ensure these processes (Meijer and Schillemans 2009). Pollitt
et al. (1998) mentioned that accountability refers to a relationship in which one party (the
accountor) is obliged to render some account of his or her actions (or the actions of a particular
organization) to another party (the accountee). Glynn (1993) summarized that accountability is
all about responsibility relationship, both externally and internally. An important way to
communicate accountability is through the provision of financial and related information, the
so-called financial accountability.
In line with Glynn (1993), the World Bank (2004) also views accountability as a
responsibility relationship. In its World Development Report 2004, the World Bank defined
accountability as “set of relationships among service delivery actors with 5 features: delegating
(explicit or implicit understanding that a service will be supplied), financing (providing the
resources to enable the service to be provided or paying for it), performing (supplying the
actual service), having information about performance (obtaining relevant information and
evaluating performance against expectations and formal or informal norms), and enforcing
(being able to impose sanctions for inappropriate performance or provide rewards when
performance is appropriate)” (World Development Report 2004, p. 48). This definition of
accountability is used in this research.
Glynn (1993) mentioned that in public sector, accountability means that those who are
charged with drafting and/or carrying out policy should be obliged to give explanation of their
actions to their electorate -- the electorate being a composite group that includes clients,
employees, and taxpayers. A public agent like subnational governments, however, can only be
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held accountable under certain conditions. Khemani (2005) argued that a public agent can be
held accountable for a particular aspect of service delivery if: (1) the agent assumes and is
assigned responsibility for that aspect of service delivery; (2) the agent has some minimum
resources and capacity for that aspect of service delivery; and (3) the agent actually undertakes
appropriate actions towards service delivery, given resource and capacity constraints. This
implies that subnational governments must be equipped with sufficient authority and resources
to exercise their government functions, before they can be held accountable for public service
delivery.
The World Bank (2004) mentioned that conceptually, accountability can be achieved
through both long route and short-route of accountability. In public services, there are three
actors that are involved: governments, citizens, and service providers; each has accountability
relationships with another. In the short route of accountability, citizens can directly hold
providers responsible for the services they deliver. This is usually the case in public services in
competitive markets, where there are options to select providers. Public services in monopolistic
markets, on the other hand, operate under a different situation. In this case, holding providers
directly responsible is usually unlikely, thus citizens hold the governments accountable, and
then the governments hold the providers accountable. This is the long route of accountability.
When the relationship along accountability breaks down, service delivery fails. This signifies
the importance of promoting accountability in order to improve public services.
Measuring accountability is not always attainable. However, quantitative measurement is
not the only way to observe if there’s a change in accountability. Friedman (2009) argued that
accountability can be examined quantitatively and qualitatively. Accountability can be measured
quantitatively if the numerical scale is known, e.g. in providing the answers to questions such as
how much did the accountor do, or how much did the accountor produce. Qualitatively,
accountability can be observed from the quality of accountor’s efforts, e.g. in answering
questions like how well did the accountor do something, or whether the change the accountor
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caused make a difference. Whether it is quantitative or qualitative, observing changes in
accountability requires a clear definition of the objectives of a policy/program and the
development, if practicable, of measures of output and outcome (Glynn 1993). For this reason,
stating standards or targets to achieve, and establishing measurement for output or performance,
can enable the observation of change in accountability, whether the change itself is quantitative
or qualitative.
2.6. Incentives in Intergovernmental Grants: How Incentives Impact Accountability
In many countries, intergovernmental grants make up a significant portion of local
governments’ budgets; thus with the implementation of decentralization, the amount of
intergovernmental grants tends to increase. This means that more funds are allocated to
subnational governments, in light that this will enable them to deliver public services to the
citizens, which are now their responsibilities under decentralization.
When it comes to public services, what matters for effective delivery are incentives and
accountability structures (Besley and Ghatak, 2003). Incentives are defined as rewards that
influence recipients’ behavior and/or decisions. It is the compensation relative to individual,
group, or organizational performance; something that influences action (Uzzi 1995); or any gifts
and rewards given out on a regular basis (Molenaar et al 2002). Incentives can be non-financial
(e.g. acknowledged reputation, voters’ approval, reelection) and financial. A financial incentive
can be defined as a monetary transfer, either in-cash or in-kind, provided directly to the recipient
with the intention to induce a behavioral change. The transfer can also be made conditional on
the behavioral change. Financial incentives can also be provided in the form of an ‘in-kind’
subsidy for a specific activity (Scott and Schurer 2009). Despite the importance of incentives in
influencing behavior, many projects and programs aimed at promoting decentralization have
been introduced without sufficient attention to the incentives (or disincentives) they create, with
respect to dimensions such as revenue mobilization, administrative performance, accountability,
and governance (UNCDF 2010).
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Funding decentralization with intergovernmental grants provision arguably weakens the
accountability to citizens (Shah 2007). In intergovernmental grants, there’s often
misunderstanding that the money is ‘somebody else’s’ thus spending efficiency is not a major
concern. People tend to be more careful if they spend their own-generated money. Bird and
Smart (2002) argued that since intergovernmental grants can be mistakenly perceived as ‘other
people’s money’, local citizens do not put as much pressure on subnational government as they
would if the money were actually ‘theirs’, as in the case of money generated from local taxes.
Rodden (2003) referred to this phenomenon as ‘fiscal illusion’: intergovernmental grants create
the appearance that local spending is funded by nonresidents. This view is misleading and as a
result, accountability is compromised.
Bahl and Linn (1992) confirm this argument based on their study on developing countries,
which pointed out that when the source of funds for local spending is intergovernmental grants,
subnational governments are less accountable for their fiscal decision because, with
intergovernmental grants, subnational governments can increase spending without increasing
local taxes. Other than that, accountability is also compromised when intergovernmental grants
are allocated for explicit ‘gap filling’ (i.e., regions with larger deficits receive larger grants). In
this case, intergovernmental grants subsidize spending beyond revenues by providing
subnational governments with incentives to spend beyond their means (Weingast 2006).
The decisions made by subnational governments (and local parliaments), like those made
by the central government (and national parliament) were influenced by incentives they faced
(Bird 2000). For this reason, incentives for strategic behavior in managing intergovernmental
grants can also be the cause of weak accountability. Strategic behavior is intentional actions
directed toward the achievement of a desired goal (Nevis et al 2003). It is not necessarily ‘bad’
behavior, but it can be ‘bad’ if it involves conflicting interests, where a party can gain more by
sacrificing other party. In the presence of incentives for ‘bad’ strategic behavior, subnational
governments can act at the cost of constituents’ welfare maximization (Oates 1972, 1993,
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Vigneault 2007) and public services provision (Vigneault 2007).
An approach to control ‘bad’ strategic behavior, or opportunistic behavior, while at the
same time improve subnational governments’ accountability, is by promoting citizens’ control,
either direct control or through representative system. When political decentralization is
efficient, the local representatives selected in local election (the parliament) should be able to
control the behavior of subnational governments, at least to some extent. In addition to
parliament control, improved democracy resulting from decentralization enables greater citizen
participation and citizen control on governments’ decision (Faguet 2011). Citizen control is a
powerful instrument for improving the governance and the actual quality of public services. For
example, participatory complaint surveys are an effective method for citizens to monitor public
service delivery, provide feedback to service units, and create a culture of citizen engagement
and government accountability.
The World Bank (2004), in its accountability relationship framework, summarizes the
accountability in public services. According to the framework, the accountability of subnational
governments is initially triggered by citizens’ demand for public services. Through various
formal and informal political processes, the demand creates incentives for subnational
governments to be accountable in delivering public services. However, in many developing
countries, the political process often fails to create strong incentives for accountability.
Prud‘homme (1995) pointed out that in many developing countries, election results are
based on personal, tribal, or political loyalty, and it says very little about local preferences.
Electoral mandates are vague and inconsistent, and even though local politicians want to fulfill
them, there’s usually mismatch between available resources and promised expenditures. The
elected politicians often lack incentives to keep their promises, and even if they don’t, local
bureaucracies in subnational government may not be persuaded to cooperate, for they too have
good reasons to pursue their own agenda. This makes representative system in political process
a weak instrument to create incentives for subnational governments’ accountability.
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Citizen control is also weak in many developing countries. OECD (2008) mentioned that
in these countries, credibility of political commitment is low. Citizens often lack knowledge and
information about what their governments can and must deliver. The outcome of this situation is
governments that don’t listen to the citizens and are willing to sacrifice citizens’ benefit to
pursue their own objectives. This will result in weak influence of citizens in making
governments accountable.
An empirical study by Eckardt (2008) supports this statement. In his study, Eckardt found
that poorly performing subnational governments are often deeply rooted in their political and
social environment. Weak political incentives may cause ineffective checks and balance, lack of
transparency, and failure in translating local citizens’ demand into public spending and policies.
If these happen, public service delivery often fails because political and bureaucratic agents face
incentives to misallocate public resources.
An example of this situation can be observed in Indonesia. Indonesia’s performance post
decentralization big bang exceeded expectations of many. In OECD Economic Survey 2010,
Indonesia is praised for “…having made considerable progress over the years in improving
social condition of its population, especially among the disadvantaged groups… nevertheless, in
some respect, social outcomes remain sub-par in relation to regional peers.” Similarly, Oxford
Analytica Daily Brief Service (June 9, 2010), also acknowledges Indonesia’s democratic
transition has exceeded expectation. Eckardt (2008) points out that Indonesia has made
remarkable progress in creating a decentralized system of government and its decentralization
policies neatly reflect the concept of democratic decentralization. With this, hopes are high that
decentralization will bring better governance, as well as enhance accountability and
performance of subnational governments.
However, years after decentralization was first implemented, public service delivery has
been a major issue that is often related to fiscal decentralization. Some major public services
sectors, education and health care in particular, need to be paid attention to (OECD 2010).
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Despite Indonesia’s democratic transition that exceeds expectation, an accountability gap
remains. Political, judicial, and societal checks–which restrain administrative misconduct in
long-established democracies–continue to be compromised by deep-seated clientelism.
Democratic rules and procedures are not yet sufficient guarantees for adequate provision of
public services (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, June 9, 2010). There is also the possibility that
decentralization can increase local elites capturing resources and reorienting policies (and
resources) to serve their private interests, rather than the public’s interests. Thus, it is feared that
there will be degradation of services formerly delivered by the central government (Eckardt,
2008).
The findings above indicate that citizens’ demand is not always influential enough to
enforce subnational governments’ accountability in public service delivery, even when there’s
significant improvement in democracy post decentralization. Broadway and Shah (2009) argued
that citizens are not always empowered to hold public officials accountable for their
non-compliance with their mandates, and/or for corrupt acts or face high transaction cost in
doing so. As a result, dysfunctional governance in the public sector results from opportunistic
behavior by public officials which may occur, and welfare maximization is no longer the main
consideration. This condition is predicted by the second generation theory of fiscal federalism
(SGT), which suggests that there are some political factors and incentives issue that influence
the outcome of decentralization.
Referring to the accountability relationship framework developed by the World Bank
(2004), in which citizens’ demand is assumed to be the trigger for governments’ accountability,
the findings suggest that another trigger may need to be developed in case citizens’ demand is
insufficient to initiate the accountability. The research argues that intergovernmental grants, if
they are enhanced from the traditional form of input-based to performance-based grants (PBG)
by incorporating incentives into the grant design, can be an alternative trigger for accountability.
The enhancement is crucial because intergovernmental grants, as argued by Shah (2007) are
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inherently prone to weak accountability.
The results of intergovernmental grants, whether they are positive or negative, depend on
the incentives–intended or not–that are built into the grants system (Smart 2007). Incorporating
incentives into the grants’ design is the innovative feature of PBG. Previous research pointed
out that incentives have a significant role in determining the final outcome of intergovernmental
grants, because incentives can induce certain behavior (Weingast 2009, Lewis and Smoke 2008)
and improve accountability (UNCDF 2010), whether it is undesirable or desirable. As
incentives for opportunistic behavior can lead to lower accountability (Bahl and Linn 2002, Bird
2000, Shah 2007, Smart 2007, Vigneault 2007), incentives for promoting good governance
behavior can also lead to improved accountability and performance (Steffensen and Larsen 2005,
Steffensen 2010, UNCDF 2010). Better performing subnational governments were consistently
more open to pressure of informed, organized, and political communities, which strengthen their
incentives to be accountable, responsive, and manage and deliver services more efficiently
(Eckardt 2008). Experiences with foreign aid to developing countries also show that
well-designed programs are often not working because they offer little or no incentives to the
stakeholders involved. Adding incentive features improves the chance to get more cooperation,
resulting in a higher success level of program implementation (Easterly 2002).
For this reason, incorporating the right incentives in intergovernmental grants can make
intergovernmental grants recipients become more accountable in exercising their roles–whether
it is the function of budget allocation, public service delivery, or other government functions.
Taking incentive into consideration in designing intergovernmental grants will increase the
chance of improvement in accountability and public service delivery. Given appropriate
incentives--in terms of heightened expectations of improved services from their constituents and
some access to resources for which they were politically responsible--even very small
subnational governments have at times demonstrated significant improvements in administrative
capacity within a relatively short time (Fiszbein 1997).
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PBG is an option to incorporate incentives in order to improve accountability. In PBG,
incentives are used as stimulation to induce desirable behavior from subnational governments,
like supporting national priority programs and compliance to regulations and/or standards,
which eventually improve accountability. The research argues that an alternative trigger for
subnational governments to be accountable in delivering public services, in addition to the
citizens’ demand as suggested by the World Bank (2004), can also be embodied in the
intergovernmental grants design, by tying the grants transfer (entitlement) to the achievement of
a certain performance or standard (attainment).
2.7. Performance-Based Grants (PBG)
Boschmann (2008) mentioned that PBG was first implemented around 1997, with
Uganda being one of the first countries to adopt this system. Since 2003, PBG has become a
countrywide system, covering all types of subnational governments in the country. Since 2007,
PBG is funded entirely from the Ugandan consolidated national budget, but some portions (e.g.
assessment cost) are funded by joint donor basket funding arrangement. The implementation of
PBG in Uganda has inspired other developing countries to start implementing PBG or to revise
current PBG system (e.g. the Philippines, Bhutan, China, Pakistan). Some countries are starting
to pilot it (e.g. Laos, East Timor, Bangladesh).
The initiative of PBG is based on the reform to introduce greater incentives to subnational
governments, in order to enhance their accountability, capacity, and performance. Being a form
of conditional grants, PBG shares similarities with traditional, input-based conditional grants.
Both typically specify the type of expenditures that can be financed, and are intended to
encourage subnational governments to undertake specific programs or activities, usually those
considered as national priority by the central government. As is also the case for conditional
grants, both can be used by central governments which often use conditional grants to make
subnational governments provide certain public services, especially when they do not provide
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such services at the required level out of their own resources (Ahmad and Thomas, 1997).
PBG is to be integrated into intergovernmental grant system, providing subnational
governments with tangible incentives to improve their institutional, organizational, and
functional performance, thereby reducing the risks associated with intergovernmental grants and
making decentralization more effective, efficient, and responsive as a strategy for delivering
public services (UNCDF 2010).
2.7.1. Definition of PBG
PBG is a form of specific grants, which operate based on conditionalities. Access to PBG
is conditional upon the overall performance of PBG (potential) recipients (e.g. subnational
governments), as approved by grantor (e.g. central government). In other words, subnational
governments need to show that they have complied with certain criteria or requirements in order
to access their grants. Unless they can demonstrate this performance, they are unable to access
all or part of their grants. To this extent, PBG can be defined as:
- Grants system that incentivizes improvements in performance by linking local governments’
performance in predetermined areas with both access and the amount of funding. This
system is a strong performance-based incentive, coupled with ex-post monitoring and
assessments (UNCDF 2010).
- Output-based transfers that link grant finance with the service delivery performance. These
transfers place conditions on the results to be achieved while providing full flexibility in
the design of programs and associated spending levels to achieve these objectives
(Broadway and Shah 2009).
- Transfers intended to influence recipients’ behavior based on certain measures of output or
performance, and in doing so, influence targeted performance (Steffenson and Larsen
2005).
A common feature that highlights the definition of PBG is the use of incentives to
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encourage certain standards of performance to strengthen he relation between performance and
reward. Good subnational government performance, as measured by the fulfillment of related
criteria/requirements, is rewarded through eligibility for grants. The theoretical literature
suggests that incentives are most likely to be effective for well-defined and measurable
behaviors (Scott and Schurer 2009). The employment of performance measurement provides a
clear definition of the objectives of a policy/program, and thus satisfies a condition required in
accountability as suggested by Glynn (1993). This principle is highly regarded in PBG, in which
access to grants will only be possible after all required conditions are satisfied.
Taking all these points into account, the working definition of PBG used in this thesis is
grants allocated to subnational governments to finance specific projects, where the transfer of
funds is conditional to the attainment of certain standards.3
2.7.2. PBG Rationales
UNCDF (2010) mentioned that the overall rationales for PBG is to provide tangible
3This research used the term ‘performance-based’ to highlight the importance of achievement of
performance standard. In addition to the traditional approach that mainly focuses on input-based grants,
literature also mentions grants that focus on the opposite side of input, naming the grants as, among others,
‘output-based’ or ‘performance-based’ or ‘outcome-based’. Output, outcome, and performance each have
different meanings and represent different stages of a process. Merriam Webster dictionary (Source:
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/output) defines ‘output’ as ‘something produced,
e.g. the amount produced at a given time’; ‘outcomes’ as ‘something that follows as a consequence’, and
‘performance’ as ‘something accomplished’.
Referring to this, among the three, output should come first and be measured interms of quantity..
Performance is measured based on what is accomplished by the output (thus emphasizing the quality of
the output), and outcome is the consequence of having the output. For example, in a clean water project,
the output is piped water connections installed in certain number of households. The performance of the
project is demonstrated by how well the connections function, e.g. they provide 24-hour access to clean
water. The outcome of the project is the consequence of having the connections, e.g. less health problems
(due to increased hygiene) and preserved ground water (because the households replace the use of ground
water with piped water).
In this research, output-based grants, performance-based grants, and outcome-based grants are viewed
indifferently, that is, as result-based funding. What is highlighted here is the shifting of focus from ‘input’
to its opposite side, namely ‘results’, in providing funds to subnational governments. Pearson (2011)
argued that result-based funding has different meaning for different people. There is no commonly agreed
definition for result-based funding, and different terms are usually used to explain similar, sometimes
even identical, concepts. Some terms frequently used (but not limited to) are: payment by result,
result-based, performance-based, and output-based – the latter is also referred to as a subset of the broad
family of result-based mechanism in Tremolet and Evans (2010).
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incentives to subnational governments to improve their performance by linking their access to
grants and/or the amount disbursed to their performance in pre-determined areas. Specific
objectives of PBG are as follows:
- Provide incentives to subnational governments to improve in key performance areas and to
adhere to national standards.
- Ensure that spending takes place where there is a clear absorptive capacity.
- Supplement capacity building needs assessments and monitoring and evaluation system.
- Improve management and organizational learning.
- Strengthen capacity development effort (focus and incentives).
- Improve accountability.
- Promote a greater level of streamlining, mainstreaming, and coordination of development
partners’ support.
Shah (2009) argued that PBG creates an incentives regime to promote the results‐based
accountability culture. In public service delivery, citizens are the principals and public officials
are the agents. The principals have bounded rationality–they act rationally based on the
incomplete information they have. In order to have a more informed perspective on public
sector operations, they face high transaction costs in acquiring and processing information. On
the other hand, agents (public officials) are better informed and their self‐interest motivates
them to withhold information from the public domain as the release of such information
contributes to their being held accountable. This asymmetry of information allows agents to
indulge in opportunistic behaviors which go unchecked due to high transaction costs faced by
principals and a lack of or inadequacy of countervailing institutions to enforce accountable
governance. Results based accountability through the use of output‐based grants empowers
citizens by enlarging their information base and lowering their transaction costs in demanding
action.
41
UNCDF (2010) argued that PBG increases the odds to break the vicious cycle of
ineffectiveness, and promote the virtuous cycle of improvement, illustrated in Figure 2.1 below:
As shown in Figure 2.1, weak capacity of subnational governments is magnified by,
among other, lack of performance incentives.  Because of this, subnational government only
creates low impact by its development standing, resulting in local citizens’ discounting their
government’s relevance. Eventually, this will make citizens put low pressure on subnational
governments, leaving the capacity of subnational government weak.
Arguably, the incentives feature in PBG can break the cycle, turning the vicious cycle into
a virtuous cycle illustrated in Figure 2.2 below:
Weak institutional capacity of
subnational governments
Citizens discount subnational
government relevance, low pressure
for performance
Reinforced by disjointed capacity
building response, inadequate/
unpredictable funding, weak
performance incentives
Low impact of subnational
government development
spending
Source: UNCDF (2010), adapted from Yongmei Zhou (2007)
Subnational government units
can learn by doing, develop
capacity and establish track
record
Subnational government unitｓ
increasingly exercise authority and
accumulate capacity for inclusive and
accountable local governance
Reinforced by coherent capacity building
response, increased performance-based
transfer of funds to subnational government
units, strong performance incentives
Citizens perceive increased
relevance of subnational
government units, bottom-up
pressure for accountability.
Source: UNCDF (2010), adapted from Yongmei Zhou (2007)
Figure 2.2.
Virtuous Cycle of Effective Subnational Governance
Figure 2.1.
Vicious Cycle of Ineffective Subnational Governance
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As shown in Figure 2.2, PBG provides incentives for subnational governments to develop
capacity and focus on accountability; they will start to deliver public services according to the
expectation of citizens. This will increase citizens’ perception of the government’s relevance,
increasing the bottom-up pressure for accountability. Eventually this will form accountability
culture in subnational governments, fostering subnational government units to develop greater
capacity.
It is important to note that, in order to achieve the expected results, PBG needs to be
complemented and coordinated with other measures, such as fiscal and institutional reforms.
PBG is not equally effective in all environments or circumstances, and are most useful and
effective when these following prerequisites, among other, are in place (Steffensen 2010):
- Strong policy support for performance incentives and the political will to cope with
pressure from subnational governments that are performing poorly.
- Based on solid analytical work, documentation of strengths and weaknesses of previous
approaches.
- PBG is robustly and carefully designed with significant involvement from
key-stakeholders: core ministries, development partners, subnational governments, etc.
- The overall subnational government framework is conducive for PBG approach.
- Capacity building arrangement is appropriate, linked to performance assessment, and
allows for a sensible mix of supply and demand driven approaches.
- PBG operations, measures, and outcomes are highly transparent and publicly disclosed,
particularly with respect to the results of regular subnational government performance
assessments.
2.8. PBG’s Supporting Theories
The emergence of SGT recognized the existence of political and social choice, and how
they create incentives for certain behavior. While efficiency assumption still holds, as it did in
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FGT, SGT acknowledged that by itself, efficiency consideration cannot motivate everybody
involved–politicians, government officials, and other stakeholders–to work effectively toward
economic welfare. Incentives are arguably a factor worth considering in the design of system
and mechanism addressing community welfare.
As a means to support public service delivery, intergovernmental grants are also exposed
to the idea of incentives. Performance-based grants, as noted earlier, are a product of
incorporating incentives into intergovernmental grants. The idea of performance-based grants
arises from New Public Management (NPM), New Institutional Economics (NIE) (Broadway
and Shah 2009, Shah 2010), and managerialism.
2.8.1. New Institutional Economics
According to Klein (1999), the term New Institutional Economics (NIE) was first
introduced by Williamson in 1975. NIE attempts to understand the institutions of social,
commercial, and political life using a combination of interdisciplinary approaches including
economics, organization theory, law, sociology, and anthropology. The heart of NIE, however, is
economics. The goal of NIE is to explain what institutions are, how they arise, what purpose
they serve, how they change, and how they should be reformed.
Institution is rules of a society that facilitate coordination among people by helping
them to form expectation, which each person can reasonably hold in dealing with each other
(Ruttan and Hayami 1984). It is also incentive systems that guide human behavior, which
consists of formal rules, (e.g. constitutions, laws, regulation), put in place by the government
and informal constraints (e.g. norms of behavior, codes of conduct) (North 2008).  By setting
the rules, institution influences the choice and behavior of people and organizations, the rules
form humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North 1990), and facilitate the
coordination of relationships between individuals, people, or organizations (Herath 2005).
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North (2008) explained that NIE emerged as a response to the limitation of
neoclassical economic theory that does not address how to create efficient market. It focuses on
already developed market and does not explain the role of political market, assuming
frictionless market (it can work without government or institution), static implication on policy
(not accounting for time, history, and the way humans learn), and ergodic worldview (world
with constant underlying economic structure, like in natural science). Though some assumptions
in neoclassical theory remain useful (e.g. price theory), the world is dynamic with continuous
change, with new economic models and theories being developed over history. This is why the
assumptions of frictionless market, static implication, and constant underlying economic
structure do not hold.
To correct this, North argued, the assumptions need to be improved by recognizing
the role of institutions, considering time change and human learning over time, and
understanding fundamental change over time. Institutional change involves purposeful and
calculated human efforts, and its pursuance is motivated by favorable results to the wellbeing of
a particular person or group. It involves human intentionality, which is the very heart of society.
Institutions that reward productivity and creativity are required for economic growth.
NIE acknowledges the important role of institution in economic development
(Herath 2005) and that it has important effect on economic performance (Joskow 2008). The
effects of alternative public policies aimed at improving performance in various dimensions will
vary along with the institutions that are available to respond to them.
Institutional arrangement is another aspect of NIE. In this arrangement, agreements
are made by individuals to govern their relationship. Such agreements are embodied in contracts.
A complete contract specifies a course of action, a decision, or terms of trade contingent on
every possible future state of affairs (Klein 1999). A contract can be considered as actual means
of coordination, organizing coordination among agents, based on a set of mutually agreed
promises (Brosseau 2008). It can be an analytical tool to identify whether agreements are settled,
45
and an enforcement tool to take action when the agreements are violated.
Many contracts can be analyzed in light of this agency problem. Contracts specify
the relationship between two parties, i.e. agent and principal, and defining for whose interest the
agent is supposed to act. The relationship, according to Toye, can be problematic if principal is
not perfectly informed at zero cost about the action of the agent (and this is usually the case),
resulting in opportunistic behavior by the agent which benefits himself while at the same time
reduces the welfare of the principal (Toye 1995).
Two points can be drawn from NIE. First, institutions – or incentives, as North put it
– that facilitate efficiency is vital to the success of an organization. The theory acknowledges the
importance of human intention behind each decision, and that incentives drive human’s choice
toward a particular action. Second, contracts are crucial to analyze the relationship between
interested parties and to foster coordination based agreements between the parties. These points
are adapted in performance –based grants.
2.8.2. New Public Management
Rhodes (1996) stated that New Public Management (NPM) design initially comes
from the “marriage” of opposites, that is of managerialism and NIE. In public administration,
managerialism is held most dearly by members of the managerial class, that places faith in the
ability of managers to provide for the needs of society by application of specialized skills and
knowledge. The ideology rests on the value of efficiency (including economic efficiency
which emphasizes the pursuit of maximum output with minimum input), that provides guidance
to managers in the application of their expertise toward the achievement of organizationally
defined goals (Edwards 1998). In a general sense, managerialism in public services is
characterized by the belief that the objectives of the services can be promoted at lower cost
when the appropriate management techniques are applied (Cutler and Waine, 1998 in Clarke et
al., 2000). Rhodes (1996) summed up that term managerialism refers to introducing
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business-type management practice to the public sector. It emphasizes professional
management, explicit standards and measures of performances, managing by results, value
for money, and is costumer oriented.
The NPM refers to introducing incentives structure (such as market competition)
into public services provision. It emphasizes disaggregating bureaucracies, greater
competition through contracting out and quasi market and consumer choice. In NPM,
government is assumed to be entrepreneurial; it shares a concern with competition, markets,
customers, and outcomes. This transformation of the public sector involves ‘less government’
(or less rowing), but ‘more governance’ (or more steering) (Rhodes 1996).
NPM is an approach that seeks to emulate private-sector practices by (1) treating
beneficiaries of public programs as customers, (2) highlighting what products the customers
want, (3) using competition among potential sources (public and private), and (4) using other
innovative forms of motivation to improve how agencies provide products customers want
(Camm and Stecher 2010).
A central feature of NPM is a greater emphasis on performance measurement and
indicators. In order to improve public sector efficiency and effectiveness, most governments in
developed nations now stress performance budgeting and performance management, a move
that represents a significant shift in public management from controlling input and procedures
to achieving results measured in term of output and outcomes (Haque 2007). Jun (2009)
mentioned performance management and output as major ideas of NPM. Other ideas include
structural devolution and decentralization, vertical coordination and autonomy within a single
agency, managerialism and management techniques, market driven techniques, competition, and
citizens as customers.
Several OECD studies characterize the term NPM as constituting a unified,
consistent and coherent set of ‘business-like’ or neo-managerial practices, focusing exclusively
on aspects of public governance. It is a continuously monitored management-by-objectives,
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with accountability for results (Raghavan 2004). NPM is referred to as a pattern of policy and
practice described as a style of organizing public services. Hood (1991) stated that most
discussion of NPM stressed a set of doctrines: professional management in the public sector,
explicit standards and measures of performance, greater emphasis on output controls, shift to
greater competition in the public sector, shift to greater competition in the public sector, stress
on private sector styles of management practice, and stress on greater discipline and parsimony
in resource use. Not all of the doctrines are equally present in all cases, nor are they necessarily
fully consistent, partly because they do not have a single intellectual provenance.
Raghavan (2004) argued that a doctrine is a view of how a single organization
design should be resolved. The doctrines of NPM reveal a set of principles, devised to bring out
the nature of NPM and its workings. The impact of assessing NPM can be divided into two
broad classifications: general impact and particular impact. The following table summarizes
some of the impact of NPM:
Table 2.1.
NPM Impacts
General impact Particular impact
Close to customers Savings (reduced budget appropriations)
Performance-driven Improved processes (faster/accessible
complaint procedures)
Commitment to continuous quality
improvements
Improved efficiency (better input-output
ratios)
Highly decentralized, with street staffs
empowered to be more flexible and innovative.
Greater effectiveness (less functional
illiteracy, crime and inequality, more
employment)
Practicing tight cost controls Resilience of administrative system
Using performance-related systems for recruiting,
posting, promoting and paying staff.
An increase in overall capacity/
flexibility (better committed staff/skilled
public servants)
Source: Raghavan (2004)
The introduction of NPM gained positive attention in the field of public management,
but it does not mean that this approach is not subject to critiques. Haque (2007) pointed out that
NPM lacks coherent analytical framework, and that the discussion of NPM has often been
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fragmented, inconsistent, technical, and uncritical. Hughes (2008) argued that there has never
been a clear exposition of what is involved in NPM and that there is no theory of bureaucracy
that clearly sets out this approach.
The field of public management keeps progressing with the emergence of the so-called
post-NPM approach, aimed at correcting the shortcomings of NPM. Even though its heyday has
passed, the three-fold legacy of NPM, as noted by Lynn (1998), remains:
- A stronger emphasis on performance-motivated administration and inclusion in the
administrative canon of performance-oriented institutional arrangements, structural forms,
and managerial doctrines fitted to particular contexts–in other words, documented advances
in the state of public management art;
- An international dialogue on and a stronger comparative dimension to the study of state
building and administrative reform; and
- The integrated use of economic, sociological, social-psychological, and other advanced
conceptual models and heuristics in the study of public institutions and management, with
the potential to strengthen the field’s scholarship and the possibilities for theory-grounded
practices.
2.8.3. The Theories’ Influence on PBG
As argued by Broadway and Shah (2009) and Shah (2010), PBG emerged from NIE
and NPM, while NPM, according to Rhodes (1996), emerged from NIE and managerialism.
Figure 2.3 below summarizes the influence of the theories on PBG.
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The principles of NIE, managerialism, and NPM are adopted in PBG. NIE
acknowledges the importance of incentives in guiding human behavior, and this principle is
adapted in PBG as its design is intended to encourage desirable behavior from grant recipients.
Managerialism promotes the introduction of business-like values such as efficiency and
performance measurement. The measurement is an important part in PBG, as access to the
grants depends on whether a certain performance standard is achieved. NPM strongly
emphasizes performance and orientation on results, rather than input, which also becomes a
feature in PBG. The focus on incentives suggested by NIE and the emphasis on performance
introduced by NPM are highlighted in the design of PBG (Shah 2010). In PBG, the incentive
Figure 2.3.
The Influence of NIE, NPM, and Managerialism on PBG
Managerialism New Institutional Economics(NIE)
New Public Management
(NPM)
Recognizing the role of incentives in guiding
human behavior. Considering time change, human
learning, and fundamental change over time.
Performance-Based Grants
(PBG)
Improving public sector
efficiency and effectiveness, by
stressing performance; shifting
from controlling inputs and
procedures to achieving results
measured in term of output,
performance, and outcome.
Linking performance, incentives,
and funding.
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feature presents itself in a way that recipients must achieve certain performance in order to
access the grants. This is the innovative side of PBG: using incentives to encourage the
desirable behavior (e.g. improved performance, better accountability) of grant recipients, by
linking to resources (funding) and the attainment of certain requirements based on measured
criteria.
2.9. PBG and Traditional, Input-based Conditional Grants
The main difference of these two lies in conditionalities of funds transfer. Traditional,
input-based specific grants provide the funds regardless of observation of a certain standard,
while PBG can only provide such funds after the standard attainment is observed.
Performance-based grants link grant finance with service delivery performance. The grants
place conditions on results to be achieved while providing full flexibility in the design of
programs and associated spending levels to achieve the objectives (Shah 2006).
The difference can have significant impact because, by insisting on standard
attainment, an accountability culture is promoted; the point is made clear that the grants are to
support the provision of public services, not merely to finance the spending of subnational
governments. Another point is that there is a link between input (intergovernmental grants) and
performance (public service delivery). This direct link between input and output is not usually
present in the design of traditional specific grants. The comparison of traditional specific grants
and PBG is summarized in the table below:
Table 2.2.
PBG and Input-based Conditional Grants
– A Comparison
Feature Traditional grants PBG
Grant objectives Spending levels Quality and access to public services
Grant design and
administration
Complex Simple and transparent
Eligibility Recipient government
departments/agencies
Recipient government departments/agencies
and non-government providers. In case of the
latter, the funds are first received by the
recipient government before used by the
providers.
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Condition Expenditures on authorized
functions and objects
Output-service delivery results
Allocation criteria Program or project proposals
approvals with expenditure
details
Demographic data on potential clients
Compliance
verification
Higher level inspections and
audits
Client feedback and redress, comparison of
baseline and post grant data on quality and
access
Penalties Audit observation on
financial compliance
Public censure, competitive pressures, voice
and exit options for clients
Managerial flexibility Little or none. No tolerance
for risk, and no
accountability for failure
Absolute. Rewards for risks but penalties for
persistent failures
Local government
autonomy and
budgetary flexibility
Little Absolute
Transparency Little External, competition, innovation, and
benchmarking
Focus Internal External, competition-based.
Accountability Hierarchical to higher-level
government, controls on
input and process with little
or no concern for results
Result-based, bottom-up, client-driven
(Source: Broadway and Shah 2009)
By moving away from systems characterized by general unconditional grants and
conditional grants based on discretionary functions, PBG can foster local autonomy on
conditions that it is accompanied by sound and unambiguous guidance, clear requirements,
capacity building, and other support. Shah (2007) argued that generally, emphasizing
result-based accountability can thrive if the following elements are present:
- Contracts or work program agreements based on pre-specified output and performance
targets and budgetary allocation
- Replacement of lifelong rotating employment with contractual appointment with task
specialization
- Managerial flexibility, but accountability for results
- Redefinition of the public sector role as purchaser, but not necessarily provider of public
services
- Adoption of subsidiarity principle–that is, public sector decisions made at the level of
government closest to the people, unless a convincing case can be made not to do so
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- Incentives for cost efficiency
- Incentives for transparency and competitive service provision
- Accountability to taxpayers
Experience has shown that if the right incentives are provided to subnational
governments, sector-wise controls and earmarking of funds can be relaxed without
compromising national target and priorities, while at the same time fostering good governance
(UNCDF 2010). The argument that incentives can foster fiscal management and accountability
is also mentioned by Feruglio and Andersen (2006). However, it is most important to note that
PBG approach in isolation should not be seen as a panacea for all the problems associated with
decentralization. The overall policy environment, confusing or contradictory policy
arrangements, civil-service constraints, and other such factors can make it very difficult for
PBG to achieve the desired results. This highlights the need to keep sight of the wider picture in
designing PBG for local governments (UNCDF 2010).
It should be noted, too, that the systems of performance-based allocations such as PBG
are not equally suitable for all types of grants and for all expenditure areas. It is therefore
important to define how PBG fit into the overall architecture of intergovernmental fiscal
relations and to ensure that PBG can be articulated with other grant schemes, and are integrated
into the overall intergovernmental fiscal relation. The overall intergovernmental relationship
between the central government and subnational governments should be considered, as well as
the incentives or disincentives it provides for local governments’ performance.
2.10. Countries Experiences in Incorporating Incentives in Intergovernmental Grants
Although not always specifically named PBG, some OECD countries have embedded
fiscal incentives into their intergovernmental transfer systems for years, to stimulate spending in
particular areas–through matching grants, grant access conditions, minimum service standards,
and requirements for specific actions to be accomplished in order to get access to grants
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(UNCDF 2010).
The Canadian Government, for example, provides health grants to the provinces,
provided only if the provinces satisfy a number of minimum conditions, such as open and equal
access to health facilities and no billing of clients. Failure to meet these conditions can lead to
the withdrawal of federal support or a reduction in the grants (Shah 2006). The US Government,
under Race to the Top Competitive Program, allows states to apply for education grants if,
among other things, they comply with requirements for progressive improvement in standards
and access, including reforms in procedures for certification and evaluation of teachers and
principals (Shah 2009). In the UK, local authorities in agreement with central government select
a number of indicators for measurement and can then receive up to 2.5% of their budget as
reward for good performance (Kaiser 2009).
In Japan, incentives are applied in public works plan. Local governments in Japan have
independence to decide a significant portion of public works projects. Because of this, it is
possible for local governments to make decision that is not in line with the central government’s
priorities. To address this, the central government established guidance on public works plans.
The instruments of this guidance include direct or indirect regulations, fiscal or non-fiscal
incentives and persuasion. Purpose-specific grants (subsidies) are often used to lead local
governments to such projects that the central government intends. In addition to the usual
purpose-specific subsidies, some special budget measures are set for the implementation of
development plans and public works projects (Bessho 2010). Public works expenditures for
road projects, forest road projects, and urban planning projects are stipulated by law and must
be implemented according to comprehensive plans to conform to national standards (Mochida
2006).
Some developing countries also have included incentives and implemented
performance-based approach in its fiscal system. A study by UNCDF (2010) sampled six
African countries (Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali) and six Asian
54
countries (Indonesia, Lao PDR, East Timor, Solomon Islands, Nepal, and Bangladesh) that have
implemented PBG initiatives either in piloting or country-wide stage. The study also evaluates
the potential of PBG implementation in another three Asian countries (Philippines, Bhutan, and
Pakistan).
Uganda, for example, implemented PBG for capital and poverty-related investments.
Conditionalities to access the grants includes linkage between the development plan and
investment plan, availability of budget and budget framework paper, functional internal audit,
three-year local government revenue, and the enhancement plan. Grants recipients are also
required to provide co-funding and establish a special account to manage the grants. Another
example is Kenya, which implemented PBG for capital investments, service delivery, and debt
servicing. Conditionalities to access the grants include the availability of debt-recovery plan,
revenue enhancement plan, service delivery plan, and citizen participation in preparation of
service-delivery plan (UNCDF 2010).
Funding public services with performance-based approach was applied in Indonesia in
2009, to finance piped drinking water service expansion in Surabaya, the second largest city in
Indonesia. The project is funded by the World Bank and Global Partnership for Output-Based
Aid (GPOBA), a partnership of donors and international organizations working together to
support output-based aid (OBA) approaches. 4 OBA and PBG approach works under the same
principle: both link incentives with performance and funding. The difference is that, under OBA,
the funds are not provided as intergovernmental grants, instead the funds are transferred directly
to water supply company (World Bank and GPOBA 2009).
4 Members of GPOBA include AusAID (the Australian Government agency responsible for managing
Australia's overseas aid program.), Department for International Finance Development/DFID (a part of
the UK Government that manages Britain's aid to poor countries and works to get rid of extreme poverty),
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency/SIDA (a Swedish government agency under the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs), International Finance Corporation/IFC (a member of the World Bank
Group), and World Bank. GPOBA's mandate is to fund, design, demonstrate, and document OBA
approaches to improve delivery of basic infrastructure and social services to the poor in developing
countries (Source: www.gpoba.org).
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In principle, as far as the project quality is concerned, OBA required accountability and
performance to access the funds inasmuch the same way as PBG. However, in OBA system, the
accountability relationship exists between the companies (as service provider) and the central
governments (the Ministry of Public Works), instead of local government. Considering the
devolution of water service function to local governments, this practice was not supportive to
the implementation of decentralization. In decentralization, local governments are supposed to
be in charge of public service delivery, and should be involved in the funds provision. OBA,
although arguably benefited local citizens, put less emphasis on the accountability in its relation
to decentralization. The funds to finance public service in the region is not managed by the
related local governments, offering little or zero incentives for local governments to actively
participate in the service delivery.
2.11. Gap in Literature Reviews: Areas that Need More Exploring
The literatures provide valuable contribution to the understanding of decentralization and
intergovernmental grants, as well as of accountability and incentives. There are findings that
accountability involves relationships between stakeholders in public service delivery. The
literatures also point out that, even though citizens welfare maximization is supposed to be the
main decentralization objective, there are plenty of evidences showing that local governments
can act against the citizens’ interest in the presence of incentives for opportunistic behavior. The
findings clearly suggest that incentives can influence decision, choice, and behavior, which
eventually impact accountability.
The literatures provide many different insights on how incentives and accountability
relates to local governments’ behavior when it comes to managing financial resources – namely
intergovernmental grants – in decentralization context. However, the areas explored by previous
research are mostly related to intergovernmental grants in general public service delivery. An
area that is not yet widely explored by previous research regarding decentralization and
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intergovernmental grants is how the accountability and incentives work in specific case, such as
in monopolistic public services. This research tries to contribute to this area by analyzing if
incorporating incentives in intergovernmental grants can be an alternative to improve local
governments’ accountability in public services, especially when the service is monopolistic.
Especially in Indonesia case, how the incentives work in decentralization scheme is
almost an untouched subject. This may be due to the fact that Indonesian intergovernmental
grants have never explicitly stated the employment of incentives until the implementation of
PBG in 2010. Given the relatively short period since its implementation, research on PBG in
Indonesia is relatively rare. This research tries to investigate the impact of PBG implementation
on Indonesian local governments’ accountability, and to identify the needs for PBG in Indonesia
intergovernmental grants system.
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS
From the literature reviews in Chapter II, it can be observed that previous research found
various experiences and evidence that incentives play a significant role in determining the result
of decentralization, for example through the political system and resources allocation such as
intergovernmental grants. When incentives for opportunistic behavior are present, the utilization
of resources is very likely to serve other interests beside public welfare maximization.  On the
contrary, incentives for accountable behavior, are conducive to the improvement of public
services. Previous research also indicates that the traditional form of intergovernmental grants
that put a heavy emphasis on input result in weak accountability (Shah 2007, Broadway and
Shah 2009).
Related to the previous findings and the theories that underlie them, the research argues
that incentives which encourage desirable behavior need to be incorporated in the design of
intergovernmental grants. There are many options to decide what behaviors are to be considered
as ‘desirable’, depending on what objectives to achieve. In this research, the desirable behavior
is behaviors that foster accountability in public services; that is, behaviors that demonstrate that
the actor responsible for public service delivery is performing its responsibility in the best
possible way considering its capacity.
The discussion in this chapter will mainly focus on how the incentives influence the
accountability in public service delivery. This chapter describes how performance-based grants
(PBG) work in using the incentives feature to improve public services, and how the actors
involved in public service delivery are responsible to other actor(s) in accountability
relationships. Based on these, a research conceptual framework and hypothesis are developed.
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3.1. PBG Framework
PBG framework describes how incentives, performances, and accountability are linked in
intergovernmental grants. The framework is developed based on efficiency in public service
delivery suggested by the first generation theory of fiscal federalism (FGT) and second
generation theory of fiscal federalism (SGT), through the introduction of incentives as
suggested in the New Institutional Economics (NIE), and performance as proposed by the New
Public Management (NPM).
Given the increased autonomy under decentralization, in many cases, the effectiveness
and efficiency of public service delivery are the most highly ranked characteristics of the
autonomous subnational governments (Nikolov 2005). Efficiency in public service delivery is a
message of FGT and SGT. SGT, however, added that there are certain political and social
factors that influence behavior, and that the factors can distract decentralization from its goal to
deliver improved public service. In other words, under certain influences, people involved in
decentralization may choose a decision that is not maximizing the welfare of local citizens, as in
the case of agency problem (Toye 1995, Shah 2010). This point is also acknowledged in New
Institutional Economics (NIE), which stresses the role of incentives in driving behavior.
Incentives that facilitate efficiency are vital to success in achieving objectives.
How incentives can facilitate efficiency depends on to what areas incentives are given,
and the areas can cover a broad range. To name a few, the areas can cover subnational
administrative issues (e.g. budget reporting and bookkeeping), technical issues (e.g.
infrastructure quality and durability), as well as social and political issues (e.g. public
participation in policy making process). Despite choices on areas to cover, ideally incentives
should foster efficiency (Steffensen and Larsen 2005). Stressing performance is a way to
improve efficiency in public sector management. The idea of performance-oriented, result-based
approach is suggested by the New Public Management (NPM), shifting the traditional emphasis
on input and procedures to performance.
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The points of NIE and NPM, which are incentives and performances, are adopted in the
theoretical frameworks as factors that are interconnected with effective decentralization funding.
To drive the utilization of decentralization funding toward improving public service, the
incentive factor needs to be considered. This is because incentives can affect behavior, and
efficiency reason alone is not enough to drive such behavior toward maximization of local
citizens’ welfare. There are social and political motives that influence subnational governments’
decisions.
PBG incorporate the idea of linking incentives, performance, and funding to improve
accountability and to deliver improved public service. Figure 3.1 below describes how PBG
works to achieve the objective.
Conceptually, PBG gives incentives to grant recipients to make appropriate choices. In
the decentralization scheme, the appropriate choices can be shown by, for example, supporting
Decentralization Objective
PBG
Performance
Funding
Contract
Improved
public service
To improve
To gain access to
Specify performance
target and standard
Specify eligibility, terms
and conditions to access
the funds
To achieve
Figure 3.1.
PBG Framework
To improve
Accountability
Incentives
Making appropriate
choices
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national priority programs or prioritizing certain public services. The incentives focus on
performance achievement in order to gain access to funding. The funding is subject to
conditionality; it cannot be accessed unless certain performance targets and standards are
achieved. A contract is enacted between grant recipients (e.g. subnational governments) and
grantor (e.g. central government) to set the rules of PBG implementation. The contract specifies
the performance targets and standards to be achieved, and eligibility, terms, and conditions to
access the funds.
The specified target and standards are useful to maintain quality and improve
accountability. To achieve this, it is also important that transparent procedures are present, flow
of funds is properly administered (Boschmann 2008), and results attainment is emphasized
(Shah 2010). PBG provides such elements: PBG arrangement and implementation are specified
in a contract, while access to funds is subject to performance achievement.
The implementation of PBG in decentralization encourages subnational governments to
use their autonomy to make an appropriate decision, which in this case, the decision that will
enable improved performance, accountability, and service delivery. The autonomy of local
governments in decision making, and how the decision can be influenced by incentives, is
explained in the decision space approach below.
3.2. Incentives: A Decision Space Approach to Influence Choice
Decentralization enables a higher level of autonomy to subnational governments in
planning and decision-making process in political, administrative, and fiscal aspects, in
expectation that this will make subnational governments make choices that better match local
needs and preferences. Thomas (1998) proposed the term ‘decision space’ to describe the range
of effective choice that is allowed by the central authorities (the principal) to be utilized by local
authorities (the agents). Decision space is designed for various functions and activities over
which local authorities will have increased choice.
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According to Thomas (1998), the decision space approach takes into account (1) the
incentives that central government can offer to subnational governments to encourage them to
make decisions that can help achieve the decentralization objective, (2) the subnational
governments’ characteristics that influence decision making and decision implementation at the
local level, (3) innovation resulting from exercising the liberty to make local choices, and (4)
the impact of local choice on performance. The decision space approach is summarized in
Figure 3.2 below:
The decision space approach suggests that the central government can introduce change
in performance through (1) centralized directed change, and (2) incentives and decision space.
With decentralization implementation, subnational governments have higher autonomy that
gives them more decision space. This means that local governments have more room to make
decisions regarding local policies, as decision space allows subnational governments to make
choices. The choices may stimulate them to make innovation, or to maintain the current
Figure 3.2.
Decision Space Approach
Central
Governments
Decision Space Incentives Centralized directed
changes
Subnational Governments’
Choices
Subnational
government
characteristics
No ChangeInnovation
Change in performance?
Source: Thomas (1998)
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condition. Thus the result of the choice can be observed in performance, whether the
performance is increased, decreased, or stagnant.
How the subnational governments use their decision space depends on their
characteristics. However, this is not the only influential factor. According to Figure 3.2 above,
how the subnational governments use their decision space can also be influenced by the
introduction of incentives. Provided the right incentives, subnational governments’ decision can
be steered, to some extent, toward a certain direction. If incentives for innovation are employed,
it can be expected that subnational governments will make decisions that foster innovation. On
the other hand, if the incentives are for status quo, no changes are expected. The incentives can
be developed further to have impact beyond subnational governments’ decision, for example by
incentivizing performance improvement.
Decision space approach is also useful to influence accountability. Thomas and Mitchell
(2011) argued that decision space and accountability are decentralization dimensions that are
interrelated in improving public service delivery in a decentralization framework. Concerning
decision space and accountability, decision space increases the responsiveness of subnational
governments’ choices to uphold local priority, which strengthen their accountability. In return,
with improved accountability, subnational governments are encouraged to use their decision
space to make appropriate choices.
In a decision space approach, decentralization is seen as a set of functions and degrees of
choices that are formally transferred to subnational governments (Thomas 1998). This extends
to the choice of intergovernmental grants utilization made by subnational governments. Though
mainly determined by the central government in allocation, once intergovernmental grants are
managed in the subnational budget, the subnational governments’ decision plays a significant
role in shaping the impact of grants on public service delivery. For this reason, decentralization
programs should consider incentives that can drive the subnational governments’ decision on
intergovernmental grants management in the subnational budget, so as to encourage local choice
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towards improving accountability and achieving the decentralization objective, which is public
service improvement.
3.3. Accountability Relationship Framework
In decentralization, public service delivery is mainly the responsibilities of subnational
governments. In exercising their responsibilities, subnational governments can deliver the
services by themselves, in which case the governments are directly accountable to citizens.
Another option is subnational governments delegating the delivery to service providers. When a
public service is delivered by the service providers, the accountability relationship is no longer
only between citizens and subnational governments, but extends to (1) the accountability
relationship between subnational governments and the providers, and (2) the accountability
relationship between citizens and the providers.
The World Bank (2004) in its World Development Report 2004 developed an
accountability relationships framework between three actors in public service delivery: clients,
providers, and policymakers. As discussed in the previous chapter, many authors agree upon
this minimal definition of accountability: an interactive communication between accountor and
accountee, in which the former’s behavior is evaluated and judged by the latter, in light of
possible consequences (Schillemans 2008, Meijer and Schillemans 2009). In its framework,
the World Bank puts an emphasis on relationships between actors, and maintains the minimal
definition of accountability in which interactive communication between accountor and
accountee is highlighted.
Actors in public service delivery is defined as individuals, households, communities,
firms, governments, and other public, nongovernmental, and private organizations that finance,
produce, regulate, deliver, or consume services. In economic theory the actors who hold others
accountable are sometimes called principals, and the actors who are held accountable are called
agents. Actors include:
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- Clients/citizens: Service users who as citizens participate individually or in groups (e.g.,
labor unions) in political processes to shape and attain collective goals. As clients,
individuals receive services to satisfy their household demand. All clients are citizens (in
most settings) but, depending on the service, not all citizens are clients.
- Politicians/policymakers: The service delivery actors authorized by the state to discharge its
legislative, regulatory, and rule-making responsibilities. Politicians may be elected or
achieve their positions through nondemocratic means. They can also be policymakers (e.g.
the general who is president but also runs the military, the telecom minister who administers
the sale of frequencies). But more commonly policymakers are the highest nonelected
officials—either from a civil service or appointed. Politicians set general directions.
Policymakers implement these directions and set and enforce the conditions for public and
private service providers to operate. Usually accountability sub-relationships between
politicians and policymakers are derived from the constitution, administrative law, or rules
of public administration.
- Providers: Public, private nonprofit, and private for-profit entities that actually provide
services. These may range from government line ministries with hundreds of thousands of
employees to a private hospital chain, or from a vast urban water utility to a single,
community-run, village school (The World Bank in World Development Report 2004, p.
48).
According to The World Bank (2004), in the accountability relationships framework,
citizens are the clients of public services such as health, education, and drinking water. As
clients, citizens have a relationship with public service providers, such as hospitals, schools, and
water companies. The relationship here is different from services offered in competitive markets.
In competitive markets, citizens can directly hold providers accountable for the services by
rewarding providers with repeat business (if they are satisfied) or by imposing penalty through
legal and social sanctions (if they are dissatisfied). This is the short route of accountability–there
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is direct accountability of providers to citizens.
Public services, on the other hand, operate under a different situation. Citizens do not
seek public services in competitive markets; instead public services are demanded from the
governments as policymakers. The governments then have the providers deliver the services.
Therefore, the citizens hold the governments accountable, and then the governments hold the
providers accountable. This is the long route of accountability. When the relationship along this
route breaks down, service delivery fails. The relation between the three actors–policymakers,
clients, and providers–can be summarized in Figure 3.3 as follows:
The relationship of accountability between citizens and providers is client power. Client
power is based on transactions through which citizens express their demand for services and can
monitor supply and providers. Between governments and providers, the relationship is compact:
the broad, long-term relationship of accountability connecting governments and providers.
Figure 3.3.
Accountability Relationships Framework
Policymakers
Clients(Citizens) Service Providers
Short route of accountability
Long route of accountability
Source: The World Bank (2004)
Voice Compact
Client Power
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Usually compact is not as specific and as legally binding of contract, but an explicit contract can
be a form of compact. Lastly, the relationship of accountability connecting citizens and
governments is voice (and politics). This is the most complex relationship of accountability,
comprising many formal and informal processes including voting and electoral politics,
lobbying and propaganda, lobbying and clientelism, media activities, access to information, etc.
Citizens delegate to governments the functions of serving their interests and finance the
governments through taxes. The governments perform by providing services. In this case,
citizens enforce accountability through voice and politics, such as elections, as well as less
definitive means, such as advocacy and legal actions.
As competitive markets is not usually the case in certain public services, service
providers like electricity companies and water companies become monopolistic. With the
absence of competitors, enforcing accountability through the short route (where the citizens as
clients can directly hold the providers accountable) does not work effectively. Therefore, the
long route of accountability becomes the option to demand the providers’ accountability. In the
long route, the citizens hold the providers accountable by holding the governments accountable
for public service delivery. The providers themselves are held accountable by the governments,
instead of by the citizens. It is the governments that will ensure the service delivery by the
providers.
A similar concept of accountability is suggested by Meijer and Schillermans (2009), who
argued that the route to accountability consists of direct and indirect accountability. Similar to
the long route of accountability, indirect accountability involves governments as an intermediate
between citizens and the public sector organization that provides services. Direct accountability
(also known as citizens accountability or horizontal accountability, a similar concept to the short
route of accountability), on the other hand, enables citizens to directly hold the providers
accountable for their services. According to them, direct accountability refers to mechanisms
and practices where public sector organizations directly account for their conduct in the
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broadest sense of the words to citizens, clients or more generally to societal stakeholders. It is a
contemporary extension of the system of accountability and a reinstatement of the original idea
of democratic accountability to citizens.
3.4. Research Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework used in this research is developed based on the idea of using
incentives to motivate subnational governments to use their decision space in making
appropriate choices (Thomas 1998), as well as to improve accountability, performance, or
results (Shah 2010). Steffensen and Larsen (2005) argued that incentives need to be linked with
performance as this promotes accountability in local decisions, which finally results in the
improved service delivery–or in other areas targeted for improvement.
The conceptual framework is mainly adapted from the accountability relationships
framework developed by the World Bank (2004). The conceptual framework is developed
assuming decentralization, in which there’s a relationship between central and subnational
governments in delivering public service. Figure 3.4 below illustrates the conceptual framework
in this research.
Governments
Figure 3.4.
Research Conceptual Framework
LocalGovernments
Citizens ServiceProviders
Long route of accountability
Central
Governments
Decentralization
Result: Delivery of good public service
Follow up:
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public services
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for good public
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The framework above is seen from the long route of accountability, as in the case of
monopolistic public services. In the long route, the framework begins with demand from
citizens to governments (central and subnational) for good public services. Responding to this,
the governments then make efforts to deliver the citizens’ demand. Within the government itself,
there’s also a coordination to improve public service. In decentralization, the central government
devolves public service functions to subnational governments, and thus subnational
governments have the main responsibilities to deliver the services. In the framework, it is
assumed that instead of delivering the services themselves, subnational governments assign
service providers to deliver the services. The framework concludes with the service providers,
responding to the assignment, delivering good public services to the citizens.
The accountability relationships framework, however, only works under ideal conditions.
Halpern et al. (2008) argued that the ideal conditions that need to be present are (1) citizens that
demand accountability, probity, and good public services from their governments and service
providers, (2) political actors or service providers who are motivated to respond to this demand.
(3) sufficient information for the citizens to understand the level of service and probity delivered,
and (4) functional feedback systems through which the citizens can reward or punish political
actors and service providers according to their behavior.
The first condition, citizens’ demand for good public services, is a general case
everywhere, and thus this condition is reasonably satisfied in almost all situations. The
fulfillment of other conditions, however, is rather uncertain.  Subnational governments and
service providers are not always motivated to respond to citizens’ demand (the second
condition), and information is not always made available for citizens (the third condition).
This situation may arise from, among others, the absence of a functional reward and punishment
system (the fourth condition), and the weak influence of citizens’ demand on subnational
governments’ decisions (the first condition is satisfied but it is not enough to make the
governments respond).
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From this viewpoint, the ideal conditions for the long route of accountability can be seen
as interrelated, rather than independently separate from each other. This also confirms the
significance of incentives in guiding behaviors. The outcome of the unfulfillment of the ideal
conditions is that the accountability relationships do not work properly, and public service
delivery is compromised.
The research argues that since the delivery of public services in decentralization is the
main responsibility of subnational governments, strengthening accountability frameworks can
also be started within the decentralization process by providing the right incentives to
subnational governments. What is considered as ‘the right incentives’ may vary; in most
developed countries, citizens’ demand may be a sufficient incentive to force subnational
governments to take action. In most developing countries, the case may be different, thus a
different incentives scheme needs to be employed.
The accountability relationships framework suggests that citizens’ demand is the trigger
to incentivize subnational governments to ensure good public service delivery. But is it the only
trigger?
Referring to the framework, the research analyzes how incentives can come from a
different source other than citizens’ demand. One notable source of incentives is within the
decentralization system itself by incorporating incentives in intergovernmental grants. In many
developing countries, intergovernmental grants are one of the subnational governments’ main
revenues; therefore, it is crucial that intergovernmental grants promote the right incentives for
the achievement of decentralization objectives, e.g. through intergovernmental grants design
that put emphasis on performance and promote accountability in public service delivery.
3.5. Hypothesis
Previous research points out that the results of intergovernmental grants depend on the
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incentives in the grant system (Bird 2000). For this reason, increasing intergovernmental grants
without considering the incentives effect are unlikely to positively impact public service
delivery. If the right incentives are provided, the incentives can foster efficiency (Steffensen and
Larsen 2005), good governance (UNCDF 2010), and accountability (UNCDF 2010, Feruglio
and Andersen 2006).
Based on these findings, the research argues that the same principle will also work in
Indonesia, and proposes the following hypothesis: “PBG improves public service in Indonesia
by strengthening local governments’ accountability in the service delivery.” A case study in
Indonesian drinking water service will be used to observe whether incorporating incentives in
intergovernmental grants positively impacted local governments’ accountability in delivering
public service.
The hypothesis will be verified using the long route of accountability in the research
conceptual framework described in Figure 3.4. As suggested by the previous findings, the
long-route of accountability is usually the case for public services with no competitor (World
Bank 2004, Schillemans 2008, Meijer and Schillemans 2009). In Indonesia, drinking water
service fits this condition.
To evaluate whether accountability improved with the implementation of PBG, compared
to the condition before PBG, the research will evaluate whether the five accountability features
introduced by the World Bank (2004) are observed:
- Delegating. Is there a clear understanding about what subnational governments must do in
delivering a specific public service?
- Financing. Do subnational governments have financial capacity to deliver the service? If
they do, do they make the financial support (such as investments and subsidies) available?
- Performing. Do subnational governments, or the service providers they appointed, actually
supply the service?
- Having information about performance. Is such information made available to all actors in
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the service delivery, e.g. the governments (central and subnational), citizens, and service
providers?
- Enforcing. Is there a reward and punishment system as a consequence of delivering the
service?
Referring to the research background in Chapter I, the research focuses on the impact of
incentives in intergovernmental grants in improving local governments’ accountability in public
service delivery, with these research questions to explore: (1) Does PBG strengthen the
accountability in public service delivery? (2) If so, how does PBG strengthen the
accountability? and (3) Is PBG generally applicable to local governments in Indonesia?
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CHAPTER IV
DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA
Decentralization is not a new concept to Indonesia. In its history, Indonesia has been
undergoing centralization and decentralization several times. The last policy endorsing
decentralization made it effective again as of January 1, 2001.
Current decentralization in Indonesia applied three decentralization modes of
decentralization: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution (Ferrazzi 2008). To make clear
which level of government is responsible for what, the governments’ functions are divided
between central government and subnational governments (i.e. provincial and local
governments), and resource sharing is organized to provide financial support in exercising the
functions.
The objective of this chapter is to review the implementation of decentralization in
Indonesia, how it is financed, and how it affects public service delivery in general. This chapter
describes how decentralization operates in the country’s political and administrative system.
Function division between levels of government and how it is funded will also be discussed.
The focus of this chapter is the financial aspect of decentralization, or fiscal decentralization,
which is embodied in intergovernmental grants. For this purpose, the management of
intergovernmental grants will be discussed from both national budget and subnational budget
standpoints. Lastly, this chapter presents several public service indicators to give a brief
overview of public service’s current state in comparison with the condition before the
decentralization.
4.1. Brief History of Indonesian Decentralization
The history of decentralization in Indonesia can be traced back to 1903 when Indonesia
was a Dutch colony. With the enactment of the Dutch Decentralization Law of 1903, local
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council for autonomous residencies and municipalities in Indonesia were created. To implement
the law, the Dutch colonial government issued a decree regarding the principles of formation,
arrangement, position, and authority of a council who would manage the finance that had been
split (LAN 2003).
When Japan occupied Indonesia from 1942 to 1945, the situation of wartime demanded
centralization of power. After Indonesian independence in 1945, the country became a republic,
and the Indonesian governments started to rearrange the relation between central and
subnational governments. A law to redefine the structure of governments at the local level was
issued in the same year. The structure was further elaborated in 1948. In 1957, the government
issued a law to provide some degree of power to subnational governments. This policy was soon
changed when Indonesia entered a more authoritarian period under Old Order regime, called
‘Guided Democracy’, in 1959. In 1965, a law reinforcing centralization was enacted. When the
New Order regime took over the power in 1967, centralization was pervasive, with central
government controlling all aspects of governments including politics, public administration, and
fiscal balance. Another law issued in 1974 stipulated the principles of such arrangements. The
centralized control was exercised through all levels of bureaucracy and military, creating
discontentment in many regions (Satriyo et al. 2003).
In 1998, following the Asian financial crisis that also hit the country severely in 1997, the
activities of separatism movement escalated. Demand for independence was strongly voiced
mainly by regions rich in natural resources, arguing that central government had been
over-exploiting the regions’ resources while abandoning the welfare of local people. The
discontentment that had been deeply rooted during the fallen New Order regime emerged and
was considered a threat to the unity of the nation. Decentralization was seen as one of the
alternatives to avoid national disintegration. Responding to this, two laws concerning
decentralization were issued in 1999, and Indonesia effectively implemented decentralization on
January 1, 2001. Both laws were later replaced by new laws in 2004, and to date the
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implementation of decentralization in Indonesia is based on the laws.  Figure 4.1 below
summarizes the milestone of Indonesian decentralization.
Decentralization in Indonesia includes administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization.
Under administrative decentralization, Indonesian government shares its power and functions
through deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. As for fiscal decentralization, the four
pillars of fiscal decentralization can be observed in Indonesia: the assignment of expenditure
responsibilities, the assignment of revenue and its local administration, the subnational
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Figure 4.1.
Milestone in Indonesia Decentralization
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borrowing and debt, and the design and provision of intergovernmental grants. All of the four
pillars are present in Indonesian laws concerning fiscal decentralization.
4.2. Administrative Division under Decentralization
Indonesia is divided into provinces (provinsi), which are further divided into regencies
(kabupaten) and cities (kota). Provinces, regencies, and cities have their own subnational
government and local parliament (Regional People’s Representatives Assembly/Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/DPRD). Provinces are headed by governor (gubernur), regencies by
regent (bupati), and cities by mayor (walikota). Regencies and cities are at the same government
level.
Regencies and cities are divided into districts (kecamatan), headed by head of district
(camat). Districts are further divided into villages (desa) and towns (kelurahan). Desas are
headed by head of desa (kepala desa), while kelurahan are headed by head of kelurahan (lurah).
Generally, desa is considered more rural than kelurahan. Figure 4.2 below describes the
Indonesian structure of government.
Figure 4.2.
Indonesian Structure of Government
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76
Since the implementation of decentralization in 2001, the number of provinces, regencies,
and districts has increased. When decentralization was first implemented, Indonesia consisted
of 31 provinces, and 348 cities and regencies. A decade after decentralization, the number of
provinces is 33, while the number of cities and regencies is 497. Rapid increase in the number
of cities and regencies occurred in 2002 and 2003. Table 4.1 below presents the change in the
number of provinces, cities and regencies from 2001 to 2011, and Table 4.2 summarizes the
number of Indonesian subnational governments (provinces, regencies, cities, districts, and
villages and towns) as of January 2011:
Table 4.1.
Number of Provinces, Cities and Regencies
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Provinces 31 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Cities and
Regencies 348 385 434 434 434 434 459 489 491 491 497
Total 379 417 466 467 467 467 492 522 524 524 530
% increase - 10.03% 11.75% 0.21% 0.00% 0.00% 5.35% 6.10% 0.38% 0.00% 1.15%
(Source: Indonesian Ministry of Finance, Directorate General of Fiscal Balance. Materials presented in
Socialization of Government Regulation No. 2/2012 in Jakarta, March 2012).
Table 4.2.
Number of Indonesian Subnational Governments
Provinces (Provinsi) 33
Regencies (Kabupaten) 399
Cities (Kota) 98
Districts (Kecamatan) 6,994
Village and Town (Desa and Kelurahan)* 77,565
*(Desa=69,249 Kelurahan=8,216)
(Source: Minister of Home Affairs Decree No. 66/2011)
4.3. Decentralization Laws and Regulations
Indonesian decentralization, and in particular fiscal decentralization for
intergovernmental grants, is regulated in several laws and governments regulation.5 The laws
5 According to the Decree of the People’s Representative Assembly (“Ketetapan MPR”) No.
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that directly touched the issue of decentralization are Law No. 32/2004 and Law No. 33/2004.
Both laws are derived from previously enacted laws, which regulated areas related to fiscal
decentralization, and are detailed in several government regulations. Figure 4.3 below
summarizes the legal framework of Indonesian fiscal decentralization.
III/MPR/2000 on The Source of Law and Hierarchy of Laws, the Indonesian basic hierarchy of laws are:
1. Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (the “Constitution”). It can only be amended by MPR.
2. Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (the “Decree of the People’s Representative Assembly”),
is made by MPR.
3. Undang-Undang (the “Laws”), is joint agreement between President and DPR.
4. Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang (the “Regulation in Lieu of Law” or “Interim
Law”), is made by President.
5. Peraturan Pemerintah (the “Government Regulation”), is made by President.
6. Keputusan Presiden (“Presidential Decree”), is made by President.
7. Peraturan Daerah (“Regional Regulation”), is joint agreement between the head of subnational
government and local parliament/Regional People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat Daerah/DPRD).
According to the Constitution (chapter 5 verse 2), President issues Government Regulation to implement
a Law. This becomes the basis for issuing government regulation after the enactment of law. Government
regulation details the mandates of law for effective implementation.
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Calavan et al. (2009) pointed out that during the first years of decentralization, subnational
governments went ahead of the political pace of decentralization in the early years. For this
reason, the latest laws included various provisions reminding subnational governments that they
are part of a hierarchical system and impose clearer limits on their authority. Some notable
points in Law No. 32/2004 are:
- Subnational governments “have relations” with central government and other regional
governments. The “relations” shall include authority, finance, public service, and
exploitation of natural resources (article 2, paragraph 4 and 5).
- The principles of sharing authority and management is to be divided based on criteria of
externality, accountability, and efficiency with due attention to “harmonious relations
Figure 4.3.
Legal Framework of Indonesia Fiscal Decentralization
Law No. 1/2004 on National
Treasury
Law No. 33/2004 on Fiscal
Balance between Central
Governments and Regional
Governance
Law No. 17/2003 on National
Finance
Law No. 32/2004 on Local
Governance
Law No. 15/2004 on the
Auditing of the Management and
the Responsibilities of the
National Finance
Government Regulations:
- No. 54/2005 on Regional Borrowings (Pinjaman Daerah)
- No. 55/2005 on Balancing Funds (Dana Perimbangan)
- No. 56/2005 on Regional Finance Information System (Sistem Informasi Keuangan Daerah)
- No. 57/2005 on Regional Grants (Hibah Daerah, replaced by Government Regulation No. 2/2012 in 2012)
- No. 58/2005 on Regional Financial Management (Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah)
- No. 38/2007 on Functional Assignments between Central Government, Provincial Governments, and
City/Regency Governments (Pembagian Urusan Pemerintahan antara Pemerintah Pusat, Pemerintah
Provinsi, dan Pemerintah Kabupaten/Kota)
- No. 7/2008 on Deconcentration and Coadministration funds (Dana Dekonsentrasi dan Dana Tugas
Pembantuan)
Government Regulation No. 2/2012 on Regional Grants (replacing Government Regulation No. 57/2005).
Source: Author compilation
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between government strata”. Provincial, regency, and city governments are all related,
interdependent, and synergistic as parts of one government system (article 11).
- Central government assumes the role in “supervision” of regional governments, including
(1) supervision of implementation of government affairs; and (2) supervision on regional
ordinances and regulations issued by the local executive (article 218, paragraph 1).
- Clarification that fostering and supervision of management (1) for regional governments at
the national level will be coordinated by the Ministry of Home Affairs; (2) for the regency
or city by the governor; and (3) for village or neighborhood governments by the regent or
mayor (article 222).
Law No. 32/2004 mainly regulates the assignments of expenditures, responsibilities, and
revenues and its local administration. Other aspects of public administrations such as local
election and subnational governance are also elaborated. This law also serves as a reference in
Law No. 33/2004 in regulating the funding of such assignments. Law No. 33/2004 mainly
regulates the financial relation between central and subnational governments, including regional
borrowings and intergovernmental grants.
Law No. 32/2004 and Law No. 33/2004 were later derived in several government
regulations that further detailed the law implementation. In 2005, a set of government
regulations concerning fiscal decentralization were issued (Government Regulation No. 54, 55,
56, 57, and 58/2005). Areas covered by the government regulations include intergovernmental
grants (consist of ‘balancing funds’ and other grants), regional borrowings, regional financial
management, and regional finance information system. In 2007, functional sharing between
central governments, provincial governments, and local governments was also enacted in a
government regulation (No. 38/2007). In 2008, another government regulation (No. 7/2008)
concerning the funding of the central government’s functions was issued, to make more explicit
the functions to be exercised by each level of government. At a more technical level,
government regulations can be derived in ministerial decrees.
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4.4. Functions Sharing and Funding
Determining the design of fiscal decentralization that works well for a country should
start with determining the power and functions to be decentralized, and to what level the
decentralization will be implemented. Rondinelli (1990) put the emphasis on the alignment of
responsibilities between levels of government, recognizing that not all functions of a nation
should be decentralized. Some that are essential to the survival of a nation, services that
benefit from economies of scale and standardization in production, that depend on large
networks of facilities or a hierarchy of services, that can only be distributed equitably by a
government large and powerful enough to redistribute wealth in the face of opposition, that
create territorial spillover effects, or that depend on massive capital investments, may be better
administered by central governments than by decentralized units.
Similarly, Ter-Minassian (1997) mentioned that, while decentralization in spending
responsibilities can entail substantial welfare gain because of efficiency in the allocation of
resources, centralized functions are efficient for national public goods, whose benefits extend
nationwide or whose provision is subject to substantial economic of scale.
The main shift of power after decentralization is to local governments. With
decentralization focusing on regencies and cities, its implementation results in local
governments receiving a substantial share of functions devolution, which is public service
functions, and decentralization funding. Local governments, who are assumed to have the best
knowledge of their regions’ and peoples’ potentials, are expected to be the ‘development
engines’ by utilizing those potentials. Local governments are expected to plan regional
development, formulate regional policies, and execute the policies in a way that is
accommodative and responsive to the regions’ conditions.
The mandate for functions sharing is stated in Law No. 32/2004. It is then explained
further in Government Regulation No. 38/2007. According to the regulation, for the central
government, government functions consist of absolute functions and concurrent functions.
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a. Absolute functions
Absolute functions are functions which are exclusively of the central government,
consisting of 6 functions: international politics, fiscal and monetary, defense, religions,
national security, and system of law.
b. Concurrent functions
Concurrent functions are functions other than the six absolute functions. In each function,
specific tasks are divided between each level of government (central, provincial, and local
governments) with consideration of externality, efficiency, and accountability. Concurrent
functions assigned to subnational governments consist of obligatory functions (public
services), and discretionary functions (management of local potential).
As for subnational governments (provincial and local governments), government
functions consist of obligatory functions and discretionary functions.
a. Obligatory functions
Obligatory functions are government functions which are related to basic public services
that must be provided by provincial and local governments.
b. Discretionary functions
Discretionary functions are real government functions that have the potential to improve
local citizens’ welfare in accordance with local conditions, uniqueness, and local potentials.
Financial support for subnational governments to exercise public service functions is
regulated in Laws No. 33/2004. According to the laws, subnational revenues come from 3
sources:
- own-source revenues (locally-raised revenues in a region, collected based on subnational
government regulation in implementation of decentralization).
- balancing funds (a component of intergovernmental grants; funds from the national budget
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allocated to regions to finance the needs of the regions in implementation of
decentralization).
- other revenues (revenues other than own-source revenues and balancing funds, e.g. grants
from third parties, donation, and intergovernmental grants other than balancing funds)
Own-source revenues are in most cases not sufficient to finance the implementation of
decentralization. This makes financial support from central government the main source of
revenue in a subnational budget. Balancing funds are the most notable in terms of nominal value.
The funds are part of intergovernmental grants. Intergovernmental grants other than balancing
funds (i.e. emergency funds, grants including PBG, adjustment funds, and special autonomy
funds) are classified as ‘other revenues’ in a subnational budget. Figure 4.4 below summarizes
the functions sharing and funding between central government and subnational governments:
Figure 4.4.
Functions Sharing and Funding
Government
Functions
Subnational
Governments
Central
Government
Absolute Functions
1. International politics
2. Defense
3. National Security
4. System of laws
5. Fiscal and monetary
6. Religion
Concurrent functions
Other than the 6 absolute
functions.
Obligatory functions
Public services
Discretionary functions
Managing local potential
Funded
by
National
budget
Funded
by Sub-
national
Budget.
Sources: Summarized from Government Regulations No. 38/2007 and No. 7/2008
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As illustrated in Figure 4.4, the financial aspect of decentralization is to be managed in
national and subnational budget. According to the laws, functions which are the central
government’s responsibilities (absolute functions and concurrent functions) are funded by
national budget. Similarly, functions which belong to subnational governments (obligatory
functions and discretionary functions) are funded by subnational budget. Consequently, the
funding of central government’s functions is to be administered in national budget, and that of
subnational governments is to be administered in subnational budget.
4.5. Intergovernmental Grants
Intergovernmental grants are the main revenues source for most Indonesian subnational
governments. According to the Ministry of Finance (2010b), the objectives of
intergovernmental grants are:
- Improving local fiscal capacity and reducing both vertical imbalance and horizontal
imbalance.
- Harmonizing funding needs in regions with regard to government functions sharing
between central, provincial, and local governments.
- Improving the quality of public service delivery and reducing the gap in public service
delivery between regions.
- Supporting fiscal sustainability and macro economy policies.
- Improving regions’ competitiveness.
- Improving local governments in exploring regions’ economic potentials.
- Improving the efficiency of national resources utilization.
- Synchronizing national development programs with local development programs.
To achieve the objectives, different types of intergovernmental grants are used. There are
five components of intergovernmental grants to date, each of them can be categorized into two
major classifications: unconditional grants and conditional grants.
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IntergovernmentalGrants
Balancing Funds
General Allocation Funds(DAU)
Specific Allocation Funds(DAK)
Revenue Sharing Funds (DBH)
Taxes
(DBH-Taxes)
Natural Resources (DBH-Natural Resources)
Emergency Funds
Grants
Special AutonomyFunds
Adjustment Funds
4.5.1. Intergovernmental Grants Components
Figure 4.5 below summarizes the components of intergovernmental grants.
1. Balancing funds
According to Law No. 33/2004, balancing funds are funds from national revenue,
allocated to regions to finance regions’ needs in the implementation of decentralization.
Balancing funds consist of three elements: the general allocation funds (Dana Alokasi
Umum/DAU), specific allocation funds (Dana Alokasi Khusus/DAK), and revenues
sharing funds (Dana Bagi Hasil/DBH). Under current laws and regulations, all local
governments will receive at least one element of balancing funds. DAU are general
grants or unconditional grants.
a. General Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Umum/DAU)
Referring to Law No. 33/2004, DAU comes from national revenue, allocated
to achieve horizontal fiscal balance and to finance regions’ needs in the
implementation of decentralization. At the beginning of the implementation of
Figure 4.5
Indonesian Intergovernmental Grants
85
decentralization, a hold harmless policy was imposed on the DAU, much more to
the extent of political rather than financial interests. Hold harmless policy
required that current year’s DAU should not be less than the previous year’s. This
policy prevented the horizontal imbalance between regions from reducing, as well
as decreased local governments’ incentives to be more efficient in planning their
budget and in implementing their programs. Hold harmless policy was abolished
in 2008. For most local governments, DAU is used to finance administrative
expenditures, especially official salaries.
Currently, a formula approach is applied in the calculation of DAU to each
local government. This approach has enabled central governments to keep already
prosperous regions from receiving too many funds, and to maintain proper spread
of general allocation funds to needy regions. Some regions with high fiscal
capacities are also excluded from DAU allocation, based on the formula.
As unconditional grants, DAU can be used according to local priorities
without intervention from central governments. DAU is transferred to subnational
governments every month in a year, in an amount equal to 1/12 of annual DAU
allocation.
b. Specific Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Khusus/DAK)
DAK is defined in Law No. 33/2004 as funds from national revenue
allocated to certain local governments to finance specific functions, which are
local governments’ functions and parts of national priority programs. DAK is
conditional/earmarked grants and formula-based. The central government decides
which local government is to receive DAK based on general criteria, specific
criteria, and technical criteria. Most subnational governments rely on DAK to
finance capital expenditures. DAK is matching grants as well, requiring
subnational government to allocate at least 10% of DAK nominal value as
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counterpart funds in a project.
DAK is formula-based, and it targets sectors considered as national priorities.
The sectors may change every year, depending on central government policies.
DAK is transferred to subnational governments in three installments, 30%, 45%,
and 25% of annual DAK allocation, respectively.
c. Revenue Sharing Funds (Dana Bagi Hasil/DBH)
According to Law No. 33/2004, DBH is funds from national revenue,
allocated to regions based on percentage to finance regions’ needs in the
implementation of decentralization. There are two subjects of DBH: taxes and
natural resources. DBH is formula-based.
According to Government Regulation No. 55/2005, DBH is shared between
central, provincial, and local governments. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 summarize the
sharing of DBH Taxes and DBH Natural Resources among central and
subnational governments.
Table 4.3.
Sharing of DBH Taxes
Taxes CentralGovernment (%)
Subnational
Government (%) Transfer time
Property taxes 10 90 Weekly
Property acquisition taxes 20 80 Weekly
Personal income taxes 80 20 Quarterly
Tariffs on tobacco products 98 2 According to
regulation
Table 4.4.
Sharing of DBH Natural Resources
Natural resources
Central
Government
(%)
Subnational
Government
(%)
Transfer time
Forestry 20 80 Quarterly
General mining 20 80 Quarterly
Fishery 20 80 Quarterly
Oil 84.5 15.5 Quarterly
Gas 69.5 30.5 Quarterly
Geothermal 20 80 Quarterly
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DBH sharing of subnational governments is further divided between
provincial and local governments, and some are subject to redistribution to all
local governments in the same provinces. Some part of DBH share of the central
government is also subject to redistribution.
DBH has the same characteristics as unconditional grants, except for DBH
natural resources from oil and gas. For revenues from oil and gas, provincial
governments are required to allocate 0.1% of the amount for elementary
education, while local governments are required to allocate 0.2% for the same
sector.
2. ‘Grants’ (Hibah)
Before discussing ‘grants’ (written in apostrophe), it is important to explain that
the word ‘grants’ here is a terminology referring to a component in Indonesian
intergovernmental grants. Throughout the previous chapter, and for the rest of the
dissertation (unless mentioned otherwise), the word grants (without apostrophe)
represent a concept in which central government transfers some amount of funds to
lower level of governments.
Referring to the word grants as a concept, all components in Indonesian
intergovernmental transfers qualified as grants. Referring to the word ‘grants’ as a
terminology, Law No. 33/2004 defines ‘grants’ as local government revenues from
foreign government, foreign organizations/institutions, central government, domestic
organizations/institutions, and individuals in the form of foreign currency, Indonesian
rupiahs, goods and/or services including experts and training that do not require
repayments. PBG is classified under this category.
The terms and conditions of ‘grants’ are stipulated in ‘grants’ agreements between
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the central government and recipient local governments; therefore, ‘grants’ can be
customized according to the type of projects and goals to accomplish. ‘Grants’ can be
designed as unconditional or conditional. The existence of ‘grants’ agreement is the
point that distinguishes ‘grants’ from other intergovernmental grants components.
While the other components are regulated by a one-size-fits-all guideline, ‘grants’
agreement is customized according to individual recipient condition and is more legally
binding. In Indonesian intergovernmental grants system, PBG is classified as ‘grants’.
3. Emergency Funds (Dana Darurat)
In Law No. 33/2004, emergency funds are defined as funds from national revenue
allocated to regions facing national-scale disaster, extraordinary situation, and/or
solvability crisis. The funds are earmarked grants. Until 2012, emergency funds have
never been allocated in the national budget. If emergency funds are to be allocated,
they must be used to address specific purposes according to Law 33/2004, thus the
funds are conditional grants.
4. Special Autonomy Funds (Dana Otonomi Khusus)
According to Law No. 18/2001, No. 21/2001, and No. 35/2008, special autonomy
funds are funds allocated to finance the implementation of special autonomy in certain
regions. Regions classified as special autonomies are stated in laws. Currently, three
provinces are designated as special autonomies: Aceh, Papua, and West Papua.  All
cities and regencies in those provinces, as a result, also gain this status.
As special autonomous regions, the provinces enjoy administrative, political, and
financial privilege. The financial privilege is in the form of additional DAU and DBH
natural resources in oil and gas. Except for additional 2% of total national DAU
allocation for Papua and West Papua provinces, special autonomy funds are
unconditional grants.
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5. Adjustment Funds (Dana Penyesuaian)
Unlike other grants which establishments and allocations are mandated in specific
laws, adjustment funds are established every year in a law of the national budget.
Unlike other laws, the law of the national budget is implemented in current fiscal year
only, as each fiscal year requires a new law. Specific laws, on the other hand, are
implemented until they are abolished. Since adjustment funds are only stated in the law
of the national budget, the funding is rather ad-hoc.
The creation of adjustment funds is arguably to support regions in executing
specific national policies established by the central government and the parliament
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR)/People’s Representatives Assembly). Adjustment
funds consist of several components, which names or terminologies varied from year to
year. Despite the terminologies, adjustment funds have specific purpose, thus qualified
as conditional grants.6
4.5.2. Intergovernmental Grants in National Budget
The allocation of intergovernmental grants in central government budget is generally
formula-based. Of all components of intergovernmental grants, balancing funds (consisting of
DAU, DAK, and DBH) are the most significant in nominal value. Until now, intergovernmental
grants were dominated by unconditional grants, especially in the form of balancing funds DAU.
Theoretically, this should enable subnational governments to exercise their fiscal autonomy by
managing their budget according to local priorities. Table 4.5 below summarizes the allocation
of intergovernmental grants in the national budget from 2005 to 2010.
6 Adjustment funds raise concerns because political intervention by DPR seems to dominate its creation.
Kumorotomo (2010) argued that this situation is motivated by interests to allocate more funds to certain
regions in case such allocation is not possible under DAU and DAK. After hold-harmless provision was
abolished in 2008, regions are not guaranteed increasing DAU allocation. Similarly, in DAK allocation,
the employment of formula also prevents the assurance of increasing DAK allocation. To make up for the
decreased funding, adjustment funds were introduced. The Ministry of Finance (2010b) confirmed that
the components of adjustment funds are not yet formula-based or allocated according to a set of criteria,
but the government is working to resolve the problem.
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Table 4.5
Intergovernmental Grants Allocation in National Budget
(in IDR trillion)
Components
Allocation per year and % of Gross Domestic Products (GDP)
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Total Balancing funds 143.3 5.1 222.1 6.7 244.0 6.2 278.8 5.6 287.2 5.1 314.4 5.0
DBH 50.5 1.8 64.9 1.9 63.0 1.6 78.4 1.6 76.1 1.4 89.6 1.4
DAU 88.8 3.2 145.7 4.4 164.8 4.2 179.5 3.6 186.4 3.3 203.6 3.3
DAK 4.0 0.1 11.6 0.3 16.2 0.4 20.8 0.4 24.7 0.4 21.1 0.3
Total special autonomy
funds and adjustment funds
7.2 0.3 4.0 0.1 9.3 0.2 13.7 0.3 21.3 0.4 30.2 0.5
Special autonomy funds 1.8 0.1 3.5 0.1 4.0 0.1 7.5 0.2 9.5 0.2 9.1 0.1
Adjustment funds 5.5 0.2 0.6 0.0 5.2 0.1 6.2 0.1 11.8 0.2 21.1 0.3
Total inter- governmental
grants
150.4 5.4 226.2 6.8 253.3 6.4 292.4 5.9 308.6 5.5 344.6 5.5
(Source: Indonesian Ministry of Finance (2010a). The difference in sums is due to rounding).
In 2005 (the fifth year of fiscal decentralization), intergovernmental transfers were IDR
150.4 trillion. In 2010, it increased to IDR 344.6 trillion. All components of intergovernmental
transfers increased during that period. DAU, the most significant component in term of nominal
value, increased from IDR 88.8 trillion in 2005 to IDR 203.6 trillion in 2010. The highest
increase was DAK, from about IDR 4 trillion in 2005 to IDR 21.1 trillion in 2010 – about
400% increase in nominal value. DBH is fluctuative during the period, but the figure increased
from 2005 to 2010. DBH is mostly enjoyed by regions rich in natural resources and those with
many tax subjects. In 2010, region benefiting the most from DBH-natural resources is East
Kalimantan province, a region rich in oil reserves, while Jakarta Special Capital Territory
received the highest DBH-taxes. Figure 4.5 below summarizes the trends of intergovernmental
grants from 2005 to 2010.
Figure 4.5
Intergovernmental Grants Trends
(In IDR Trillions)
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(Source: Indonesian Ministry of Finance (2010a)).
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According to Law No. 33/2004, at least 26% of estimated net national revenues must
be allocated as DAU. The average percentage of allocation between 2007 and 2010 is 30%. In
2010, intergovernmental transfers combined with line ministries budget allocation to
subnational governments reached 60.62%, in an amount of IDR 682.69 trillion (Ministry of
Finance 2010b).
4.5.3. Intergovernmental Grants in Subnational Budgets
Fiscal decentralization in Indonesia is more focused on expenditure decentralization,
compared to revenue decentralization. Subnational governments are given autonomy to generate
local taxes (e.g. restaurant and hotel taxes, motor vehicle taxes, entertainment taxes) and
retribution (e.g. parking retribution, market retribution). However, most taxes are still controlled
by the central government. Concerning personal income taxes, for example, 80% of the total is
the central government’s while the remaining 20% are shared to subnational governments. Other
major taxes like corporate income taxes, sales taxes, and value added taxes are controlled by the
central government.
Expenditure decentralization, on the other hand, is more evident. Given limited
revenue sources for most subnational governments, and the significant difference in fiscal
capacity between regions, the devolution of government functions needs to be supported by
financial support from the central government. For this reason, intergovernmental funds,
especially balancing funds –DAU, DBH, and DAK– continue to be a major revenue source for
most subnational governments. Figure 4.6 below summarizes the nominal amount of
subnational governments’ revenues from 2007 to 2010.
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(Source: Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics. Financial Statistics of Regency/Municipality Governance
2007-2008 and 2009-2010).
DAU has been the major source of revenues for most subnational governments.
However, the percentage of DAU to total subnational revenues tends to decrease from 2007 to
2010. DBH and DAK fluctuated slightly during the period. On average from 2007 to 2010,
DAU accounted for 59.21% of total subnational governments’ revenues. DBH is the second
highest with 16.96%, and DAK is the third with 7.44%. This shows that despite the decreasing
percentage, DAU is still dominating the subnational revenues. Own-source revenues (OSR) and
other revenues increased every year from 2007 to 2010. On average, 7.24% of subnational
governments’ revenues come from PAD, and 9.16% come from other revenues.
Figure 4.7 below summarizes subnational expenditures from 2007 to 2010. Major
expenditure in subnational budgets are salary expenditure (averaged 46.32% of total expenditure
from 2007 to 2010), capital expenditures (averaged 26.99%), and goods and services
expenditure (averaged 17.14%). From the three major expenditures, only salary expenditure
experienced steady increase annually, reaching 51.08% of total subnational expenditures in
2010 from 42.59% in 2007. On the contrary, capital expenditure decreased from 30.84% in 2007
to 21.24% in 2010, while goods and service expenditures decreased from 17.61% to 16.58%
during the same period.
2007 2008 2009 2010
Others 8.23% 7.20% 11.25% 9.95%
DAK 6.95% 7.89% 7.99% 6.92%
DAU 60.93% 61.42% 56.98% 57.50%
DBH 17.10% 16.95% 16.29% 17.51%
OSR 6.79% 6.54% 7.50% 8.12%
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Figure 4.6
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(Source: Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics. Financial Statistics of Regency/Municipality Governance
2007-2008 and 2009-2010)
The data shows that salary expenditures for subnational officials, especially local
government officials, is the most significant expenditure in local budgets.  In comparison with
central and provincial government, in 2010, central government official salary expenditure
covers 20.8% of total national expenditures, and 26.37% of provincial expenditures, while local
government official salaries in average cover 50.7% of total local expenditures (Ministry of
Finance 2010a). If compared internationally, the expenditure for official salaries is very high,
compared to around 5% in more developed countries (Lewis and Smoke 2008).
Why are salary expenditure so high compared to other subnational expenditures?
When decentralization was started, central government officials who used to work under line
ministries regional offices were transferred to subnational governments, and became part of
subnational bureaucracy. To ease the burden of official salaries, the central government included
the official salary component into DAU formula (to be discussed in the next chapter). This
component is still included in DAU formula. As decentralization developed, subnational
governments could recruit more officials with central government’s approval. At first, 100% of
2007 2008 2009 2010
Other expenditures 0.86% 0.93% 0.65% 0.69%
Social and financial support 6.64% 5.68% 5.97% 5.54%
Grants and Subsidies 1.45% 1.79% 3.12% 4.86%
Capital 30.84% 30.06% 25.84% 21.24%
Goods and services 17.61% 17.36% 17.00% 16.58%
Salary 42.59% 44.19% 47.42% 51.08%
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Figure 4.7.
Subnational Expenditures Composition
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salary expenditure was covered in the formula. For fiscal year 2011, the government and DPR
agreed to cover 83.1% of provincial salary expenditure and 68.56% of local salary expenditure
(Ministry of Finance, 2010b). Despite the decreasing coverage from the central government,
salary expenditure still dominates. In 2011, it covers 46.16% of subnational expenditures
(Ministry of Finance 2012).
4.6. The State of Public Service Delivery
According to World Development Indicators 2010, most public services indicators in
Indonesia show that there is improvement in public services post decentralization. Table 4.6
below shows that indicators in education and health are generally improving from 2000 to 2008.
A notable exception is access to water in urban area, which declined from 90% in 2000 to 89%
in 2008. 7
Table 4.6.
Selected Public Service Indicators
Indonesia, 2000 and 2008
Year
Education Health Water Sanitation
Primary
School
Enrollment
Secondary
School
Enrollment
Infant
Mortality
Life
Expectancy
Access –
Rural
Area
Access –
Urban
Area
Access –
Sanitation
(%) (%) (/1000 livebirths) (years) (%)
(%) (%)
2000 94 50 38 66 66 90 44
2008 96 65 29 68 71 89 52
(Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2010, retrieved from
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2010 )
Despite the improvement domestically, compared to the neighboring countries which
are closest in wealth –Vietnam, Philippines, and Thailand– indicators for health, water, and
sanitation services place Indonesia in a relatively low position. Table 4.7 summarizes several
indicators of education, health, water and sanitation in 2008 in Indonesia and other countries in
South East Asia. Infant mortality rate is the highest compared to the three other countries, while
7 (Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2010, retrieved from
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2010 )
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life expectancy is the lowest (the same as Philippines). Access to improved water source8 in
Indonesian rural area is 71%, and in urban area 89%; both are the lowest compared to the three
other countries. In the case of access to improved sanitation,9 Indonesia is among the lowest
with 52% of population having access to sanitation. This is second only after Cambodia, whose
GDP per capita is among the lowest in South-East Asia (based on GDP per capita in 2008).10
Table 4.7.
Selected Public Service Indicators
South-East Asian Countries, 2008
Country
Education Health Water Sanitation
Primary School
Enrollment
Secondary
School
Enrollment
Infant
Mortality
Life
Expectancy
Access –
Rural
Area
Access –
Urban
Area
Access –
Sanitation
(%) (%) (/1000 livebirths) (years) (%)
(%) (%)
Brunei 93 95 6 78 Not
Available
Not
Available
Not
Available
Cambodia 96 Not Available 49 62 56 81 29
Indonesia 96 65 29 68 71 89 52
Lao PDR 89 37 46 66 51 72 53
Malaysia Not Available 69 6 74 99 100 96
Myanmar Not Available 50 53 64 69 75 81
Philippines 88 60 25 68 87 93 76
Singapore Not Available Not Available 2 81 - 100 100
Thailand 91 70 12 74 98 99 96
Vietnam 99 Not Available 20 74 92 99 75
(Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2010)
8Access to improved water source refers to the percentage of the population with reasonable access to an
adequate amount of water from an improved source, such as a household connection, public standpipe,
borehole, protected well or spring, and rainwater collection. Unimproved sources include vendors, tanker
trucks, and unprotected wells and springs. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least 20
liters a person a day from a source within one kilometer of the dwelling (Definition by World Health
Organization/WHO and United Nations Children Emergency’s Funds/UNICEF – Joint Measurement
Program/JMP).
(Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.H2O.SAFE.RU.ZS?display=map).
9Access to improved sanitation facilities refers to the percentage of the population with at least adequate
access to excreta disposal facilities that can effectively prevent human, animal, and insect contact with
excreta. Improved facilities range from simple but protected pit latrines to flush toilets with a sewage
connection. To be effective, facilities must be correctly constructed and properly maintained (Definition
by World Health Organization/WHO and United Nations Children Emergency’s Funds/UNICEF – Joint
Measurement Program/JMP.
(Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.ACSN.UR/countries/1W?display=graph).
10 According to World Development Indicator 2010, GDP per capita as of 2008 (in current US Dollar) in
descending order for South East Asian countries is as follows: Brunei Darussalam (37,414), Singapore
(36,738), Malaysia (8,099), Thailand (3,993), Indonesia (2,172), Philippines (1,925), Vietnam (1,070),
Lao PDR (910), and Cambodia (741). Data for Myanmar is not available.
(Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD).
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The data shows that in general, decentralization is marked with improvement in most
public service. However, even with the improvement, Indonesia still performs relatively low
compared to neighboring countries with roughly similar wealth. In specific cases like water
service, indicators show worsening condition after decentralization. The indicators do not show
the cause of such condition, but they imply that there is room for improvement in public service
delivery in Indonesia.
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CHAPTER V
EVALUATION OF INDONESIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANTS
In Indonesia, intergovernmental grants have been the main source of revenues for most
local (and provincial) governments. As described in Chapter IV, Indonesian intergovernmental
grants consist of five components: balancing funds, special autonomy funds, adjustment funds,
emergency funds, and ‘grants’ (hibah). All of the components can be classified into
unconditional and conditional grants.
Among the five components, the most significant in nominal values is balancing funds.
Balancing funds have three subcomponents: the unconditional grants DAU and DBH, and the
conditional grants DAK. From 2005 to 2010, balancing funds always made up more than 80%
of intergovernmental grants. Because of its significant proportion, balancing funds have greater
effect on subnational budgets, compared to other intergovernmental grants components. The
accountability of balancing funds management at the local level also significantly impacts the
subnational governments’ performance in delivering public services.
This chapter evaluates balancing funds in light of their role in improving public service
delivery. Previous research argues that unconditional grants aim at equalization (Steffensen
2009, Broadway and Shah 2009), which means equalizing the (fiscal) capacity of subnational
governments to provide comparable public services at comparable rates (Broadway 2007).
Conditional grants aim at, among other things, improving specific sectors considered as high
priority nationally (Steffensen 2009) to achieve minimum service standard in public service
delivery (Broadway 2007, Slack 2007).
This chapter focuses on whether balancing funds function as their intended designs, in the
sense that DAU and DBH have equalizing effect, and DAK puts emphasis on financing specific
sectors. Consistent with the research focus, which is incentives and accountability, this chapter
also evaluates balancing funds in light of the incentives embedded in them (if any) even
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implicitly, and how the implementation of balancing funds demonstrates accountability. The
evaluation results will be used to identify (1) the limitation of balancing funds, and (2) the
improvement that needs to be introduced in Indonesian intergovernmental grants, and (3) the
significance of implementing PBG in Indonesia.
5.1. General Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Umum/DAU)
As unconditional grants, DAU can be used according to subnational priority without
intervention from the central government. Law No. 33/2004 states that DAU aims at ensuring
equal distribution of fiscal capacity to reduce the inequality in financial capacity among regions
with due consideration to the needs and potentials of each region. DAU is established based on
fiscal gap, which is the difference between fiscal needs and fiscal capacity. In this sense, regions
with high fiscal capacity and low fiscal needs will receive less DAU than regions with low
fiscal capacity and high fiscal needs. This principle confirms DAU as a factor for equal
distribution of fiscal capacity.
DAU is allocated based on the formula stipulated in Law No. 33/2004. According to the
law, at least 26% of net domestic revenues established in the national budget must be allocated
for DAU. This makes DAU the most significant part of intergovernmental transfers in terms of
nominal value, and also the major revenue source for most subnational governments.
DAU formula uses weighted variables. While the law states the fixed variables to be used
in the formula, the weight of each variable can differ according to the central government’s
proposal and national parliament’s (DPR) approval. The formula for DAU allocation is as
follows:
DAU = Basic Allocation + Fiscal Gap
= Basic Allocation + (Fiscal Needs – Fiscal Capacity)
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a. Basic allocation
The variable of basic allocation is total salaries of subnational government employees,
which used to be provided in full as basic allocation. However, a recent trend in DAU
formula does not provide for full support of subnational official salaries. In 2011, the
variable weights are 83.1% for provinces and 68.56% for cities and regencies. This means
that DAU only covers 83.1% of official salaries in provinces, and 68.56% of official
salaries in cities/regencies (Ministry of Finance 2011).
b. Fiscal needs
Fiscal needs mean the financing requirements of the region in providing basic public
services. The variables of financing requirements are total population index (TPI), areas
size index (ASI), construction cost index (CCI), gross regional domestic products per
capita (GRDP per capita), and human development index (HDI). The formula also accounts
for the average total expenditures (ATE) in subnational budgets. Taking all the indexes into
account, the formula for fiscal needs is:
Fiscal needs = ATE (TPI + ASI + CCI + HDI + GRDP per capita)
c. Fiscal capacity
Fiscal capacity means financing sources of the region derived from the variables of
own-source revenues (OSR) and revenue sharing funds (Dana Bagi Hasil/DBH), which
consist of revenue sharing from taxes (DBHT) and from natural resources (DBHNR). The
formula for fiscal capacity is:
Fiscal capacity = OSR + DBHT + DBHNR
DAU used to adopt hold-harmless policy, a policy requiring current year’s DAU
should be at least the same as last year’s. The policy was abolished in 2008, and DAU allocation
formula is adjusted to exclude already prosperous regions from receiving too much DAU. Based
on the formula, some subnational governments may have decreasing DAU or not receive DAU
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at all.
DAU allocation process consists of 2 steps. The first step is allocating total DAU from
the national budget. The allocated amount is stipulated in the annual Law of the National
Budget (Undang-undang Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara/UU-APBN). The
second step is allocating DAU to each subnational government. The allocation amount per
subnational government is formalized and established by presidential decree, and is transferred
monthly each in an amount of 1/12 of the allocation.
Figure 5.1 below illustrates the process of DAU allocation. In the allocation process, the
total DAU pool is divided into city/regency pool and provincial pool. Unless decided otherwise,
the proportion is 90% and 10%, respectively.  Each pool is then distributed to cover basic
allocation and fiscal gap, using the weighted variables based on DAU allocation formula.
Figure 5.1.
DAU Allocation Process
Total DAU allocation
= at least 26% x net domestic revenue
Total DAU allocated to cities/regencies
= 90% x Total DAU allocation*
Total DAU allocated to provinces
= 10% x Total DAU allocation*
(Source: Author’s summary based on Law No. 33/2004 and Government Regulation No. 55/2005)
* According to Government Regulation No. 55/2005, the proportion of DAU allocation between provinces and cities/regencies is determined
based on the sharing of authority. If the proportion is not determined, 90% and 10% ratio between cities/regencies and provinces are used.
Basic Allocation
=cities/regencies official
salaries
Fiscal gap
= fiscal needs – fiscal
capacity
Cities/regencies Fiscal
needs
Cities/regencies Fiscal
capacity
- Own source revenues
- Taxes revenue sharing
- Natural resource
revenue sharing
- Total population
- Area size
- Construction Cost Index
- Gross Regional
Domestic Product per
capita
- Human Development
Index
Basic Allocation
=provinces official salaries
Fiscal gap
= fiscal needs – fiscal
capacity
Provinces Fiscal needs Provinces Fiscal
capacity
- Own source
revenues
- Taxes revenue
sharing
- Natural resource
revenue sharing
- Total population
- Area size
- Construction Cost
Index
- Gross Regional
Domestic Product per
capita
-
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A concern in the allocation of DAU is that it is mostly used for administrative
expenditures such as local official salaries (Usman et al. 2008, Lewis and Smoke 2008), thus
leaving only a relatively small portion for closing the fiscal gap. Generally DAU is barely
enough to cover salary expenditures because the expenditure, most of the time, is higher than
DAU. This implies that DAU’s other function, closing the fiscal gap, is reduced.
Table 5.1 summarizes the percentage of salary expenditure to DAU and to total revenues
in 2006, 2008, and 2010, for both local governments and provincial governments.
Table 5.1
Subnational Salary Expenditure and DAU
Year Subnational governments Salary/DAU
2006 Cities/regencies 69.4%
Provinces 141.5%
2008 Cities/regencies 207.5%
Provinces 116.6%
2010 Cities/regencies 102.8%
Provinces 150.9%
(Source: Author computation based on subnational budgets submitted to the Ministry of Finance for
fiscal year 2006, 2008, and 2010).
The portion of salary expenditure in Indonesian local budgets is very high compared to
other countries. In 2010, budgeted salary expenditure for central government was 20.8% of total
national expenditure. For provincial governments, the figure was 26.37% of total provincial
expenditures, and for local governments it was 50.7% of total local expenditures (Ministry of
Finance 2010a). If compared internationally, the expenditure for official salaries is very high,
compared to around 5% in more developed countries (Lewis and Smoke 2008).
5.2. Revenue Sharing Funds (Dana Bagi Hasil/DBH)
The fiscal decentralization framework in Indonesia requires the central government to
share the income from natural resources and taxes to the provinces and local governments. The
shared revenues are known as revenue sharing funds or DBH. According to Law No. 33/2004,
the shared revenue from natural resources (DBH natural resources) consist of revenues from oil
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and gas, forestry, other general mining, geothermal, and fishery. The sharing arrangements
differ across types of natural resources and levels of government (central, province, producing
and non‐producing cities/regencies). As for shared taxes revenues (DBH taxes), the shared
revenues apply to property taxes (or land and building taxes), land rent, and domestic personal
income taxes.
a. DBH Taxes
The sources of DBH Taxes are property taxes, land rent, and domestic personal
income taxes.11 Income taxes are shared in the central government’s favor, which is
entitled to 80% of the amount. Income taxes are one of major revenues and most of the
taxes are still centralized. Income taxes shared with subnational governments is domestic
personal income taxes. The shares of subnational governments are transferred on a
quarterly basis. The allocation formula of DBH Taxes is summarized in Figure 5.2 below:
11 In 2009, Law No. 28/2009 on Local Taxes and Local Retribution was issued. According to this law,
property taxes and land rent will be a part of local taxes. The Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Home
Affairs are mandated by this law to arrange the shift of property taxes from central taxes to local taxes by
2013, and the shift of land rent in one year after the law enactment – which is due in 2011.
Tax Revenues
DBH  Taxes Allocation Form ula
Property Taxes Land rent Domestic Personal IncomeTaxes
Central Govt. 10%
Provincial Govt. 16.2%
Local Govt. 64.8%
Cost of collection 9%
Central Govt. 20%
Provincial Govt. 16%
Local Govt. 64%
Central Govt. 80%
Provincial Govt. 8%
Local Govt. 12%
Central government share of
10% is distributed as follows:
- 65% to all local governments
- 35% to local governments
whose realized contributions
in the previous year exceeded
estimated receipts from
certain sectors.
Central government
share of 20% is
redistributed to all local
governments
Figure 5.2.
DBH  Taxes Allocation Form ula
Source: Author summary based on Law No. 33/2004
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b. DBH Natural Resources
The sharing of natural resources’ favoring producing regions emerges as a response
to natural-resources rich regions, which considered themselves to be undertreated
during the New Order regime. Centralization at that time had been driving almost all
natural resources revenues from those regions to Jakarta, leaving them with poor
infrastructures and low-quality life for local people. When the regime fell following the
Asian economic crisis in 1997, strong demands for larger shares emerged, threatening
the unity of the nation. The newly appointed government accommodated the demands in
decentralization laws, deciding that revenues from natural resources will be distributed
in favor of producing regions through DBH natural resources.
DBH Natural Resources come from revenues from oil, gas, forestry, general
mining, geothermal, and fishery. For oil and gas revenues, the central government has
the major share of 84.5% and 69.5%, respectively. Provincial governments’ shares are
3.1% and 6.1%, while local governments’ are 12.4% and 24.4%, respectively. For
general mining, geothermal, and forestry, the central government’s shares are less
significant at 20% of revenue figures. Provincial governments’ share is 16% and the
remaining 64% goes to local governments.  As for fishery, the central government
keeps 20% of revenues and distributes the remaining 80% equally to all local
governments.
In general, producing regions (cities/regencies) gain the most from natural
resources revenues, followed by regions in the same provinces. For forestry, general
mining, and geothermal, the share for all local governments is 64%. Of this amount,
32% is the entitled to producing regions, while the remaining 32% is distributed equally
to all cities/regencies in the same provinces. The same rule also applies to revenues
from oil and gas, but with different proportions. DBH natural resources are administered
by the central government and transferred to subnational governments on a quarterly
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basis. Figure 5.3 below summarizes the allocation formula for DBH natural resources.
5.3. Specific Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Khusus/DAK)
Specific grants DAK focus on achieving national priorities and aim at supporting certain
regions to finance specific public service infrastructure and to enhance regional development.
Most subnational governments rely on DAK for capital expenditures (Ministry of Finance 2011,
Gervais 2010).
DAK is conditional grants which utilization must comply with the central government’s
guideline. It is also a matching grant that requires counterpart funds from local governments (in
an amount of at least 10% of the DAK allocation amount). According to Law No. 33/2004,
DAK is allocated to certain regions to fund specific activities that are of regional affairs, and
Natural Resource Revenues
Figure 5.3.
DBH Natural Resources Allocation Form ula
Forestry, general
mining, geothermal Oil
Fishery
Central Govt. 20%
Provincial Govt. 16%
Local Govt. 64%
Central Govt. 84.5%
Provincial Govt. 3.1%
Local Govt. 12.4%
Central Govt. 20%
All local govts. 80%
Land‐rent:Only for producingcities/regenciesRoyalty:
- 32% for producingcities/regencies
- 32% for non‐producingCities/regencies inthe same province(equallydistributed)
Local govt. share of12.4% is distributedas follows:
- 6.2% for producingcities/regencies
- 6.2% for non‐producingcities/regencies inthe same province(equallydistributed)
Source: Author summary based on Law No. 33/2004
Gas
Central Govt. 69.5%
Provincial Govt. 6.1%
Local Govt. 24.4%
Local govt. share of24.4% is distributedas follows:
- 12.2% forproducingcities/regencies
- 12.2% fornon-producingcities/regencies inthe same province(equallydistributed)
80% of fisheryrevenues are equallydistributed to all localgovernments
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that are determined as national priorities. National priorities to be supported by DAK financing
are determined every year, but several basic public services like education and health remain as
targeted sectors since DAK was first established.
DAK allocation process consists of 2 steps: (1) selection of eligible recipients, and (2)
computation of DAK amount to each eligible recipient. DAK allocation is conducted by the
Ministry of Finance. Technical data are provided by line ministries, other data are provided by
relevant government agencies, e.g. line ministries and Central Bureau of Statistics. According to
Law No. 33/2004, three criteria are used for DAK screening process:
1. General criteria are based on consideration of a subnational government’s fiscal capacity,
with priority given to regions whose fiscal capacity is lower than the national average,
indicated by net fiscal index.
2. Specific criteria are prepared with attention given to laws and regulation, such as regions
with special autonomy (currently Papua Province and West Papua Province), and regions
which meet certain regional characteristics. The regional characteristics are disadvantaged
regions (daerah tertinggal)12, coastal/island/border regions, natural disaster-prone regions,
food security regions, and tourism regions
3. Technical criteria are based on considerations determined by related line ministries using
indicators that illustrate infrastructural characteristics in each sector.
Figure 5.4 below summarizes the DAK allocation process. To be eligible for DAK, a
subnational government needs to pass one of the three criteria (general, specific, or technical
criteria).
12 According to the State Ministry of Accelerated Development of Disadvantaged Regions,
disadvantaged regions are regions which are less developed compared to other regions, and which
populations are relatively poor. Indicators to determine whether a region is disadvantaged include
regional economy, human resource, work force, business environment, infrastructures, natural resources,
and environment. Typical characteristics of disadvantaged regions are high poverty rate, limited economic
activity and focused on natural resources, minimum infrastructures, and low quality of human resources.
Usually they are located in isolated areas. (source: http://webgis.kemenegpdt.go.id/sidt/pages/home.php)
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In the screening process, subnational governments are firstly screened through general
criteria. If that is satisfied, the subnational governments are classified as eligible DAK recipients.
Otherwise, they will be screened through specific criteria. If they cannot satisfy the specific
Figure 5.4.
DAK Allocation Process
I. General Criteria II. Specific Criteria III. Technical Criteria
Is the region’s fiscal capacity
lower than national average?
Is the region a part of Papua
Province or West Papua
Province?
Is the region a disadvantaged
region?
Does the region satisfy certain
regional characteristics?
Does the region’s technical
index show the need for
DAK funding?
(1) Selection of eligible recipients
Eligible for
DAK
Ineligible for
DAK
Formula-based DAK
computation to allocate DAK
per sector
(2) DAK Computation
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No No NoYes
DAK allocation
per recipient
Formula-based DAK computation to allocate DAK
per recipient per sector
Source: Author, based on description of Indonesian Ministry of Finance (2010b).
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criteria, they will be screened through the technical criteria. If they still fail to satisfy the
technical criteria, they are classified as ineligible. Otherwise, they will be eligible for DAK.
After eligible recipients are determined, the amount of DAK allocation for each recipient
is computed. The computation is formula-based, using indexes and weighted average (Ministry
of Finance 2010). DAK is transferred three times in a fiscal year, in an amount equal to 30%,
45%, and 25% of total DAK allocation, respectively, conducted 15 days after the Ministry of
Finance receives DAK utilization reports.
In recent years, there’s a growing trend in the number of areas considered as national
priorities and the number of DAK recipients. In 2003, the first year of DAK implementation,
five sectors were determined as national priorities with 354 recipients. In 2010, 14 sectors were
determined as national priority with 523 recipients. Fragmentation, thus, becomes a concern.
With the increasing number of sectors and recipients, if total DAK pool does not increase at
least proportionally, fragmentation is inevitable. Table 5.2 summarizes the number of DAK
prioritized sectors and recipients.
Table 5.2.
DAK – Number of Prioritized Sectors and Recipients
Year Sector ProvincialGovernments
Local Governments Total
Regencies Cities
2003 5 24 265 65 354
2004 6 0 283 71 354
2005 8 2 305 72 379
2006 9 0 348 86 434
2007 9 0 348 86 434
2008 11 24 363 88 475
2009 13 28 386 91 505
2010 14 32 398 93 523
(Source: Indonesian Ministry of Finance).
The allocation of balancing funds DAU, DBH, and DAK are all based on formula.
However, some allocation procedures are often criticized for being too complicated and less
transparent. For example, the procedure of DAU calculation is extremely complex and not
transparent. The complexity of DAU formula has been subjected to criticism as it does not
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provide transparency and is difficult to confirm (Fane 2003, Brodjonegoro and Vazquez 2002).
To date, how the calculation was conducted has never been made available to the public, thus it
is nearly impossible to confirm the allocated amount. The same is also true with DAK. DBH is
the only exception, since there is a reconciliation procedure between the central government and
subnational governments to confirm the share of DBH.
5.4. The Limitation of Balancing Funds
The purposes of balancing funds in Indonesia includes strengthening subnational
governments’ fiscal capacity, reducing fiscal disparity (i.e. fiscal capacity inequality) between
the central and subnational government and among subnational governments, improving the
quality of public service, and reducing the gap in public service among regions (Ministry of
Finance 2011). In public services delivery, the unconditional grants component in balancing
funds functions as equalization grants, which aim at reducing fiscal disparity among local
governments. Equalizing local governments’ fiscal capacity arguably enables local governments
to provide comparable public service at comparable tax rates (Broadway 2007). The conditional
grants, on the other hand, provide funding for specific public service to improve it or to promote
the achievement of a certain standard (Broadway 2007, Slack 2009). The importance of
equalization is based on the premise that all people in a nation are entitled to a reasonably
similar standard of public services provided by governments (Ahmad et al. 1999).
This section will evaluate the effect of DAU, DBH, and DAK as individual components
and as systems on local governments’ fiscal capacity inequality, or fiscal disparity. Local
government is the focus of this analysis because public services are devolved to local
governments; therefore their fiscal capacity is important for public service provision.
The fiscal disparity is measured by the Coefficient of Variation (CV). CV measures
variability in relation to the mean and is used to compare the relative dispersion in one type of
data with the relative dispersion in another type of data. CV can be used to measure the
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equalizing effect of grants on fiscal disparity, with lower CV indicating reduction in fiscal
disparity (Blochliger 2007). In this analysis, CV is calculated in 4 steps to observe the change in
local governments’ fiscal disparity with the addition of each balancing fund component.
a. CV is calculated based solely on own-source revenues per capita (OSR).
OSR of a local government consists of local taxes, local retribution, profit from subnational
enterprises, and other OSR (e.g. interest revenues and donation). It is the most relevant
indicator of a subnational government’s capacity to generate revenues by its own efforts.
Thus using OSR can highlight the difference in fiscal capacity between subnational
governments.
b. CV is calculated based on OSR and DBH per capita (OSR+DBH).
Unlike OSR that depends on local governments’ efforts to generate revenues, DBH mainly
arises as a result of regional advantage which can provide additional revenues. Regions with
favorable conditions to generate taxes and regions rich in natural resources benefit the most
from DBH, since the formula of DBH favors such regions in the sharing of revenues.
Therefore, DBH significantly strengthens the fiscal capacity of such local governments. The
impacts of the increased fiscal capacity will be evaluated in this section.
c. CV is calculated based on OSR, DBH, and DAU per capita (OSR+DBH+DAU).
The unconditional grants DAU are also equalizing grants. The effects of DAU will be
evaluated by observing the change in fiscal disparity (which have been calculated based on
OSR and DBH), after including DAU in the figure.
d. CV is calculated based on OSR, DBH, DAU, and DAK per capita
(OSR+DBH+DAU+DAK).
In recent years, DAK has become more fragmented as more subnational governments
receive DAK funding and more sectors are regarded as national priorities. The coverage of
DAK is widening, but with smaller amount. This may indicate that DAK has lost its
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specificness. The last step of CV calculation tries to answer whether DAK, considering the
fragmentation and widening coverage, has shifted from its original role as conditional
grants, which provide capital investment assistance to selective regions in specific sectors.
The result of the CV calculation for local governments’ fiscal disparity is summarized in
Figure 5.5 below.
From Figure 5.5, it can be observed that fiscal disparity between cities/regencies
originally exists to some degree when only OSR is considered as local revenues. Fiscal disparity
then increases with DBH allocation, and decreases after DAU allocation. This is not surprising
since DAU is meant to be equalization grants. When DAK is allocated, fiscal disparity
decreases even further.
The interesting point is the reduced fiscal disparity as a result of DAK allocation. DAK is
a specific grants financing capital investment; it has some specific purposes, but equalization is
not one of them. Yet, the graphs show that the contribution of DAK to reduced fiscal disparity
becomes more evident over the years. In 2001 and 2002, the contribution of DAK to reduced
fiscal disparity is very small. Between 2003 and 2010, the gap between CV with
OSR+DBH+DAU+DAK and CV with OSR+DBH+DAU is widening, suggesting that the
impact of DAK on reducing fiscal disparity becomes more obvious.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
OSR 1.7258 1.5368 1.4225 1.4855 1.6025 1.5591 1.5441 1.5740 1.6188 1.7175
OSR + DBH 1.8062 1.8032 2.0639 1.4809 2.0761 2.1282 1.9071 2.0513 1.7667 1.8028
OSR  + DBH + DAU 0.6492 0.5954 0.6733 0.6039 0.7432 0.5993 0.6298 0.6537 0.6260 0.6384
OSR  + DBH + DAU + DAK 0.6482 0.5965 0.6533 0.5801 0.7098 0.5602 0.5794 0.5934 0.5717 0.6022
0.0000
0.5000
1.0000
1.5000
2.0000
2.5000
Coefficient of
Variation
Figure 5.5
Local Governments Fiscal Disparities
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The situation can be interpreted as follows. Since revenue decentralization is not yet
applied as rigorously as expenditure decentralization, most taxing power lies within the central
government’s control, as well as revenues generated from natural resources. Some parts of tax
revenues and natural resource revenues are transferred back to subnational governments in the
form of DBH taxes and DBH natural resources. Because of the difference in regional
advantages, some subnational governments receive substantial amount of DBH taxes (like
special capital territory, Jakarta) or DBH natural resources (like subnational governments in
oil-rich regions of Aceh, East Kalimantan, and Riau), compared to other regions. This can
further push fiscal disparity.
To promote equality in local governments’ fiscal capacity, DAU is added into the scheme.
The allocation formula of DAU takes DBH into consideration, in expectation that regions with
higher DBH (relative to their fiscal needs) will not be favored with higher DAU. According to
the result of CV calculation, this equalization mechanism actually works: a decrease in fiscal
disparity between regions with the introduction of DAU can be observed.
Finally, there is conditional grant DAK where recipients are determined based on
selection criteria, and which purpose is to encourage development in targeted sectors. It has
been shown that the number of DAK recipients is increasing as well as the number of targeted
sectors. CV calculation shows that DAK contributes to reducing fiscal disparities at a greater
degree over the years. This situation indicates the shifting of DAK characteristics: from specific
grants to equalization grants, suggesting that DAK tends to lose its specificness and becomes
more equalizing.
It should be noted that the provision for salary expenditure included in the DAU formula
affects the equalizing effect of DAU. Figure 5.6 below shows that the CV (that has decreased
after DAU allocation) increases again after salary expenditure are accounted for. This indicates
that the equalizing effect of DAU is partially offset by salary expenditure.
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To put it together, the net effect of balancing funds in general is reductive to fiscal
disparity among local governments, as shown by CV analysis. From the equality viewpoint, this
means that balancing funds as a system equalizes local governments’ fiscal capacity. Since
fiscal capacity is associated with local governments’ potential to generate revenue in order to
provide standardized public services (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 1997), more equal fiscal
capacity will also equalize local governments’ potential to provide public services. The outcome
of this condition is more comparable public services that can be accessed by citizens anywhere
across the country.
Based on the CV results, some points to note in how balancing funds work as a system
are (1) DAU and DBH work in opposite directions in reducing inequality, (2) salary expenditure
reduce the equalizing effect of DAU, and (3) DAK shifts from specific to equalization grants.
The last point signifies that intergovernmental grants have lost the functions of specific grants
which provide funding for capital investment to the majority of subnational governments.
5.5. Incentives in Balancing Funds
Balancing funds do not explicitly state any incentive for improved efficiency,
accountability, or performance, but some incentives features are embedded in the allocation
formula of DAU, DBH, and DAK.  In DBH, incentives can be observed in the shared revenues
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
OSR  + DBH + DAU 0.6492 0.5954 0.6733 0.6039 0.7432 0.5993 0.6298 0.6537 0.6260 0.6384
OSR  + DBH + DAU - Salary 1.0314 0.9880 1.1131 0.9335 1.1349 0.8003 0.9937 1.0586 0.9890 1.0467
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Figure 5.6.Salary expenditure' Impact on Fiscal Disparity
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from property taxes. The allocation formula provides 3.5% of revenue from property taxes to be
distributed to local governments whose contribution realization for property taxes exceeded the
budgeted amount. Although the collection of such taxes is administered by central governments,
local governments assist the process by providing accurate data and encouraging local citizens
to comply with property tax obligation. However, since the property taxes and land rent have
become local taxes, the incentives issue is no longer relevant in the context of
intergovernmental grants, as the revenues will be parts of own-source revenues (OSR).
In DAU allocation formula, for example, official salary is accounted as a variable in
determining DAU allocation. This can stimulate subnational governments to employ more
people. Therefore, an incentive for efficiency is embedded in DAU formula to discourage
ambitious recruitment of new employees and/or launching more generous fringe benefit plans.
As basic allocation in the DAU formula only covers a part of salary expenditure (in 2011,
83.1% of salary expenditure in provinces and 68.56% in cities/regencies, according to Ministry
of Finance (2011)), the part that is not covered by DAU must be provided from other sources,
thus adding a financial burden to subnational budgets. This can be an incentive for subnational
governments to stop employing more people. This incentive, however, is not always effective.
For subnational governments who perceive hiring people as an alternative to providing
employment, partially covered salary expenditure may still be seen as an incentive to recruit.13
Some incentives feature can be observed in the DAK allocation formula. Examples from
drinking water and sanitation service will be used for illustration.
a. DAK for drinking water
The allocation of DAK for drinking water is formula-based. One of the components in
the allocation formula is the drinking water technical index. The higher the index, the
higher DAK allocation a subnational government will receive. How the index is calculated
13To control the growth of subnational government officials, the recruiting and dismissing of subnational
government officials are regulated by the central government.
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is determined by the Ministry of Public Works, and the index figures may change every
year. In 2012, the technical index (TI) for drinking water is determined as follows
(Ministry of Public Works 2011):
Where:
Water scarcity
index (WS)
= Number of villages with water scarcity in a city/regency
Number of villages with water scarcity in Indonesia
Low-income
population index (LP)
= Number of low-income population in a city/regency
Number of low-income population in Indonesia
Water coverage index
(WC)
= % population without access to piped water in a city/regency
% population without access to piped water in Indonesia
Idle capacity index
(IC)
= Idle capacity of water in a city/region
Idle capacity of water in Indonesia
Awareness index
(AW)
= % budget allocated for water sector, not including DAK, by a city/regency
% budget allocated for water sector, not including DAK, by all local govts
Reporting index (RP) = Score of DAK for drinking water implementation in the previous year
Total national score of DAK for drinking water implementation in the
previous year
It can be observed from the formula that the allocation of DAK for drinking water
favors subnational governments who allocate more budget for drinking water, as shown by
the awareness index (AW). This is a positive incentive to encourage subnational
governments to increase spending in drinking water sector, as this can improve
accountability of subnational governments in providing water service through providing
additional resources.
The incentive is particularly important in the presence of the fungibility effect. It’s
been a concern in previous research and literature that conditional grants, like DAK, are
prone to fungibility (Slack 2007), a situation where grants recipients shift their funding to
unassisted sector, as a result of receiving grants. This is contrary to the spirit of allocating
conditional grants; the intention of providing the grants is to support recipients’ financial
condition so that more funds are allocated to the targeted sector. In other words, conditional
TI = 5% WS + 40% LP + 5% WC + 40% IC + 5% AW + 5% RP
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grants are supposed to complement, rather than to substitute, the recipient’s own financial
resources. Responding to this, the allocation formula of DAK for drinking water includes
the awareness index. The index accounts for the allocation of the subnational budget for
drinking water outside DAK.
An incentive for performance that can also be observed in the formula is the
reporting index. The Ministry of Public Works gives a score to the result of DAK
implementation. The higher the score, the more favorable the reporting index becomes,
which will lead to higher DAK allocation. This can encourage subnational governments’
compliance to reporting requirements.
b. Sanitation
Another example is sanitation sector. Technical index (TI) for sanitation sector in
2012 is determined as follows:
Where :
Low-income population
index (LP)
= Number of low-income population in a city/regency
Number of low-income population in Indonesia
Sanitation coverage
index (SC)
= % population with access to sanitation in a city/region
% population with access to sanitation in Indonesia
Awareness index (AW) = % budget allocated for water sector, not including DAK, by a city/regency
% budget allocated for water sector, not including DAK, by all local govts
Reporting index (RP) = Score of DAK for drinking water implementation in the previous year
Total national score of DAK for drinking water implementation in the
previous year
Regional Sanitation
Strategy Index (RS)
= % subnational government’s ownership of regional sanitation strategy
documents
For the sanitation sector, the same incentives case as the drinking water sector
applies to the reporting index and awareness index. Another incentive that can be observed
in the sanitation formula is in the sanitation coverage index. The sanitation coverage index
favors the percentage of population with access, implying that the more people to get
TI = 25% LP + 30% SC + 15%AW + 15% RP + 15% RS
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access to sanitation, the higher the allocation of DAK for sanitation. This appears like a
contradictive concept, but in this case performance is incentivized. Reward is given to
improved performance. Subnational governments, where large parts of the population have
access to sanitation, are appreciated for making efforts to improve sanitation condition. The
technical index for sanitation gives 30% weight for the sanitation coverage index, the
highest of other variables in the formula.
All in all, it can be said that incentive features, albeit implicitly, have been incorporated
in the DAU and DAK allocation formulas. The incentives, however, do not clearly link to
improved performance and accountability. The subnational governments’ awareness of the
incentives feature is not yet empirically measured, but since the information on formulas are
publicly available, the correlation between incentives (e.g. higher DAK allocation) and
performance (e.g. higher sanitation coverage, higher counterpart funding allocation from
subnational budgets) should have been observed.
5.6. Accountability in Balancing Funds
To date, the focus of most studies related to fiscal decentralization has often been efforts
to optimize revenue sources, while studies on the optimization of expenditure focuses are rarely
conducted. Studies of the implementation and impact of DAK are rare. Linked to this, questions
that frequently emerge concern simple things like how the distribution mechanisms and
management of DAK are proceeding. Although there are several criteria for the allocation of
DAK, the accountability processes at the national and regional levels have not yet been widely
publicized (Usman et al 2008).
The DAU system is primarily focused on a gap-filling approach to subnational finance.
The employment of formula to determine DAU allocation for each subnational government is
an objective manner, but accountability to local citizens for service delivery performance is
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neglected (Shah et al. 2012).14 The same case is also true for DBH, as the allocation formula
does not take accountability to local citizens into account either.
As far as accountability to local citizens for service delivery performance matters,
monitoring the accountability of DAK is more likely than of DAU and DBH. As
specific/conditional grants, the input provided as DAK can be associated with specific output.
This is different from DAU and DBH, in which output can cover a wide range of services,
whether they directly benefit the citizens or not.
However, monitoring the quality of DAK-funded projects and other technical aspects are
not strongly enforced. A reason for this is because line ministries have limited resources to
check each individual project. Even if the monitoring is conducted, its purpose is rather
corrective than preventive. The DAK procedure allows line ministries to recommend to the
Ministry of Finance to delay DAK transfer based on monitoring results, but this rarely happens
because many local governments depend on DAK for capital expenditures. Also, the transfer of
DAK funds is mainly tied with the administrative requirements rather than the result of
monitoring.15 A concern about this practice is that, even though a DAK project has been
completed as planned, the quality issue is not a major focus. How the project will benefit the
citizens is not rigorously evaluated, and this can weaken the incentives for improved
performance and accountability in public service delivery.
At this point, a mechanism to ensure the accountability of balancing funds to local
citizens for public service delivery is not yet in place. This needs to be addressed because
balancing funds are provided in subnational governments’ functions to deliver public services,
and therefore the accountability for public service should be ensured.
Currently, efforts to maintain the accountability of balancing funds mainly depend on the
14 The reason for keeping politics at bay may be due to the intention to put a limit to lobbying for higher
DAU. However, through annual budget discussion between the central government and the national
parliament (DPR), funds can be allocated under different names to provide additional financial support
for certain regions. Political process, eventually, always find a way to cater to political interests.
15 Interview with Gustaf Kasmiri, Section Head of DAK, Ministry of Finance (March 2012).
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audit conducted by the Supreme Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan/BPK). Some
weakness in the internal control of balancing funds identified by the audit are, among others:
lack of coordination between subnational governments and central government’s ministries,
mismanagement in the transfer of DAK where subnational governments are given the funds
regardless of their readiness to implement the projects, and the allocation of DAK to subnational
governments which, according to DAK selection criteria, are not eligible (Bisri 2008).
5.7. Balancing funds and local governments’ spending behavior
From the viewpoint of local budget management, whether local governments’ actions
maximize the citizens’ welfare can be observed in their spending behavior. The major source of
revenues for most subnational governments is DAU. On average from 2007 to 2010, DAU
accounted for 59.21% of total subnational governments’ revenues. DBH is the second highest
with 16.96%, and DAK is the third with 7.44%. In the same period, DAU tend to decrease, but
it remains the largest part of local revenues.
A brief overview on local governments’ revenues and expenditures are presented in
Chapter IV, and in this chapter Figure 4.9 is presented again for further discussion on the trends
of local governments’ spending behavior.
2007 2008 2009 2010
Other expenditures 0.86% 0.93% 0.65% 0.69%
Social and financial support 6.64% 5.68% 5.97% 5.54%
Grants and Subsidies 1.45% 1.79% 3.12% 4.86%
Salary 42.59% 44.19% 47.42% 51.08%
Goods and services 17.61% 17.36% 17.00% 16.58%
Capital 30.84% 30.06% 25.84% 21.24%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
Figure 4.9.Subnational Expenditures Composition
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Since DAU is mainly used to cover salary expenditure, decreasing DAU implies less
support from central governments to pay local officials. However, as shown in Figure 4.9, the
spending behavior of local governments show that salary expenditure keeps increasing, while
the remaining expenditure items (except grants and subsidy expenditures) show decreasing
trends. This indicates that local governments cut composition of those expenditure items to
compensate the decreasing DAU, in order to finance increasing salary expenditure.
The indication can be observed in the trends of capital expenditures and goods and
services expenditures, which are the second and third highest expenditures in local budgets.
Both are decreasing between 2007 and 2010. The most notable decrease is in capital
expenditures. Figure 4.9 above shows a striking correlation that as salary expenditure increase,
capital expenditures decrease significantly.
This situation also indicates that in general, local governments make minimum efforts, as
far as local budgets are concerned, to complement the conditional grants DAK with funds from
local budgets. Transfers of DAK are fluctuating during the period, and according to the CV
analysis in the previous section of this chapter, DAK has become more fragmented in recent
years, implying less allocation to each local government for capital support. However, the
decreasing DAK is not accompanied by increasing capital expenditures to compensate the
reduced financing. In other words, there’s an indication that when intergovernmental grants
decrease, local governments do not step in to make up the difference for maintaining or even
improving the level of current public services.
Khemani (2005) argued that accountable local governments should undertake appropriate
actions towards service delivery, given resources and capacity constraints. Referring to this,
when there’s space for improvement (given the constraints), accountable local governments will
act toward citizens’ welfare maximization by, among others, prioritizing sectors with highest
direct benefits to the citizens in their budgets. In Indonesia, however, this does not seem to be
the case. In general, the spending behavior of most local governments heavily focuses on
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serving local bureaucracy, and when the intergovernmental grants intended to support the
bureaucracy (e.g. DAU) decrease, the situation that usually accompanies it is that local
governments cut other expenditure items, and increase the spending level for local officials.
5.8. The Significance of A Performance-Based Approach
Based on the findings presented in this chapter, the research identifies some limitations of
balancing funds as follow:
a. Balancing funds are mainly serving equalization purpose, with diminishing focus on
improving specific public services.
The approach to improving public service delivery is more toward equalization of
fiscal capacity, rather than addressing particular public services. However, promoting public
service delivery in all regions which meet certain standards through the allocation of
balancing funds alone is most likely not met.
This is because the equalization of fiscal capacity is not optimal considering (1) the
allocation method of balancing funds, and (2) the significant amount of salary expenditure
component in the DAU allocation formula. After taking the effect of DBH and salary
expenditure into consideration, DAU is actually not very equalizing. On the other hand,
DBH only provides for a small fraction of the population, and DAK is allocated to almost
all local governments irrespective of their fiscal capacity. Amendments that make DAU
more equalizing are possible, but DBH works in the opposite direction to improve system
fairness. This condition leaves changing principles of conditional grants the only option to
provide additional support, which will help poor regions deliver minimum service standards
(Gervais 2010).
However, the improving public service delivery through conditional grants is also
problematic. Conditional grants DAK play a major role in maintaining capital investments
in many regions (Ministry of Finance 2011), but in recent years DAK have wider coverage
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and provide easier access to almost all subnational governments, at the cost of
fragmentation.
From the CV analysis in the previous section, it can be concluded that balancing funds
are losing the functions of conditional grants. DAK becomes more equalizing like the
unconditional grants DAU, thus compromising its intended design to address specific public
sectors.
b. Balancing funds do not explicitly communicate incentives to encourage accountable
behaviors from local governments.
In the conditional grants DAK, some incentive features are in place, but the target,
standard, and achievements measurement are not explicitly described. This makes it
difficult to find the relation between input and output/performance. As for the unconditional
grants DAU and DBH, despite the objective formula used in their allocation, accountability
to citizens is often neglected (Shah et al. 2012).  To sum up, in balancing funds, there’s an
absence of an explicit link between incentives, performance, and access to funds to promote
accountability in public service delivery.
Another issue regarding incentives is that, in local budget management, balancing
funds do not provide strong incentives for local governments to prioritize expenditures that
can directly benefit the citizens. Decreasing DAU, for example, correlates with increasing
salary expenditure and decreasing capital expenditures. Confirming whether there’s a causal
effect between the situations requires another approach, but as an indication, the data
suggest that most local governments put a high priority in serving its bureaucracy (as
indicated by the large proportion of salary expenditure). At the same time, expenditure items
which are more directly related to the citizens’ benefits, such as capital expenditures, are
given significantly lower proportion in local budgets. The concern arises of whether local
governments act accountably in allocating local budgets, in the sense that they have
appropriately used the available resources and capacities to maximize citizens’ welfare.
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To address the limitation of balancing funds identified above, the research argues that (1)
Indonesian intergovernmental grants need conditional grants that can work effectively to
address specific public services, and (2) the design of such grants needs to consider incentives
for accountability. For this reason, implementing PBG is an option to address specific public
services while at the same improving the accountability in service delivery.
The argument refers to the theories and previous research which show that improving
specific public service sectors is best achieved by implementing conditional grants (Musgrave
1973, Steffensen 2007, Broadway 2007, Broadway and Shah 2009, Slack 2009), while at the
same time offering incentives for achievement of performance and accountability. The
importance of incentives is recognized in the New Institutional Economics theory (NIE), which
acknowledges that incentives play a role in guiding human behavior (North 1990, 2008). The
New Public Management theory (NPM) points out the importance of improving efficiency and
effectiveness by stressing performance, shifting from controlling inputs and procedures to
achieving results, measured in term of output, performance, and outcome (Hood 1991, Rhodes
2006, Haque 2007, Jun 2009).
The point of each theory–incentives suggested by NIE and performance suggested by
NPM–is connected to funding which is embodied in PBG (Shah 2010). The link between
incentives, performance, and funding is important to promote accountability, improved
institutional capacity, and local autonomy. The principles of the performance-based approach
arguably have a positive impact based on the developing country experiences (UNCDF 2010).
Introducing PBG in Indonesia is a start to implement the conditional grants that uphold the
principles of performance and accountability in providing specific public services, and to make
up for the absence of effective conditional grants in intergovernmental grants.
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5.9. PBG in Indonesian Intergovernmental Grants
PBG is classified under an intergovernmental grant component called ‘grants’ (hibah).16
‘Grants’ accommodate not only PBG, but also other conditional grants other than DAK. ‘Grants’
fund regional affairs (devolved functions), with due consideration to a region’s fiscal capacity,
and are prioritized for public services. Like balancing funds and other intergovernmental grants,
‘grants’ are regulated in the law regarding fiscal decentralization, Law No. 33/2004. At a more
technical level, ‘grants’ are regulated in Government Regulation No. 2/2012.
According to the regulation, there are three sources of funds for ‘grants’: foreign grants,
foreign loans, and national revenues, as shown in Table 5.3 below.
Table 5.3.
Sources of ‘Grants’ and Their Uses
Foreign grants Foreign loans National revenues
- Regional affairs
- Projects supporting national
development programs
- Projects specifically
requested by foreign grantors
- Regional affairs
- Projects supporting
national priorities
- Regional affairs
- Public services and capacity building
- Other activities resulting from central
government’s policy that add
financial burden to subnational
budgets
- Specific activities determined by the
central government
(Source: Government Regulation No. 2/2012)
Although ‘grants’ has been a component in intergovernmental grants, it was not
effectively used until 2009. Before that, if specific projects in regions were to be funded by
central governments but not through DAK (or through loans), the funding was channeled to
local governments through ministerial funds, known as deconcentration funds and
co-administration funds. Both funds are administered by line ministries; they remain parts of
the national budget and are never accounted for by subnational governments in subnational
budgets.
16 ‘Grants’, which is the name of a component of Indonesian intergovernmental grants, is written with
apostrophes to differentiate it from grants (without apostrophe), which represent transfer of funds from
one government transferred to another (level of) government.
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The first effective ‘grants’ project were traditional input-based grants, which came from
foreign loans in 2009 for the development of mass rapid transit (MRT) system in Jakarta. In
2010 and 2011 several ‘grants’ projects followed, all of them are performance-based. The
‘grants’ projects are summarized in the following table:
Table 5.4
‘Grants’ Projects
Projects Executingagency
Disbursement
mechanism
Grants
period
Source of
funds
Total
amount
(IDR)
Number
of
recipients
Targeted
Output
Jakarta Mass
Rapid Transit
Ministry of
Transportation
Input based 2009 –
2014
Foreign loan
(Japan)
5.3
trillions
1 (The loan is
used to acquire
tender
assistance
services,
construction,
and vehicles)
Local Basic
Education
(L-BEC)
Ministry of
Education
Performance-
based (PBG)
2009 –
2012
Foreign
grants
(European
Commission
and
Netherlands)
125
billions
50 Improvement of
education
capacity
Drinking
water
(completed)
Ministry of
Public Works
Performance-
based (PBG)
2010 –
2011
Foreign
grants
(Australia)
35 77,000 house
connections for
piped water
Waste Water
(completed)
Ministry of
Public Works
Performance-
based (PBG)
2010 –
2011
Foreign
grants
(Australia)
35
billions
5 4,826 waste
water
connections
Water and
Sanitation
Program
(WASAP-D)
Ministry of
Public Works
Performance-
based (PBG)
2010 –
2012
Foreign
grants
(Netherlands)
18
billions
6 Community-
based and
institution-based
sanitation
system
Accelerated
Sanitation
Development
Ministry of
Public Works
Performance –
based (PBG)
2010 –
2012
Foreign
grants
(Australia)
48
billions
22 Sanitation and
waste water
infrastructure
(Source: Indonesian Ministry of Finance)
5.9.1. PBG Approval Process
The process is mainly driven by line ministries. Unlike DAK which uses a
formula-based approach in its allocation, as a part of ‘grants’, PBG is based on certain
considerations and policies. According to Government Regulation No. 2/2012, general
considerations used to determine grants recipients (including PBG recipients) and the allocated
amount are:
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- Low fiscal capacity
- Regions requested by foreign grantor
- Regions which meet criteria determined by line ministries
- Regions decided by central government to be recipient
The considerations above are not the only points that count for recipient selection. Other
eligibility criteria for PBG recipients can be customized according to the design and target of
each project. Figure 5.7 below summarizes PBG approval process.
Upon choosing the potential recipients and the projected amount, line ministries submit
the proposal to the Ministry of Finance. Based on this, the Ministry of Finance prepares ‘grants’
agreement to be signed by the Ministry official and the head of subnational governments
(governor, mayor, or regent) or their representatives. Before the signing of ‘grants’ agreement,
the Ministry of Finance can ask subnational governments to provide additional documents
confirming their willingness to comply with terms and conditions of the grants, e.g. local
regulation on capital investment, local budget containing allocation for counterpart funds, and
other documents as necessary.17
17 Based on interview with Yuddi Saptopranowo, Section Head Regional Grants III, Indonesian Ministry
Figure 5.7.
PBG Approval Process
Line Ministries
Proposing potential PBG recipients and projected amount
Ministry of Finance
Endorsing PBG recipients and projected amount
Ministry of Finance and Subnational Government
Signing Grants Agreement
PBG allocation to each recipient
Considering fiscal capacity, grantor’s request, line
ministry’s criteria, and government policies
Additional documents can be asked from
potential recipients
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5.9.2. PBG Implementation and Funds Disbursements
Line ministries issue guidelines on PBG implementation. The activities conducted by
subnational governments are strictly limited to those determined in the guidelines and must
comply with the grant agreement. Monitoring and supervision are conducted by related line
ministries. Periodical reports must be submitted to line ministries and the Ministry of Finance.
The detailed arrangement on implementation, supervision, monitoring, and reporting are
described in the guidelines. As in the case of PBG allocation, the arrangement for these aspects
can also be customized according to the projects.
Disbursement of PBG funds is subject to administrative and technical requirements.
The administrative requirement includes submission of certain documents. Technical criteria
include verification result of the attainment of a certain standard/target in project
implementation. The standard/target may differ for each project, and are explained in the project
guideline. Disbursement can only be made if both administrative and technical requirements are
satisfied. Failure to meet the standard/target results in ineligibility to receive PBG funds.18
of Finance, March 2012.
18 ibid.
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CHAPTER VI
CASE STUDY: PBG FOR DRINKING WATER
This research uses PBG for drinking water in Indonesia as a case study to evaluate the
impacts of PBG implementation on local governments’ accountability in delivering public
services. As a consequence of functions sharing in decentralization, Indonesian local
governments are responsible for the provision of drinking water service. To deliver the service,
most local governments assign water supply companies as service providers, while a small
percentage of local governments exercise the provision themselves. Beside the companies and
local governments, private sectors also provide this service by retail sales, delivering the water
on a door-to-door basis rather than through water pipes network, but the number is insignificant
compared to water supply companies.
The research selects PBG for drinking water for two reasons. First, drinking water is a
monopolistic public service, and the delivery of the service is predicted to follow the long-route
of accountability suggested by the theoretical framework in Figure 3.4. In drinking water
service, a complete set of actors in the long route of accountability are present: citizens that
demand water service, local governments as policy makers  who are responsible to ensure the
service delivery, and service providers (water supply companies) who exercise the delivery
based on assignment from local governments.
Second, drinking water is a sector with high importance in the national agenda, but it is in
relatively poor condition. Drinking water has been assigned a national priority sector since 2005,
and is included in the targets of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 2015. However,
according to the data of the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics, drinking water is one of the
public services with decreasing indicators post decentralization. The performance of this sector
is also relatively low. In 2010, The Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning
classified drinking water service as “needs special attention”, the lowest of three categories used
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by the central government to monitor the progress of MDG targets. Compared to neighboring
South East Asian countries of comparable income, in 2008 the performance of drinking water
service in Indonesia is among the lowest, according to the World Bank in its World
Development Indicators 2010.19
The situation raises interest of why drinking water service in Indonesia is still in a poor
condition despite its importance to citizens (water is one of the vital basic needs) and the
national policy that puts it as a priority. Why does this happen and how can this be changed?
This makes the drinking water sector an ideal case study since the research can observe whether
there’s a difference between the condition before and after PBG implementation, and how the
incentives feature in PBG work to improve local governments’ accountability in this service.
This chapter explains the condition of drinking water before PBG implementation, the
background of PBG for drinking water, how PBG is implemented, and the impact of PBG
implementation on local governments’ accountability in drinking water service delivery. In this
chapter, the research tries to find the answer of whether the incentives feature in PBG makes
positive improvement in local governments’ accountability, and if it does, how it works. Finally,
this chapter describes the results of the survey conducted to investigate local governments’
response to PBG implementation.
6.1. The Condition of Drinking Water Service in Indonesia
Drinking water is defined in Minister of Public Works Decree No.15/PRT/M/2010 as
“household drinking water which, with treatment process or without treatment process, satisfy
health standards and is directly drinkable”. In 2009, most Indonesian households rely on
self-provision for water. Figure 6.1. below illustrated the primary source of drinking water for
Indonesian households in 2009.
19 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2010
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(Source: National Economic Survey 2009, in Ministry of Public Works (2012))
As illustrated in Figure 6.1 above, the majority of households use groundwater as
drinking water, obtained through protected wells (28%), unprotected wells (8%) and pumps
(18%). The use of groundwater has raised concern in recent years due to its detrimental effects
on the environment, including the intrusion of salt water and land subsidence. Bottled water
(13%) gained more popularity especially among urban households because of its practicality –
people can drink directly from the container, unlike other sources (including piped water) where
the water needs boiling. Piped water accounts for 16% of the population. There are also
households which use more than one source of drinking water, but the survey only measures the
primary source (Ministry of Public Works 2012).
Drinking water has been one of the national priorities. The Indonesian government
commits to achieve the target of MDG in the water sector, which is to halve the number of
population without sustainable access to drinking water by 2015. The percentage to be achieved
is 75.3% in urban area, 65.8% in rural area, and 68.9% in total, using the condition in 1993 as
the baseline. In order to achieve the MDG target by 2015, the central government established
28%
8%
18%16%
13%
17%
Figure 6.1.Primary Source of Drinking Water  in 2009
Protected well
Unprotected well
Pump
Piped
Bottled
Other
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annual target of total households (urban and rural) with access to safe drinking water. The
annual target is summarized in Table 6.1 as follows:20
Table 6.1.
Annual Target of Households Access to Drinking Water
Remark Annual Target
Percentage of total households with access to
drinking water
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
62% 62.5% 63% 63.5% 67% 68.9%
(Source: Ministry of National Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency (Kementerian Perencanaan
Pembangunan Nasional/Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas))
In 2010 total households with access to safe drinking water is 44.19%. This is below the
annual target, which is set at 62%. Based on the review of the MDG target achievement
progress in 2010, the Ministry of National Development Planning classified the water sector as
“need special attention”. This is the lowest of the three categories in which the MDG progress
results is classified, after “already achieved” and “on-track” (Ministry of National Development
Planning 2010).
The governments’ investment in drinking water service as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) tends to decrease after decentralization. According to The World Bank (2006a),
average annual spending in drinking water sectors from 1994 to 2000 are as follows:
Table 6.2.
Annual Spending for Drinking Water Sector (1994 – 2000)
Level of government
Average (in IDR trillion, except in % of GDP)
1994-1997 1998-2000
Central government 842 1.450,8
Provincial governments 55 106
Local governments 29 538
Total 926 1,610.5
% of GDP 0.23% 0.40%
Source: The World Bank (2006a).
20 Deputy Minister of National Development Planning/Deputy Chairman of National Development
Planning Agency (2010). Presentation on Roadmap of Acceleration of Millennium Development Goals
Achievements (Peta Jalan Percepatan Pencapaian Tujuan Pembangunan Millennium), Jakarta, December
8, 2010.
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According to Table 6.2 above, the spending as a percentage of GDP increased during the
period of 1993-2000. This trend ceased to continue in decentralization era. From 2004 to 2009,
the percentage of spending for drinking water tends to decrease annually, as summarized in
Table 6.3 below:
Table 6.3.
Annual Spending for Drinking Water Sector (2004 – 2009)
Component 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Drinking water sector 3,135 3,621 4,115 4,760 5,190 5,609
GDP 2,295,826 2,774,281 3,339,217 3,950,893 4,951,357 5,613,442
% of GDP 0.14% 0.13% 0.12% 0.12% 0.10% 0.10%
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, in Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (2011).
The most notable decrease in drinking water service is in urban area after decentralization.
Starting from 2001, generally there is an increasing trend of access for rural households but
decreasing access for urban households. The year of 2010 is the turning point; in this year, the
percentage of access for rural households exceeded that of urban households. Figure 6.2 below
summarizes the change in percentage of households with access to drinking water from 1993 to
2010.
(Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, several years of National Economics Survey (Survey Ekonomi
Nasional/Susenas), in Ministry of National Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency
(Bappenas) (2010)).
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Urban 50.58% 51.45% 51.66% 53.37% 54.42% 52.70% 52.97% 46.02% 59.51% 58.22% 57.26% 56.77% 55.62% 54.57% 54.07% 50.15% 49.82% 42.51%
Rural 31.62% 30.79% 30.77% 34.36% 35.86% 35.55% 35.19% 31.31% 40.39% 40.29% 40.98% 42.93% 41.50% 42.68% 43.93% 42.95% 45.72% 45.85%
Total 37.73% 37.74% 38.03% 41.18% 42.76% 41.95% 42.18% 37.51% 48.68% 48.33% 47.73% 48.81% 47.62% 47.79% 48.31% 46.45% 47.71% 44.19%
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Figure 6.2.Percentage of Households with Access to Drinking Water
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According to the Ministry of Public Works (2012), the relatively rapid development of
water service in rural areas, in comparison with urban areas, is mostly influenced by the central
government’s intervention. The central government-stimulated community-based water supply
facilities have continued to proliferate and reach more beneficiaries. At the same time, local
governments’ funding for drinking water has lagged behind the national target, both in funding
amount as well as coverage, and local investments in urban drinking water cannot keep pace
with population growth and depreciation.
One of the possibilities of why local governments’ investments is relatively low is the
fragmentation in DAK for drinking water. DAK is said to be the major source of funding for
capital investments (Ministry of Finance 2011), thus decrease in DAK for drinking water may
decrease local governments’ investment in this sector.
Table 6.4 and Figure 6.3 below summarize the allocation of DAK for drinking water from
2005 (the first year drinking water became a targeted sector) to 2010.
Table 6.4
Allocation of DAK for Drinking Water
Year
Number of
recipients
Total DAK for drinking
water (In IDR billion)
Average
(In IDR billion)
Minimum
(In IDR billion)
Maximum
(In IDR billion)
2005 259 203.50 0.79 0.46 2.39
2006 433 608.00 1.40 0.38 6.19
2007 434 1062.37 2.45 0.53 8.85
2008* 450 1142.29 2.54 0.11 9.61
2009* 431 1142.29 2.65 0.00 7.73
2010 452 357.23 0.79 0.56 2.45
*combined figure of drinking water and sanitation.
Source: Indonesian Ministry of Finance
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From the data, the average DAK allocation increased from 2005 to 2007. In 2008 and
2009, the figure still increased, but it should be noted that in those years the DAK was given as
joint allocation for water and sanitation. The proportion of DAK allocation for water and for
sanitation in regions was decided by subnational governments. In 2010, average DAK allocation
for clean water is close to the average allocation in 2007.
Observing the average DAK allocation between 2005 and 2010, fragmentation is obvious.
Adjusting the current value to inflation, the average DAK allocation in 2010 is actually lower
than that in 2005. This indicates fragmentation in DAK for clean water. As the number of DAK
recipients increase without proportional increase in DAK pool, average allocation for each
recipient decreases.
Smaller allocation limits the choices of subnational governments to do major investments
with DAK, unless they are prepared to provide more counterpart funds. Without such
willingness, and if subnational governments prefer to keep relying on DAK, capital investment
in water sector can be disturbed.
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6.2. Drinking Water Service Provided by Water Supply Companies
The World Bank (2007) mentioned that piped water (i.e. drinking water provided by
water supply companies) is the most sustainable, safest and, in the long term, least costly
solution for the provision of water in urban centers. However, the majority of the total
population does not have access to piped water. As described in Figure 6.1, piped water is one
of the drinking water sources, used as primary drinking water source for 16% of Indonesian
population, mostly in urban area. The urban area, as shown in Figure 6.2, is facing declining
access to drinking water service. The decrease also happens to access to piped water.
According to the data of the Central Bureau of Statistics, the percentage of population
with access to piped water (i.e. the number of population with access to piped water divided by
total population) increased from 1993 to 2000, the last year before decentralization
implementation. The percentage then decreased in the decentralization era, starting from 2001
and continuing to 2010. In 2010, the percentage was 12.44%, lower than the condition in 1993
when the coverage was 14.71%. Figure 6.4 below illustrates the service coverage from 1993 to
2010:
(Source: Central Bureau of Statistics)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Piped water As a % of total population 14.71%16.15%16.37%17.59%19.17%19.09%18.59%19.24%18.25%18.30%17.03%17.96%17.99%18.38%16.18%15.03%15.87%12.43%
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Figure 6.4.Percentage of Population with Access to Piped Water
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Coucouvinis (2010) argued that the decline is caused by lack of investments in water
supply companies. In 2007, only 0.37% of local budgets were allocated for water supply
companies. Investment in water supply generally cannot keep pace with population growth, and
service coverage continues to decline. This condition resulted from local governments’
reluctance to invest in water supply companies, which signifies a lack of trust in the companies.
Prior to decentralization, the central government was largely responsible for the financing and
construction of water supply infrastructure at the local level. After decentralization, central
government investment decreased, but local governments did not step in to fill the gap as they
were supposed to. The decrease in investments can hinder water supply companies from
expanding piped water service coverage. Hawes (2010) mentioned that the under-investment is
sustained and the proportion of investments is declining in comparison with population over the
past decade.
While DAK fragmentation may be a reason for decreasing investments in drinking water
in general, it is hardly the reason for decreasing investments in piped water in particular. Local
governments tend to prioritize spending money by through their departments (e.g. public works
department in case of water service), instead of investing the in water supply companies
(Coucouvinis 2010). This can be detrimental to the piped water service, since the companies –
being local government-owned enterprises – cannot raise water tariffs according to the
companies’ policy. Water tariffs are regulated by local governments, and the tariffs do not
always cover the cost. Many water supply companies are thus unable to add water connection to
expand their service coverage, especially to poor citizens, because they cannot raise sufficient
funds from sales (World Bank 2007).
In order to accountable in providing public services, local governments need to allocate
sufficient amount of funding from their budgets. When the services are not directly provided by
the local governments, they also need to support the service providers and ensure that the
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providers deliver the service effectively by providing technical assistance and investments.
Providing funds is a way of being accountable to local citizens (Glynn 1993).
PBG for drinking water targets expansion of piped water service by providing incentives
for local governments to increase their investments in water supply companies. With increased
investments, it is expected that more citizens, especially poor citizens in urban area, can have
access to piped water.
6.3. Overview of PBG for Drinking Water
PBG for drinking water is implemented in 2010 and 2011, involving 35 local
governments. The funding for PBG came from foreign grants provided by the Australian
Government through AusAID. The main objective of the project is to support the achievement
of one of MDG targets, which is to reduce by half the proportion of the population without
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation, with priority on low-income
citizens. A secondary objective is to strengthen the financial position of water utilities, and to
enhance the commitment of local governments to their water supply company/waste water
treatment company. The outcome of the project is expected to be improved public services
provided to the population  (Ministry of Public Works 2010).
PBG for drinking water is granted to local governments, on the condition that they will
make investment in their water supply companies. It targeted 77,000 household connections to
piped water. Assuming six persons per household, about 462,000 persons would benefit from
the additional connections. The amount of the grant is set at IDR 2 million per connection for
the first 1,000 connections, and IDR 3 million subsequently. The line ministry responsible for
this project is the Ministry of Public Works. It acts as executing agency and works closely with
AusAID in monitoring, evaluating, and verifying the implementation. Ministry of Public Works
also has issued a Water and Sanitation PBG Project Implementation Manual (PIM), a guideline
of PBG project implementation. The PIM poses a number of criteria to the local government as
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the recipient of the grant, and the ultimate beneficiary.  In addition, the PIM specifies technical
requirements for the service connections.
The eligibility criteria, selection of grants recipient, project implementation, and
verification and reimbursement process are explained in the Consolidated Report of Verification
Survey for Water and Sanitation Hibah (Australia-Indonesia Partnership 2011a). The
explanation is summarized in the following sections.
6.3.1. Eligibility Criteria
Local governments interested to participate in PBG for drinking water program have
to fulfill a number of criteria to determine eligibility. There are four categories of eligibility:
recipient eligibility, beneficiary eligibility, technical eligibility, and additional eligibility. All
eligibilities must be met to qualify as grants recipient.
a. Recipient eligibility
The recipient of PBG for drinking water is local government. To be eligible, the local
government must meet the following criteria:
- The local government and its water supply company do not have outstanding debt to the
central government, or are involved in a program to restructure their outstanding debt.
- There is sufficient capacity to distribute water to new consumers.
b. Beneficiary eligibility
Beneficiary is customers who benefit from household connections funded by PBG for
drinking water. The eligibility criteria for beneficiary are:
- Categorization as low income household as determined by the head of the region.
- Installed electrical power of ≤ 1,300 VA, while 50% of the targeted beneficiaries have
installed electrical power of ≤ 900 VA.
- Willingness and ability to meet the water supply company’s customer requirements.
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c. Technical eligibility
- Connection is made subsequent to conclusion of the grants agreement between the
Ministry of Finance and local governments.
- The technical specifications of the service connection are in line with the quality
standard in use by the water supply company, which should refer to the technical
standard issued by the Ministry of Public Works and the national standards of
Indonesia.
d. Additional eligibility
- Availability of a list of potential beneficiaries.
- Availability of an implementation document covering at least the value of the grant for
the number of service connections to be installed per year.
- Availability of a technical planning document, i.e. detailed engineering design (DED),
for the service connections to be installed.
- Readiness for verification and audit.
- Availability of operational funds for related activities in the local governments receiving
grants.
6.3.2. Selection of PBG Recipients
Figure 6.5 below summarizes selection process of PBG recipients. The Ministry of
Public Works made a list of potential PBG recipients, based on the water capacity available in
each region to serve additional customers. The Ministry of Finance provides fiscal capacity data
and outstanding debt data of potential recipients. Based on the data, the potential recipients are
sorted into shortlisted candidates. A baseline survey is then carried out in regions whose local
governments satisfied the recipient criteria. The survey is to confirm the status of beneficiary
criteria; it aimed at identifying low-income households interested in connecting to a piped-water
system of the water supply company. If the beneficiary criteria are satisfied, the Ministry of
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Public Works, the Ministry of Finance, and local governments coordinate to check the status of
technical and additional eligibility. After all eligibility criteria are met, the process for grants
application by local governments begins.21
Local governments selected as PBG recipients are required to submit certain
documents to confirm their commitment in PBG projects. This confirmation signifies the local
autonomy in PBG; local governments have the liberty to decide their participation in the
program. Grant agreements are then signed by the Minister of Finance and mayor/regent, or
their representatives. Thirty-five local governments are selected as recipients of PBG for
drinking water in 2010 and 2011. The process of selecting recipients, implementing the
programs, monitoring, verification, and disbursements are conducted in close coordination with
the donor, AusAID.
6.3.3. PBG Implementation
Figure 6.6 below summarizes the implementation process of PBG for drinking water.
PBG for drinking water requires pre-financing. Recipient local governments allocated the funds
21 Based on interview with Reni, project officer, Directorate of Drinking Water Improvement, Ministry of
Public Works, March 2012.
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Figure 6.5.
Selection Process of PBG Recipients
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from local budget for equity investment in their water supply company. With this investment,
water supply companies build piped-water household connections for low income households,
and report the works to local governments.
Application for reimbursement can be processed if the connections worked well
according to standards determined by the Ministry of Public Works. For PBG project, the proof
of the connection’s functionality came from paid water bills for two consecutive months.
Verification is performed by the Ministry of Public Works and AusAID representatives. After
the connections are verified, local governments can apply for funds reimbursement to the
Ministry of Finance.
6.4. Recipients of PBG for Drinking Water
PBG for drinking water is granted to 35 local governments; 22 received the grants in
2010 and 13 received the grants in 2011.22 The composition of local governments receiving
22 A local government, Kab. Situbondo, withdrew participation after its share was allocated.
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PBG based on their fiscal capacity23 in 2009 is illustrated in Figure 6.7 below .
The majority of participating local governments are classified as local governments with
low fiscal capacity, with 24 out of 35 local governments. Local governments with medium, high,
and very high fiscal capacity are 6, 4, and 1, respectively.
Table 6.5 below summarizes the general information of local governments who received
of PBG for drinking water, including the grants allocation, grants realization, and fiscal capacity
in 2009. The table shows that as for target achievement, on average 97% of piped water
connections had been installed and functioning well. A piped water connection is considered
achieving PBG requirements if it has been functioning well for three months, confirmed by
payments made by customers to water supply companies. This emphasizes that PBG insists not
only on the availability of output resulting from the grants funds, but also on the fact that the
output is functioning well (performance).
23 Fiscal capacity is calculated by the Ministry of Finance for each subnational government (i.e.
provincial and local governments) every year. The compilation of the calculation is published as ‘Fiscal
Capacity Map’ in annual ministerial decree, which classified subnational governments into 4 categories:
low, medium, high, and very high. The last decree regarding fiscal capacity is Ministry of Finance Decree
No. 244/PMK.07/2011. The decree defines fiscal capacity as “subnational governments’ financial
capacity as reflected on the revenues in subnational budget (not included DAK, emergency funds, loans,
and other revenues which utilization is restricted to certain expenditures) to finance local expenditures
after deducted by salary expenditures, with consideration to the number of poor population”. The formula
of fiscal capacity used for grants allocation is different from that of fiscal capacity used for DAU
allocation. The same terminology often caused confusion.
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Table 6.5.
Recipients of PBG for Drinking Water
Year No. City/Regency (Kab/Kota)
Grant Allocation Realization
Fiscal
Capacity in
2009
Grant
Amount
(IDR 000)
Targeted
House
Connection
Grant
Amount
(IDR 000)
Targeted
House
Connection
2010 1 KAB. BANGKALAN 2,300,000 1,100 100.0% 100.0% Low
2 KAB. BANJAR 5,000,000 2,000 100.0% 100.0% High
3 KAB. BOGOR 12,500,000 4,500 100.0% 100.0% Low
4 KAB. BOYOLALI 2,450,000 1,150 100.0% 100.0% Low
5 KAB. CIAMIS 8,000,000 3,000 43.8% 50.0% Low
6 KAB. CIANJUR 2,000,000 1,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
7 KAB. CILACAP 2,900,000 1,300 100.0% 100.0% Low
8 KAB. DONGGALA 2,000,000 1,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
9 KAB. GARUT 9,950,000 3,650 100.0% 100.0% Low
10 KAB. JOMBANG 2,600,000 1,200 100.0% 100.0% Low
11 KAB. KAPUAS 2,000,000 1,000 100.0% 100.0% High
12 KAB. KARAWANG 14,000,000 5,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
13 KAB. KLATEN 8,000,000 3,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
14 KAB. KUDUS 2,000,000 1,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
15 KAB. KUNINGAN 14,450,000 5,150 100.0% 100.0% Low
16 KAB. LAMPUNG UTARA 1,400,000 700 100.0% 100.0% Low
17 KAB. LOMBOK TIMUR 1,000,000 500 100.0% 100.0% Low
18 KAB. MUARA ENIM 3,500,000 1,500 100.0% 100.0% Medium
19 KAB. PANDEGLANG 2,000,000 1,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
20 KAB. SERANG 11,000,000 4,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
21 KAB. SIDOARJO 14,000,000 5,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
22 KAB. SITUBONDO* 2,000,000 1,000 0.0% 0.0% Low
TOTAL 2010 125,050,000 48,750 92.9% 93.2%
2011 1 KAB. SUKOHARJO 2,000,000 1,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
2 KAB. WONOGIRI 5,000,000 2,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
3 KAB. WONOSOBO 14,000,000 5,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
4 KOTA BALIKPAPAN 2,000,000 1,000 100.0% 100.0% Very High
5 KOTA BANJARBARU 3,500,000 1,500 100.0% 100.0% High
6 KOTA BANJARMASIN 14,500,000 5,000 96.6% 100.0% Medium
7 KOTA BOGOR 5,000,000 2,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
8 KOTA JAYAPURA 1,000,000 500 100.0% 100.0% Medium
9 KOTA MALANG 11,000,000 4,000 100.0% 100.0% Medium
10 KOTA PADANG 3,500,000 1,500 100.0% 100.0% Medium
11 KOTA PALANGKARAYA 1,500,000 750 100.0% 100.0% High
12 KOTA PALEMBANG 17,000,000 6,000 100.0% 100.0% Low
13 KOTA PEKALONGAN 1,000,000 500 100.0% 100.0% Medium
TOTAL 2011 81,000,000 30,750 99.7% 100.0%
TOTAL 2010 AND 2011 206,050,000 79,500 96.6% 96.9%
*Withdrew participation after the grants was allocated.
Source: Minister of Finance Decree No. 245/PMK.07/2010 (fiscal capacity data) and Australia-Indonesia Partnership (2011b) (other data).
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6.5. Accountability Relationship Framework in Drinking Water Service
Referring to the conceptual framework described in Chapter III, an accountability
relationships framework in drinking water service is established in Figure 6.8 below:
Since water is a monopolistic public service, the short route of accountability is not
expected to be observed. Instead, the accountability is ensured through the long route of
accountability (Word Bank 2004). Similar to the conceptual framework, in this framework
citizens demand good water service from the governments. The governments then make water
supply companies to deliver the demands.
Water service is a decentralized sector; this makes the main responsibility is on local
governments, to whom the central government provides intergovernmental grants as financial
support. In this case, the intergovernmental grants is PBG, which will be the focus of analysis.
The framework in Figure 6.8 suggests that central and local governments are coordinated
through the employment of PBG, and that the features of PBG arguably benefit the coordination.
The result of this process, provided all the ideal conditions are met, is the delivery of good
drinking water services.
Governments
Figure 6.8.
Accountability Relationships in Drinking Water Service
Local
Governments
Citizens Water supplycompanies
Long route of accountability
Source: Author, adapted from Halpern et al (2008) and Ehrhardt et al (2010)
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The data presented in the previous sections show that drinking water service (piped
water) is decreasing. This signifies that the accountability relationship is not working as
expected. Referring to the framework, there are 3 possibilities sources of distraction on the
long-route of accountability: (1) citizens’ lack of demand for piped water service, (2) local
governments’ lack of capacity to improve the service, or (3) both of them.
The next sections will evaluate why the accountability relationship does not work
effectively in drinking water service in Indonesia, focusing on the possible causes of distraction
in the accountability relationships.
The first step is to evaluate whether there’s citizens’ demand for piped water service. To
do this, the research uses secondary data about the demands from citizens. From the data, it will
be observed whether citizens voice their demand of piped water to the governments.
Theoretically, citizens’ demand is the trigger in the long route of accountability, without which
the governments do not have any pressure to take action. It means that if citizens’ demands exist,
local government should have the incentives to improve the demanded service.
The second step is to evaluate whether local governments have the capacity to improve
the service. This research will focus on financial capacity, indicated by local governments’
investments in piped water. Conceptual framework suggests that as a part of accountability,
local governments need to provide financial support to water supply companies in order to
supply the citizens’ demand for good piped water service. To have an insight of local
governments’ financial capacity to increase investments, the research estimates the amount of
investments needed in order to reach piped water service coverage according to national
standard, and compares the estimated investments with local governments’ financial capacity.
From the evaluation results, the possible cause of the decreasing service will be identified.
Based on this, the research will evaluate whether the situation changes with the implementation
of PBG and if it does, how PBG work to cause the change.
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6.6. Citizens’ Demand for Drinking Water Service
Drinking water can be provided by governments (local governments and central
government), water supply companies, and the private sector. If provided by local governments,
drinking water is supplied by public service agencies or by community-based drinking water
facilities operated by the communities. The funding comes from local budgets, either from the
central government through intergovernmental grants (including DAK for drinking water) or
from own-source revenues. DAK targets urban slum areas, fishermen villages, and rural areas
(Ministry of Public Works 2010).
The central government through line ministries also provides drinking water, mostly
community-based. A community-based water supply system is used in communal scale and
managed independently by the communities, based on guidelines issued by the governments.
Although the design of the system is expected to be easy to operate and maintain, transferring
the management of the system to the communities is not always a desirable option. Vazquez
(2011) documented the experience of Guatemala, where rural households do not prefer
community-based water supply facilities. According to the findings, this reflects the
community’s fatigue in providing the labor and other input to maintain the system. The
community will benefit from the government’s technical and management assistance to improve
the quality of water supply. The assistance will also reduce voluntarily input and prevent the
system from falling into disrepair (Whittington et al. 2007, Harvey and Reed 2009).
Most private sectors provide water by selling it retail, targeting residential areas where
water access is limited. Water is delivered in carts by passing street vendors, and is sold at a
high price, making water provided by the private sector the most expensive option (Hawes
2010).
In interviews with AusAid and Ministry of Public Works officials, it is found that citizens’
demand for piped water from water supply companies is actually high. Waiting lists of potential
customers can be found in almost all water supply companies. Even among poor households,
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willingness to have piped water connection from the companies is very high.24 This is because
poor households are least likely to have ready access to safe drinking water, thus making them
dependent on private sectors which sell water at a higher price than water supply companies.
Long waiting lists of water supply companies also appear in many local newspapers and
publications, e.g. in Makassar, the biggest city in Sulawesi island (40,000 as of August 2012,
according to Kabar Makassar, a local newspaper),25 Samarinda, the capital of Kalimantan
Timur province (7,369 as of September 2012, according to the official website of Samarinda
Water Supply Company),26 Kendari, the capital of Sulawesi Tenggara province (10,000 as of
October 2012, according to Antara, Indonesian national news agency).27
According to the accountability relationships framework, the trigger of the long route of
accountability is citizens’ demand for service. There is a strong indication that citizens’ demand
for piped water is high, and given the democratic governance, the demand already reached the
governments. However, the service coverage of piped water remains low. The waiting lists are
not always addressed immediately by water supply companies. An almost uniform reason is that
they lack the capacity to provide water to all applicants due to, among others, limited raw water
capacity, limited production capacity, and obsolete water system–all these can be traced to
limited investment funds for service expansion. The under-investment argument is also
mentioned by, among other, the Ministry of Public Works (2012), Coucouvinis (2010) and
Hawes (2010).
The framework also suggests that, in the long route of accountability, the next step after
citizens’ demand is the governments’ effort to ensure that the citizens get the service they ask. In
the case of piped water, the effort can be observed in the form of investments for piped water
24Based on interview with Poppy Lestari (AusAid), Putri and Reni (Ministry of Public Works), March
2012.
25 http://www.kabarmakassar.com/?p=12320
26 http://pdamkotasamarinda.co.id/read/news/2012/68/7.369-calon-pelanggan-belum-terealisasi-sambunga
n-pdam.html
27 http://sultra.antaranews.com/print/260647/daftar-tunggu-pdam-kendari-10000-calon-pelanggan
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service. The fact that investments remain low despite strong demand from the citizens raises a
question of why local governments do not increase its investment.
A possibility is that local governments lack the financial capacity to increase their
investments. This can be the reason due to the high dependency on DAK for capital expenditure
(Ministry of Finance 2011, Gervais 2010), which may be an indication for low financial
capacity. According to the Ministry of Finance, 42.3% of all Indonesian local governments are
under the category of low fiscal capacity in 2009, 26.8% in the medium category, 15.7% in the
high category, and the remaining 15.2% are in the very high category. Based on the data, local
governments with low fiscal capacity represent the largest group, which can be the reason for
their low investments. Besides, decentralization in Indonesia is more focused on expenditure
side, rather than revenue side (Nugrahanto and Muhyiddin, 2008). While all public service
functions have been devolved to local governments, most revenue sources such as major taxes
are still managed by the central governments. This makes most local governments depend on
intergovernmental grants as the major revenue sources.
Is this the case for local governments’ low investments in drinking water service? The
next section will evaluate local governments’ financial capacity to identify whether financial
capacity is the main reason for the low investments in drinking water service.
6.7. Local Governments’ Financial Capacity to Invest in Drinking Water Service
According to the accountability relationships framework, following citizens’ demand,
local governments who are mainly responsible for the delivery of public services, will respond
to fulfill the demand. The response of local governments is expected to be observed in, among
others, budget allocation for piped water service, including for investment in water supply
companies to expand piped water service coverage. However, the current situation shows that
even though there is citizens’ demand for piped water, its service coverage has been declining,
as well as local governments’ investments in water supply companies.
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The research tries to evaluate whether this situation results from local governments’ lack
of financial capacity. To achieve this, local governments’ financial capacity is estimated and
assessed against a hypothetical situation where the capacity is assumed to be used for
investment in piped water. The objective of this approach is to identify whether local
governments have the financial capacity to allocate more funds for investments in the service.
The research argues that, if the estimation shows that local governments have the
financial capacity to invest, budget limitation is not the main reason for the lack of investment.
In this case, local governments could have been more accountable to local citizens in providing
water service if they had increased their investments in water supply companies. This is because
with the investments, water supply companies can expand their service coverage and deliver
water service to more citizens.
The research uses local governments participating in PBG for drinking water and their
water supply companies as samples. There are 35 participating local governments, but only 24
have water supply companies that have been audited for fiscal year 2010. Because the
estimation requires data of water supply companies, the research only includes the 24 regions
(cities and regencies) which local governments received PBG and which water supply
companies have been audited for fiscal year 2010. Data related to water supply companies is
obtained from the results of audits conducted by Supreme Audit Body (Badan Pemeriksa
Keuangan/BPK) or by Government Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan dan
Pembangunan/BPKP). Data related to local governments’ budget is obtained from the Ministry
of Finance.
6.7.1. Estimating Investment Needs and Borrowing Capacity
According to the Ministry of National Development Planning, the target of service
coverage for drinking water in 2011 is 62.50% of total population.28 Since water supply
28 Deputy Minister of National Development Planning/Deputy Chairman of National Development
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companies’ service areas do not cover the whole population, it is assumed that this target is to be
achieved within the companies’ service areas. In other words, the target of 62.50% is assumed to
represent 62.50% of the population in the companies’ service area. To achieve this target, the
research tries to estimate investments required from each local government, and evaluate
whether the local government has the financial capacity to make the investments.
The estimation is hypothetical. Data from local budgets in fiscal year 2010 and from
water supply companies’ audited reports 2010 will be used to estimate the investments need.
Assumptions used in the estimation are:
1. Local budget surplus from fiscal year 2010 is available to use for investment in water supply
companies.
2. In case budget surplus is not sufficient, local governments take long term loans to cover the
difference. The loans are to be paid in 10 years, assuming annual fixed interest rate of
11.75%, which is currently applied to loans from central to local governments, provided the
loans are in domestic currency.
3. Maximum amount of loans is determined by local governments’ borrowing capacity.
According to Government Regulation No. 54/2005 on Regional Loans, borrowing capacity is
represented by Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR).29 A local government is eligible to
borrow if its DSCR is at least 2.50.
4. The yardstick for water service coverage to be achieved is 62.50%, which is the national
target of households with access to piped water in 2011.
5. Citizens receive piped water from household connections.30
Planning Agency (2010). Presentation on Roadmap of Acceleration of Millennium Development Goals
Achievements (Peta Jalan Percepatan Pencapaian Tujuan Pembangunan Millennium), Jakarta, December
8, 2010.
29 According to the Government Regulation No. 54/2005, DSCR formula is as follows:
DSCR = {Own-source revenues+(DBH – DBH for Reforestation) + DAU} – Salary expenditures >2,5
Loans principals + Interests + Other loans-related expenses
30 Citizens can get piped water from (1) household connection installed in citizens’ residences, (2) public
hydrant installed for communal use in certain neighborhoods, (3) water depots and water trucks which
sell water via retail system, where citizens pay certain amounts of money to get certain quantity of water.
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6. All work to install piped water connections can be finished by the end fiscal year 2011.
Using these assumptions, the investment need and the borrowing capacity are then
estimated. The estimation of investment need follows these following steps:
1. Estimating the difference in water service coverage between the actual condition in 2010
and the target in 2011, which is 62.5%. The difference is the starting point to estimate the
investments needs. For example, in Kab. Serang (Serang regency), actual water service
coverage in 2010 is 29.39%. Thus, the difference from the target is 33.11% (62.5% -
29.39%).
2. Estimating the number of additional piped water connections required to close the
difference. To calculate this, first the research estimates the additional number of the
population in the service area represented by the difference in point (1). In Kab. Serang, the
difference of 33.11% represents 248,582 people. Assuming a household consists of five
people,31 49,716 additional piped water connections (248,582/5) are required to reach the
2011 target.
3. Estimating the amount of investments needed to install additional piped water connections
in point (2). Assuming the investment cost for one connection is IDR 6 million (about JPY
50,000), the investments need is estimated to be IDR 6 million times additional
connections. 32 Following the above example, estimated investments need for Kab. Serang
is IDR 298.3 billion (cost per connection of IDR 6 million x additional connection of
49,716 units).
The estimation of borrowing capacity follows these steps:
1. Estimating the loans to cover the investments, in case budget surplus is not sufficient. In
Kab. Serang, budget surplus in 2010 is IDR 66.7 billion. This means that the local
31 This assumption is used by the auditor to audit the water supply companies.
32 Based on the cost estimation of PBG for drinking water used in AusAID (2010).
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government will need additional loans in an amount of IDR 231.6 billion (investments need
of IDR 298.3 billion – budget surplus of 66.7 billion).
2. Estimating the borrowing capacity with the additional loan. Based on DSCR formula,
borrowing capacity of Kab. Serang is 3.19. The figure is higher than the minimum DSCR
requirement of 2.50, which means that Kab. Serang has sufficient borrowing capacity to
take the full loans.
The results of estimation are as summarized in Table 6.6 below:
Table 6.6.
Estimation Results -
Investment Needs and Local Governments’ Financial Capacity
Area
Water
supply
company’s
service
coverage in
2010
Difference
from 2011
target
(62.5%)
Additional
population to
cover to
reach service
coverage of
62.5%
Additional
house
connection
required to
reach service
coverage of
62.5%
Total
investment
needs
(IDR
million)
Local budget
surplus
(IDR million)
Additional
Loans
(IDR
million)
DSCR
with
additional
loan
Kab. Bangkalan 14.54% 47.96% 302,440 60,488 362,928 10,902 352,026 1.83
Kab. Banjar 30.00% 32.50% 198,022 39,604 237,626 89,560 148,066 4.86
Kab. Boyolali 66.12% Achieved
Kab. Ciamis 30.39% 32.11% 126,893 25,379 152,271 162,500 0 -
Kab. Cianjur 54.76% 7.74% 32,833 6,567 39,400 102,919 0 -
Kab. Cilacap 45.80% 16.70% 157,976 31,595 189,571 36,479 153,092 6.75
Kab. Donggala 44.40% 18.10% 90,685 18,137 108,822 17,308 91,514 2.98
Kab. Garut 38.23% 24.27% 143,549 28,710 172,259 118,854 53,405 20.24
Kab. Jombang 19.24% 43.26% 217,133 43,427 260,559 53,445 207,114 4.33
Kab. Karawang 30.35% 32.15% 353,949 70,790 424,739 204,002 220,737 6.05
Kab. Klaten 37.54% 24.96% 165,221 33,044 198,265 27,500 170,765 1.91
Kab. Kuningan 34.28% 28.22% 110,707 22,141 132,848 55,496 77,352 4.65
Kab. Lombok Timur 37.11% 25.39% 82,374 16,475 98,849 17,343 81,506 8.09
Kab. Muara Enim * 38.86% 23.64% 71,747 14,349 86,096 84,369 1,727 1,075.26
Kab. Pandeglang 6.76% 55.74% 638,686 127,737 766,423 57,190 709,233 0.75
Kab. Serang 29.39% 33.11% 248,582 49,716 298,299 66,653 231,645 3.19
Kab. Sidoarjo 31.04% 31.46% 576,427 115,285 691,713 139,390 552,323 3.50
Kab. Situbondo 26.66% 35.84% 152,956 30,591 183,548 104,309 79,239 5.60
Kab. Sukoharjo 11.91% 50.59% 373,846 74,769 448,616 52,731 395,885 1.11
Kab. Wonogiri 46.94% 15.56% 87,014 17,403 104,417 108,589 0 -
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Area
Water
supply
company’s
service
coverage in
2010
Difference
from 2011
target
(62.5%)
Additional
population to
cover to
reach service
coverage of
62.5%
Additional
house
connection
required to
reach service
coverage of
62.5%
Total
investment
needs
(IDR
million)
Local budget
surplus
(IDR million)
Additional
Loans
(IDR
million)
DSCR
with
additional
loan
Kab. Wonosobo 72.85% Achieved
Kota Balikpapan 75.97% Achieved
Kota Banjarmasin 98.53% Achieved
Kota Palangka Raya 48.58% 13.92% 28,317 5,663 33,981 16,679 17,301 23.61
*The estimated loans for Kab. Muara Enim is relatively low (IDR 1.7 billion). Assuming a 10-year repayment period and 11.75% interest rate, its
annual loan repayment is very low compared to its annual revenues. Using DSCR formula on page 152, the computation results in a very high
DSCR of 1,075.26.
From the 24 local governments in the table, four have achieved the water coverage
target in 2011. According to the estimation results, the remaining 20 local governments need to
increase the coverage between 7.74% and 55.74%, requiring additional investments between
IDR 39,400 million and IDR 766,423 million. Figure 6.9 below shows the estimated investment
needs and sources of investments financing for the 20 local governments.
Figure 6.9 shows that only three local governments (Kab. Cianjur, Kab. Ciamis, and
Kab. Wonogiri) can cover the whole investment using their budget surplus. Seventeen local
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governments need to seek external financing, which is assumed to come from loans, if they
want to achieve the target of 62.5% piped water service coverage. Assuming access to loans is
readily available, the external financing is to be obtained from loans. The loan amounts are
estimated to stand between IDR 1,727 million (Kab. Muara Enim) and IDR 709,223 million
(Kab. Pandeglang).
Taking additional loans will impact a region’s capacity to repay. Therefore, the
central government put a ceiling on the maximum loans allowed to local governments. When a
local government decides to take a new loan, it is required to compute its borrowing capacity,
represented by the Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR). DSCR is an indication of a local
government’s financial capacity to pay its loans. The payments of outstanding loans (i.e. loans
which have already been taken before) are also included in projecting DSCR. According to
Government Regulation No. 54/2005 on Regional Loans, minimum DSCR after considering all
loans should be at least 2.50 every year until the loan is fully repaid. The summary of estimated
DSCR is presented in Figure 6.10 below:
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Figure 6.10.Local Governments' Borrowing Capacity
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The estimation results show that, for 17 local governments that need loans, 4 local
governments (Kab. Pandeglang, Kab. Klaten, Kab. Bangkalan and Kab. Sukoharjo) cannot meet
the minimum DSCR if they take the full loans to cover the investment needs. The remaining 14
local governments have DSCR above 2.50, ranging from 2.98 (Kab. Donggala) to 1,075.26
(Kab. Muara Enim – not shown in Figure 6.10).33 This indicates that the majority of local
governments included in the estimation have sufficient capacity to take full loans needed, in
order to meet the target of water service coverage of 62.5% in 2011.
6.7.2. The Implication of Estimation Results
Before discussing the implication of the estimation results, it is important to clarify
that the estimation tries to predict what the financial capacity of local governments would look
like, in a hypothetical situation where local governments are assumed to maximize the use of
their budget surplus and borrowing capacity, in order to reach the national target of piped water
service coverage of 62.5%. Considering this, there are some factors to notice regarding the
estimation results.
First, the research does not aim at providing evidence that local governments have
all the funds at all times to finance the needs for investment in piped water, or in any public
service for that matter. It is acknowledged that, in reality, local budget surplus is not going to be
used (and is not supposed to be used) completely to finance only one kind of investment. What
the research is trying to confirm is whether most local governments have the capacity to make
investments, or at least some part of the investments, if they choose to make it one of their
priorities.
Second, the actual drinking water service coverage varies widely in the regions
included in the estimation. For the regions which have not achieved the service coverage target
of 62.5%, their service coverage range from 6.76% (Kab. Pandeglang) to 54.76% (Kab. Cianjur).
33 For convenient presentation, Kab. Muara Enim is not shown in the figure because of the very high
DSCR compared to other regions.
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Especially in regions with low service coverage, achieving the 62.5% target in a fiscal year is
not always technically possible. It is acknowledged that the estimation only covers the financial
side, assuming the investments are technically feasible.
Taking the above factors and the assumptions into account, the estimation results
indicate that most local governments participating in PBG for drinking water programs have the
capacity to invest in piped water as to reach the national target in 2011 (62.5%). From 24 local
governments evaluated in this estimation, 7 have already achieved national target of piped water
service, while 17 others have not. From 17 local governments that have not reached national
target for piped water service, 14 local governments have the financial capacity to invest in the
service, including 3 local governments that can cover the investment only from their budget
surplus. This finding confirms the results of Ehrhardt et al. (2010), who mentioned that based on
their sample, 83% of Indonesian local governments actually have the capacity to invest in piped
water to achieve MDG target by 2015. However, under-investment in piped water service is
obvious, with only 9% investing enough to meet the national target.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the estimation results is that, if local
governments make drinking water a priority, financially they are able to increase their
investments in this sector. It does not necessarily mean that local governments can provide for
all investments at once, but if they prioritize water investments in budget allocations, they do
have the financial capacity to make significant investments by using their budget surplus and/or
borrowing capacity. Therefore, the financial issue is hardly the cause of the lack of investments
in piped water; most local governments have the capacity to increase investments in this service.
6.8. Distraction in Accountability Relationships and the Role of PBG
The evaluation results in Section 6.6 and 6.7 are summarized in Figure 6.11 below:
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Figure 6.11 highlights the research findings, which are (1) citizens’demand for piped
water service is high, and (2) most local governments have the financial capacity to increase
their investments level by using their budget surplus combined with loans in order to support
water supply companies in service expansion. However, the data shows that this does not
happen. Service coverage of piped water is declining as well as local governments’ investments
Governments
Figure 6.11.
Current State of Accountability Relationships
In Drinking Water Service
LocalGovernments
Citizens
Water supplycompanies
Long route of accountability
Source: Author, adapted from Halpern et al (2008) and Ehrhardt et al (2010)
CentralGovernments
Funding
Result: Delivery of good water service
Ensure good
water service
Demand good
water service
Demand for piped water is high.
Democratic governance, free press,
and direct election of mayor and
regents provide opportunity for
citizens to voice this demand to their
local governments. However, the
demand is not strong enough to
increase investment allocation in
piped water.
Despite citizens’ demand,
Investments in piped water are
low, even though local
governments have sufficient
capacity to increase investments
to some extent, by using budget
surplus and/or taking additional
loans.
Result is not yet satisfactory. Service
coverage of piped water is declining. Water
supply companies have waiting lists but do
not always have the capacity to install
household connections.
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in this service. This signifies that the result of drinking water service delivery is not yet
satisfactory.
Conceptually, if the citizens present their demand, local governments will face pressure to
provide the demand. Research findings suggest that in piped water service, the demand does not
result in increased investment to improve the service, even though most local governments have
the financial capacity to do so.
There are many possibilities as to why this is the case. As argued by the Ministry of
Public Works (2012) and AusAID (2009), households have developed an alternative to cope
with the needs for drinking water in the absence of piped water connections. This may ease the
sense of urgency for immediate reform in drinking water service. As shown in Figure 6.8,
groundwater still provides a significant supply of drinking water, and is used by the majority of
the population. Also, as argued by Hawes (2010), buying water from private sectors, despite its
high price, is still a common practice wherever piped water is not available.
Also, some institutions at the local level have not yet adopted core principles of
transparency, governance, and participation that have proven to be critical (Indonesian National
Program of Community Empowerment, 2011). This can result in local governments’ not taking
into account the citizens’ demand appropriately. In Indonesia, citizens are given the opportunity
to give input to local budgets and development plans through an annual planning process. In the
process, a forum is established from the lowest government unit (desa/village) to be taken to
higher levels–a type of bottom-up approach. Olken (2010) stated that in Indonesia, the
facilitation of opportunity where citizens can express their direct interests significantly increases
citizens’ knowledge about development projects. The facilitation also results in greater
perceived benefits of the projects, and higher reported willingness of the citizens to contribute to
the success of projects implementation. However, the type of projects selected e.g. road,
irrigation system, water, sanitation) did not always change as a result of citizens’ expressing
their direct preferences.
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The research argues that, regardless of the exact reasons for the low investments, the root
of this situation is lack of incentives. Citizens’ having alternative drinking water sources, for
example, reduces local governments’ incentives to improve piped water service. Lack of
political pressure to adapt citizens’ proposal of prioritizing water service also results in reduced
incentives. AusAID (2009) argued that the deteriorating condition of water supply companies is
an impact of local governments channeling funds to other sectors. This again shows the lack of
incentives for local governments to increase investments in piped water service.
The lack of incentives finally leads to the weak accountability relationship between local
governments and citizens, and between local governments and water supply companies. The
accountability to citizens is weakened because local governments are less responsive to the
citizens’ demand, while the accountability to water supply companies is weakened because as
owners, local governments fail to provide sufficient support for service expansion. On the other
hand, this also weakens the accountability of water supply companies to local governments. The
companies are supposed to execute the service on behalf of local governments, but because of
the lack of support, they also lack the capacity to deliver good quality service.
As acknowledged in the second generation theory of fiscal federalism and the new
institutional economic, incentives are acknowledged to be essential in influencing behaviors and
responses on a particular subject. Hence, stimulating changes in behavior can be done by
offering incentives. Since the citizens’ demand is not an effective incentive to local governments,
the incentives should be provided from another source.
As decentralization is also a part of the long route of accountability in the framework, the
central government can step in to provide the incentives to encourage local investments in piped
water. The incentives are provided as PBG, which is a part of intergovernmental grants that
comes with decentralization implementation. The research identifies several features of PBG
which provide incentives to improve accountability relationships as follows:
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a. Citizens’ Demand (Accountability relationships between citizens and local
governments)
The accountability relationships between citizens and local governments emerge as
demand for piped water. As shown by the data, access to piped water in Indonesia is
uniformly limited in all provinces. The limited access is especially true for poor people. In
2005, more than 80 percent of Indonesian households in the poorest quintile of the
population rely on water from wells and from natural sources such as rain and river springs,
whereas the rate of households using these sources, declines to less than 35 percent for the
richest quintile (World Bank 2006b). Generally, poor citizens are those who are least likely
to have influence over policy makers because, among other things, they may not be well
informed about the quality of public services or they may place less weight on public
services when evaluating policy makers (World Bank 2004). For many reasons, their
demand for public services like piped water is likely to go unnoticed.
A feature in PBG that can address this situation is the eligibility criteria for PBG
beneficiaries, which requires that beneficiaries must be low income households. This
requirement allows poor citizens to have their demand fulfilled, and thus improve the
accountability of local governments to the citizens.
Having access to piped water also provides side benefits, other than the availability of
safe drinking water itself. Low income households that have piped water connections
installed reported that they have less health problems, which can also be associated with
higher school attendance in days for their children and thus an advantage from an education
viewpoint. Another positive impact is that they have more opportunities to open small
businesses where water is essential, like catering, laundry, and motorcycle wash. 34PBG
34 Interview with Rita Herlina, Head of Regional Grants Sub Directorate, Ministry of Finance (March
2012).
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also requires that the piped water connections are not only installed, but also function well
for a specified amount of time. This ensures the sustainability and quality of water service
post installment.
Another way that PBG improves accountability between local governments and
citizens is how PBG encourages budget allocation that brings direct benefit to citizens. By
requiring local governments to pre-finance the piped water investments, PBG drives local
budget allocation to projects whose benefits can immediately and directly be enjoyed by the
citizens. Prioritizing projects with direct benefits is especially important since historically,
the expenditure items that receive the highest allocation is that with indirect benefits, like
salary expenditures.
b. Local Governments’ Financial Support to Service Providers (Accountability
relationships between local governments and water supply companies)
This aspect of accountability relationships significantly improves as a result of PBG
implementation. Data shows that local governments’ investments in water supply
companies are relatively low in the past decade. At the same time, a way to be accountable
as the companies’ owners is to provide the financial support necessary to improve service
delivery. By requiring local governments to invest in water supply companies, PBG
improves the accountability of local governments to the companies.
Data of the 24 local governments sampled in Section 6.7 show that the majority of
local governments increased their investments in water supply companies with the
implementation of PBG. Table 6.7 below summarizes the investments made by the local
governments from 2007 to 2009, in comparison with the minimum investments made in a
particular year to comply with the PBG requirement (either in 2010 or 2011, depending on
the time when the local governments were participating in the PBG program).
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Table 6.7.
Local Governments’ Investments
(In IDR million)
Local Governments 2007* 2008* 2009* Average
Minimum
investment
required in
PBG**
1 Kab. Bangkalan 0 100 33 2,300
2 Kab. Banjar 6,325 6,500 8,625 7,150 5,000
3 Kab. Boyolali 9,080 7,500 2,600 6,393 2,450
4 Kab. Ciamis 1,500 3,250 4,000 2,917 3,500
5 Kab. Cianjur 32,076 0 0 10,692 2,000
6 Kab. Cilacap 200 0 0 67 2,900
7 Kab. Donggala 2,000 1,934 350 1,428 2,000
8 Kab. Garut 0 11,000 0 3,667 9,950
9 Kab. Jombang 4,000 4,000 5,370 4,457 2,600
10 Kab. Karawang 6,750 2,154 3,160 4,021 14,000
11 Kab. Klaten 2,000 1,000 2,000 1,667 8,000
12 Kab. Kuningan 4,200 1,500 1,200 2,300 14,450
13 Kab. Lombok Timur 12,000 11,500 9,500 11,000 1,000
14 Kab. Muara Enim 2,905 14,226 10,384 9,172 3,500
15 Kab. Pandeglang 4,000 0 0 1,333 2,000
16 Kab. Serang 7,500 9,066 15,000 10,522 11,000
17 Kab. Sidoarjo 3,000 7,850 0 3,617 14,000
18 Kab. Situbondo 0 2,825 7,175 3,333 2,000
19 Kab. Sukoharjo 57,000 5,950 5,320 22,757 2,000
20 Kab. Wonogiri 2,086 2,750 7,368 4,068 5,000
21 Kab. Wonosobo 3,240 1,640 11,065 5,315 14,000
22 Kota Balikpapan 3,700 9,100 4,165 5,655 2,000
23 Kota Banjarmasin 26,500 40,000 31,500 32,667 14,500
24 Kota Palangka Raya 250 250 250 250 1,500
Source:
* Local budgets submitted to the Ministry of Finance. Please note that the investment data is not exclusively for
drinking water, but represent all investments made in the fiscal year.
** Ministry of Finance. The minimum investments are equal to the amount of PBG allocated to each local
government, and are to be used solely for the improvement of piped water service. Some local governments (e.g. Kab.
Serang, Kab. Ciamis, Kab. Pandeglang, Kota Palangkaraya, Kab. Bangkalan) allocated more than the minimum
amounts, either to be invested in a single year or multiyear.
According to the data in Table 6.7, 14 out of 24 local governments (58%) allocated
more investments to comply with PBG, compared to their average investment in 3 fiscal
years (2007-2009). For the 14 local governments, the difference between the average
investments and the minimum investments made under PBG range from IDR 478 million to
IDR 12,150 million. Figure 6.12 below illustrates the investments allocation of the 14 local
governments.
162
Among the 14 local governments in Figure 6.12, 12 are local governments with low
fiscal capacity in 2009. One local government has medium fiscal capacity (Kab. Sidoarjo),
and one has high fiscal capacity (Kota Palangkaraya). From the figure, it can be observed
that low fiscal capacity does not always result in low investment, given the right incentives.
For example, Kab. Wonosobo, Kab. Karawang, and Kab. Kuningan have low fiscal capacity.
At the same time, they receive a high amount of PBG which means they need to pre-finance
high investments. This requirement can be met with satisfactory results; all of them achieve
100% of the target.
The investments from local governments also strengthen the accountability of water
supply companies to local governments. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs (2012),
local government investment is different from grants; investments need to be recovered. The
recovery comes in the form of dividends paid by the companies, and in the form of
social/economic/other benefits to the regions. Putting investments in the companies
therefore increases local governments’ incentives to improve the monitoring and
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coordination as efforts to ensure investments’ recovery. The increased monitoring and
coordination provides higher incentives for water supply companies to perform and thus
improves their accountability to local governments.
6.9. Local Governments’ Responses to PBG
PBG for drinking water is a pilot project for PBG implementation. The system is
relatively new compared to DAK, another type of conditional grants in intergovernmental grants
which has been providing funding for drinking water service since 2005. Concerns were high at
the beginning of its implementation of whether local governments have difficulties in adapting
to the new system.
To investigate the response of local governments, a survey was conducted in February
and March 2012. The targets of the survey are local government officials working in financial
and revenue management department. This department is responsible for managing the financial
aspect of intergovernmental grants revenues. Of 35 local governments, 17 participated in the
survey. The first part of the questionnaire examines their perception on drinking water funding
through DAK and through PBG. The second part of the questionnaire explores the reasons for
their preference to a particular funding, whether it is DAK or PBG.
The first part of the questionnaire focused on 4 aspects to compare DAK and PBG:
1. Administrative procedure in planning activities
2. Administrative procedure in requesting reimbursement
3. Time required for fund reimbursement
4. Workload
Respondents were asked the same questions regarding DAK and PBG. The responses are
analyzed using a sign test. The results are as follows:
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The statistical results indicate that there’s no significant difference in respondents’
perception on administrative planning, administrative reimbursement, and time for
reimbursement between DAK and PBG. However, respondents have the perception that PBG
requires less workload compared to DAK. When asked about the overall preference between
DAK and PBG, eight respondents prefer PBG (47.1%), four prefer DAK (23.5%), and five have
no preference (29.4%), as illustrated in Figure 6.13 below.
In the second part of the questionnaire, respondents are asked open-ended questions about
the reasons for their preference for DAK or PBG. The respondents’ answers can be summarized
in Table 6.8 below:
47.1%
23.5%
29.4%
Figure 6.13Funding Preference
PBG
DAK
No Preference
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Table 6.8.
Reasons for Preference of PBG or DAK
PBG DAK
Advantage + Clear guideline about the
projects/activities that can be funded
+ Project implementation can expand
beyond one fiscal year
+ Targeted specific sector, thus focus
on solving specific problem
+ Grants agreement provides clear
instructions on allocation and other
arrangements
+ Quality standards enable focused
verification and transparency
+ Improved budget and reporting
accountability
+ Clear activity to be funded makes it
easier for accounting records
+ Local governments have higher
flexibility to decide what projects
to finance, provided the projects
satisfy DAK guidelines.
+ No pre-financing eases the burden
of local budget
+ Funds are received in advance,
supporting local cash management
Disadvantage - Pre-financing requirement adds burden
to local budget
- Local parliament’s resistance to
pre-financing hinders budget approval
- Technical guidelines are prone to
ambiguity, some grey area exists for
eligible and non-eligible
projects/activities
- Project implementation is limited to
one fiscal year
- Wide scope of activity can reduce
focus on the most urgent area
- Wide scope of activity causes
reporting problems if executing unit
fails to detail the report properly
-
From the questionnaire result, generally local governments can adapt to PBG system and
PBG implementation is perceived positively. It is also identified that pre-financing is the major
concern of respondents. Four respondents said pre-financing is burdensome to the local budget,
while three mentioned that it raised resistance from local parliaments. However, the three
respondents who acknowledged resistance confirmed that the parliaments finally agreed with
the pre-financing scheme.
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The response on pre-financing is somehow contradictory with the analysis result. In the
previous section, the analysis result indicates that most local governments have the capacity to
increase investments, and also according to the data, all local governments participating in PBG
programs can manage to provide the pre-financing for investments in piped water.
The research argues that this condition further confirms the needs for incentives to
influence budget decision. Budget scarcity is a common problem faced by all governments, and
for this reason priorities need to be determined. Increasing investments in a sector may well
mean major spending in local budgets, but this does not necessarily mean that local
governments cannot afford to do it. With the right incentives, budget decisions can be
influenced toward certain priorities, and this is the principle that has been applied in PBG. Most
importantly, in the case of PBG, the spending is actually temporary because the funds used for
pre-financing will be reimbursed through grants. Thus, cash flow management, rather than
increased spending, is the main issue in pre-financing.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Improvement in public service delivery is the motive for most decentralization (Ahmad et
al. 2005), and the ultimate goal of decentralization (Oates 1972, 1993, Musgrave 1973). This
improvement is made possible by the devolving of public service functions to subnational
governments (i.e. provincial and local governments), who are believed to have better knowledge
of citizens’ needs and preferences.
In most developing countries, the main financial support for decentralization is mostly
provided by the central government in the form of intergovernmental grants. Therefore, it is
important that the intergovernmental grants provide the right incentives so as to achieve the
decentralization goal (UNCDF 2010). PBG features incentives to encourage improvement in
performance and accountability, and links access to funds with the attainment of certain
standards. By incorporating incentives, PBG also promotes accountability by emphasizing a
result-based, bottom-up, client-driven approach (Broadway and Shah 2009).
In Indonesia, PBG was first implemented in 2010, targeting specific public services such
as drinking water, sanitation, and education. In light of PBG being a part of Indonesian
intergovernmental grants, the research tries to identify the significance of PBG in the
intergovernmental grants. As for PBG implementation, using PBG for drinking water as a case
study, the research evaluates the impact of PBG on local governments’ accountability in public
service delivery, and investigates whether PBG is applicable to local governments.
With regard to PBG implementation, the research accepts the hypothesis that PBG
improves public service in Indonesia by strengthening local governments’ accountability in the
service delivery. This chapter concludes the research by describing the answers to the three
research questions: (1) Does PBG in Indonesia strengthen the accountability of local
governments in public service delivery?, (2) If so, how does PBG strengthen the accountability?,
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and (3) Is PBG generally applicable to local governments in Indonesia?. This chapter also
explains the suggestion for future implementation of PBG, based on the research findings.
7.1. PBG in Indonesia strengthen the accountability of local governments in public service
delivery
In the research conceptual framework, accountability is defined as “a set of relationships
among service delivery actors with five features: delegating (explicit or implicit understanding
that a service will be supplied), financing (providing the resources to enable the service to be
provided or paying for it), performing (supplying the actual service), having information about
performance (obtaining relevant information and evaluating performance against expectations
and formal or informal norms), and enforcing (being able to impose sanctions for inappropriate
performance or provide rewards when performance is appropriate)” (The World Bank, World
Development Report 2004, p. 48). In light of this definition, the research observes whether
there’s a change in local governments’ behavior concerning the delegating, financing,
performing, having sufficient information, and enforcing the delivery of public services as a
result of PBG implementation.
In Indonesia, drinking water service is included in the public services devolved to local
governments under decentralization. This satisfies the delegating feature in the definition of
accountability above. However, the fulfillment of other features, namely financing, performing,
having sufficient information, and enforcing, is rather doubtful given the input-based approach
in intergovernmental grants.
Based on the case study of PBG for drinking water, based on hypothetical analysis on
local governments’ financial capacity, the research finds that most local governments have the
financial capacity to increase their investments in piped drinking water, through the utilization
of budget surplus or combining the budget surplus with loans. This is consistent with the
findings of Ehrhardt et al. (2010) in their study on Indonesian local governments. Despite
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sufficiency in financial capacity, local governments’ investments for piped drinking water
service tend to decline, even though the percentage of population who has access to piped
drinking water is decreasing, and citizens’ demand for piped drinking water is high.
One of the requirements of PBG for drinking water is local governments allocating local
budgets for investments in water supply companies to pre-finance piped water service
expansion. Reports on PBG implementation show that all participating local governments could
allocate investment from their budgets regardless of their fiscal capacity, even with the
pre-financing requirement which involves careful cash management. Among the 35 recipients of
PBG for drinking water, 22 are local governments with low fiscal capacity, and all of them
could fulfill the pre-financing requirement and achieve the specified standard.
Referring to the definition of accountability in the research conceptual framework, the
research observes the following changes in Indonesian local governments’ behavior concerning
the delivery of public services:
- Financing. Providing financial resources is an important way to communicate
accountability (Glynn 1993), however this is what most Indonesian local governments
often lack . An example of this situation can be found in drinking water service. Prior to the
implementation of PBG for drinking water, most local governments actually had the
financial capacity to increase their level of investments, but did not do so. The
implementation of PBG stimulates local governments to increase their investments level in
public service delivery. There’s a change in local governments’ decisions, as far as
financing is concerned, with the implementation of PBG. Friedman (2009) argued that
accountability can be observed from the qualitative effect, that is, by observing whether the
change makes any difference. Referring to this and the analysis result, the research argues
that local governments’ increasing investments in public services is indicative of
improvement in local governments’ accountability in delivering the services.
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- Performing. The present condition of the Indonesian public services  remains highly
unsatisfactory to citizens, with problems including  slow service delivery and poor quality
under unskilled service providers constantly occurring  in the process. As a result, an
extensive number of customers’ complaints have steadily built up because of the low
satisfaction level (Mohamad 2007). The case of drinking water shows a similar condition,
with decreasing service coverage despite high demand from the citizens, indicating that the
service is not adequately supplied to meet the demands. In many regions in Indonesia,
citizens applying for house connection need to face long waiting lists. PBG for drinking
water addresses this issue by requiring local governments to invest in water supply
companies, so the companies as service providers can respond to the citizens’ need. PBG
further encourages quality standard by requiring the installed house connections to function
well for at least three months to be qualified for the grants. This arrangement improves
accountability of local governments to citizens, as the governments ensure certain standards.
- Sufficient information. Besides ensuring performance, verification of standards attainment
also provides an information base for governments, both local and central, e.g. about how
the water service is delivered, what problems there are, and how the service providers
perform. In PBG for drinking water, the verification is conducted by central governments
based on local governments’ request, and the request is based on the information on work
conducted by water supply companies. The availability of information will improve the
coordination between (1) local governments and their water supply companies, as the
companies perform the work on behalf of the governments, whose investments recovery
depends on the companies’ quality of work, and (2) local governments and the central
government, as coordinator of public services at the national level; constant communication
with local governments will help to identify problems and to formulate policies to address
them. The availability of information also encourages transparency and a mechanism for
check-and-balance, which fosters accountability.
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- Enforcing. PBG funds is transferred to local governments given all requirements are
satisfied. In PBG for drinking water, a house connection is considered satisfying
requirements if it has been functioning well for 3 months, confirmed by payments made by
customers to water supply companies. When this is verified, local governments’
pre-financed investments will be reimbursed through the grants’ transfer. The
conditionalities serve as a basis for accountability enforcement. Local governments need to
demonstrate accountability in delivering the services, otherwise they will lose the
opportunity to get their investments reimbursed.
7.2. PBG works by promoting incentives to stimulate desirable behavior: focus on
performance and accountability
Based on the research finding, it can be argued that fiscal capacity is not always the
reason for lack of investments in public sector in Indonesia. Investment is allocated in local
budgets enacted by local governments and local parliaments, signifying the political agreement
on how to make use of local budgets. It is a matter of choice: which sectors to be allocated more
funding are determined by the decision to make such sectors local priorities. While low fiscal
capacity can expose local governments to tighter budget constraints, allocation for additional
investment in certain public sectors is still possible as long as local governments prioritize the
sector while making budget decisions. Another indication that local governments may not
properly prioritize investments in public services can be observed in the structure of local
expenditures. The data shows that between 2007 and 2010, the percentage of salary
expenditures increased at the expense of almost all remaining expenditures, most notably capital
expenditures, signifying lower priority for investments.
The research argues that the main reason for this situation is incentives. When citizens’
demand is does not result in considerable consequence if it is not satisfied, incentives for local
governments to take action is low. For example, in the drinking water sector, most citizens still
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have access to alternative water sources like wells, rivers, or rain water. Because of this, the
citizens’ demand for piped water does not provide strong incentives for local governments to
provide piped water service, at least not as a service that requires immediate attention. As a
result, local governments withdraw from making investments in water supply companies to
expand piped water service.
The findings about local governments’ lack of investments despite sufficient financial
capacity, and the composition of local budgets with heavy emphasis on the administration of
local bureaucracy, suggest the importance of incentives to influence local governments’
decisions. As argued by Thomas (1998) in decision space approach, local governments’ choice
is influenced by incentives, local characteristics, and decision space. Decentralization brings
greater autonomy for local governments, providing greater decision space including in local
budget management. The challenge is to balance the decision space with the right incentives so
as not to encourage opportunistic behaviors, such as self-serving bureaucracy which neglects the
welfare of the citizens.
PBG incentivizes local governments to use their decision space for more focus on citizens’
welfare, which can be materialized, among other things, in increased investments in public
services. Research findings confirm that there’s an increase in Indonesian local governments’
investment levels after the implementation of PBG.
7.3. Local governments can adapt relatively well to PBG.
Compared to the input-based conditional grants DAK, PBG is relatively more demanding
in term of conditions to satisfy to be eligible for the grants. Monitoring is heavily enforced,
since access to funds is directly linked to the verification of results. PBG also requires
pre-financing, which means there’s risk on local governments’ side that the investment will cost
the local budget if they fail to satisfy PBG requirements.
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DAK for drinking water has been implemented since 2005, compared to PBG that is
relatively new–the first PBG project which started in 2010. Because of this, DAK system is
more familiar to local governments. As a new system, local governments are not yet familiar to
PBG. These factors may hinder local governments’ willingness to accept PBG, which may drive
their preference to DAK.
To understand how Indonesian local governments perceive PBG in comparison to DAK, a
survey was conducted among local governments who received PBG. In the survey, the
responses from respondents (local government officials) do not support the idea that for officials
DAK is preferable to PBG. Given the same projects and the same funding, 47% of respondents
prefer the funding to be allocated as PBG rather than DAK, 24% prefer DAK, and 29% show no
preference. Clarity in what to fund, how much, and how to verify the projects/activities
contributed to transparency and accountability, and eased the reporting process. Respondents
show concern, however, that the pre-financing requirement adds a burden to local budgets.
In general, survey results indicate that the respondents can adapt relatively well to the
PBG system. Compared to DAK, the respondents have no different perception on administrative
procedures and waiting time for funds transfers. The respondents, however, perceive PBG and
DAK differently in terms of administrative workload, with PBG being perceived to require less
workload than DAK.
7.4. Conclusion: What can be learned from Indonesian PBG for drinking water?
This research uses a conceptual framework (Figure 3.4) derived from accountability
relationships framework (Figure 3.3) developed by the World Bank (2004). The accountability
relationships framework suggests that accountability in public services can be achieved through
the short-route and the long-route of accountability. The short-route is normally the case for
public services in competitive markets, while the long route is for public services in a
monopolistic market. In the short-route of accountability, citizens can directly hold service
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providers accountable for the quality of the service. In the long-route, citizens usually don’t hold
the providers directly; instead they hold the governments accountable, then the governments
hold the providers accountable for the services.
The research conceptual framework focuses on the long-route of accountability. Under
ideal conditions, citizens’ demands for public services makes local governments work to ensure
that service providers deliver the demanded services. Incentives for local governments to do this
may come from, among others, the political process. Given an effective political system,
politicians in local governments will try to satisfy local preferences as to secure their electability
in the next election. For the same reason, politicians in parliaments will ensure that local
governments respond positively to citizens’ demands. And to cater to the citizens’ interests,
information on governments’ capacity to deliver services and how they actually deliver the
services is made publicly available, empowering citizens to control their governments.
Therefore, an effective political process will ensure, or at least will increase the probability of,
good public services to citizens.
However, in many developing countries, election results barely show local preferences.
The election results are most often based on personal, tribal, or political loyalty. Electoral
mandates are vague and inconsistent, available resources and promised expenditures are usually
mismatched, the elected officials often lack incentives to keep their promises, and bureaucracies
in subnational governments may have their own agendas to pursue (Prud’homme 1995). The
availability of information is not enough unless citizens have legal, political, and economic
means to press their demands against the governments (World Bank 2004). These factors,
among others, can cripple citizens’ demand to impact local governments’ accountability, thus
distracting the long-route of accountability.
Based on the findings, the research argues that pressure for local governments’
accountability can also originate from decentralization, by strategically incorporating incentives
in intergovernmental grants to encourage accountable behavior. Implementing PBG to promote
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incentives under a decentralization scheme can influence local governments’ behavior toward
better performance and improved accountability. In particular, incorporating incentives into
intergovernmental grants can be an option to stimulate local policies that directly benefit public
service delivery, especially when citizens’ demand is not strong enough to influence local
policies. This finding can contribute to the accountability relationships framework as an
alternative trigger for local governments’ accountability, in addition to citizens’ demand (voice).
7.5. Toward Future Directions
Despite its promising results, it should be noted that the effectiveness of PBG is subject to
pre-requisites. UNCDF (2010) suggests that PBG by itself is not a solution for all accountability
problems, and it is most useful and effective under certain conditions, e.g. solid analytical works,
involvement of key stakeholders in its design, and transparent and publicly disclosed
information. The research acknowledges these conditions and strongly recommends that, in
addition to PBG implementation, other aspects that support good governance should be
improved at the same time. For example, clarity in function assignments needs to be promoted
so as not to create confusion about who should do what and be responsible to whom.
The design of PBG also needs to be adjusted and perfected, and the implementation
procedures enhanced over time to accommodate the experience gained from previous PBG
projects. In the following sections, the research suggests alternative schemes for PBG
implementation and factors to consider in PBG allocation in a nation’s priority service areas.
a. Alternative scheme for PBG
In PBG for drinking water in Indonesia, the motivation to comply with all
requirements may be due, or partly due, to the pre-financing requirement. The requirement
makes local governments ‘pledge’ their budget as ‘collateral’ to the result of project
implementation. Knowing that the funds used for pre-financing can be lost in the case of
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incompliance, local governments are motivated to attain the standards so as to get the funds
reimbursed. This is beneficial from the viewpoints of accountability and performance
standard.
This requirement is rather strict as local budgets assume all pre-financing. In some
circumstances, it might be necessary to acknowledge that potential PBG recipients are
facing serious financial constraints which make them unable to assume full pre-financing.
For this reason, the research suggests that future PBG schemes can consider adapting
alternative approaches with less strict requirements such as:
- Partial pre-financing scheme.
In this scheme, a portion of PBG is transferred up-front to support pre-financing from
the local budget. The pre-financing portion will be reimbursed later if PBG
requirements are satisfied. This scheme also requires local governments to provide
‘collateral’, but less burdensome than the full pre-financing.
- Installment transfers scheme.
In this scheme, PBG is transferred in several installments. The first installment is
transferred up-front as working capital for a local government. The verification result of
the first installment will determine the local government’s eligibility for the second
installment, and so on. This scheme makes the local government ‘pledge’ the project
instead of  money from the local budget. Unless it complies with the PBG requirement,
the project is at risk of being unfunded and unfinished.
- Reward scheme.
This scheme does not require a contribution from the local budget; rather it offers a
reward if local governments can reach a certain achievement. No punishment is
imposed if the target is not reached. For example, rewards are given to a local
government whose region’s sanitation coverage improves by at least x%, or to local
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governments whose audited financial statements are unqualified, etc. The challenge for
this scheme is to determine indicators for such achievements.
b. Factors to consider in PBG allocation
The case on Indonesian intergovernmental grants provides an insight into how
carefully designed conditional grants can easily shift into equalizing grants, as in the case
of DAK. Although this can be justified as helping to reduce fiscal disparity, the resulting
absence of conditional grants’ role in intergovernmental grants system can have adverse
impact investment in public service. To correct this, the role of conditional grants needs to
be restored and improved.
Learning from Indonesia case, the research suggests that intergovernmental grants
need to be more focused on utilization, rather than mobilization, of financial resources.
Input-based grants put a lot of emphasis on financial resources mobilization by supplying
local governments with unconditional and conditional grants, but what the input would
become is of little interests in this instance. Central governments sometimes use an
allocation formula that is meticulously designed to ensure fairness in input allocation,
however without sufficient consideration on the result, the mobilization of input can have
distorted consequences and not in line with the grants’ original purpose.
Focus on performance rather than input is strongly encouraged to improve
accountability. Besides accountability, focus on performance also fosters local governments’
commitment to improve certain public service sectors. Also, conditional grants need to take
into account the readiness and willingness of local governments to receive the grants and
participate in the projects. In PBG, incentives are offered but at the same time so are the
consequences for failure. Therefore, local governments need to consider whether they are
willing to participate. In line with the spirit of decentralization, which upholds local
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autonomy, local governments should be given the liberty to use their autonomy to decide
whether to receive or not to receive certain grants from central governments.
In input-based conditional grants, allocation is made by central governments without
prior approval from local governments, signifying a top-down approach. Since PBG
requires strong commitment from local governments to comply with rather strict
requirements, local governments’ approval should be taken into account before PBG
allocation to each recipient. This approval is also necessary considering the punitive
mechanism that is implicitly embedded in PBG: failure in complying with PBG
requirements will results in delay, or even cancellation, of grants transfer. This consequence
needs to be well communicated to minimize negative reactions from local governments in
case they fail to fulfill the requirements.
Adopting PBG on a greater scale in any nation may require a lot of adjustments of
institutional arrangements, both in local and central bureaucracy. Since PBG requires
verification of a project’s implementation before transferring the funds, this system requires
strong policy support from the central government, in particular the sectoral ministry, to handle
the work and to cope with the pressure of making unpopular decision when local governments
perform below standards. Political will to enforce negative consequences needs to be present.
Further research in institutional arrangements, as well as political and social factors surrounding
PBG implementation, are strongly encouraged.
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QUESTIONNAIRE
Name : _______________________________________________________________________
Position : _______________________________________________________________________
Region : _______________________________________________________________________
Phone : _______________________________________________________________________
E-mail : _______________________________________________________________________
The questionnaire consists of 2 parts.
- Part 1 is Likert scale questions. 1 indicates strong disagreement, 5 indicates strong
agreement. Please circle a number according to your opinion.
- Part 2 is open questions. Please feel free to write down your opinion.
Part I
A. Water Service to Communities
1. Generally, water service coverage increased after
decentralization.
1    2    3    4    5
2. Generally, water service quality increased after
decentralization.
1    2    3    4    5
3. Current condition of water service has already
achieved local government’s expectation.
1    2    3    4    5
4. There’s a need for water service improvement for the
benefit of communities.
1    2    3    4    5
B. Funding Water Service
1. Water service is one of the priority sectors in local
budget allocation.
1    2    3    4    5
2. Funding from central government is the main source
of capital expenditure in water service.
1    2    3    4    5
3. Local budget can afford water service delivery
without support from central budget.
1    2 3    4    5
4. Additional funds from central government are
necessary to improve water service delivery.
1    2    3    4    5
5. Compared to DAK, PBG for drinking water involves
higher level of central government’s intervention.
1    2    3    4    5
Appendix
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C. DAK for Drinking Water
1. Administrative procedures are relatively simple. 1    2    3    4    5
2. Time required to reimburse the funds is relatively
short.
1    2    3    4    5
3. Additional workload is insignificant. 1    2    3    4    5
D. PBG for Drinking Water
1. Administrative procedures are relatively simple. 1    2    3    4    5
2. Time required to reimburse the funds is relatively
short.
1    2    3    4    5
3. Additional workload is insignificant. 1    2    3    4    5
Part 2
1. Assuming the same amount of funds and projects, would you prefer receiving funds
in the form of DAK or PBG? Why?
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
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2. If there is another PBG program in the future, would you recommend your local
government to participate? Why?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
3. Please write down your comments on the implementation of PBG for drinking water.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Date:___________________________
